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ART. I.—THE IDEA OF THE PARABLE.

THE New Testament parable—*παράβολον*, from *παρα*, to or against, and *βαλλω*, to throw, that is, to throw forward or against, to place one thing by the side of another—consists in bodying forth through language a supernatural truth in a natural fact, either actual or supposable. It is the peculiar union of the infinite and finite. The one is the substance, the other the form; the one is the spiritual meaning, the other the verbal expression. The one is a vast profound deep into which the reason may sink by the power of the Spirit, but which it can not fathom; the other a placid beautiful surface, indicating the mystery beneath by the varied rays of light which it reflects. To get an idea of the parable it is necessary, therefore, to apprehend both spheres of being; to stand in the element of the supernatural and invisible by faith, and at the same time to understand, in some measure at least, the natural and visible by means of reflection and study—to be in living sympathy with the spiritual meaning which it bears in itself on the one hand, and on the other, to know the nature of the outward form which its spiritual meaning assumes. As the outward form, however, is the medium through which the internal spiritual meaning addresses the faith and understanding of the Christian, it becomes in turn the medium through which the Christian may approach the internal spiritual meaning; the medium through which he may come to possess the

general idea common to all parables and the import also of any particular one.

We may distinguish two methods, now, according to which we may institute an enquiry into the nature of the parable. We may, as it were, take a position within; we may lay hold of the spiritual meaning in the light of the New Testament as a whole, and then from this point of observation proceed to unfold both the nature of the parable and its outward form. Or, we may take a position without; we may study the outward form as this appears in the natural fact, and through it approach the spiritual meaning which lies deep within. We can not regard either, however, taken by itself, as the true method. Nor is either by itself altogether possible. For the inward and the outward, matter and form, the meaning and the expression, are correlative. A true idea of the one is possible only in the light of the other. The principle, though apparently paradoxical, is actually operative every where. The soul and the body, though parts of one organic whole, are, nevertheless, very different both as to their attributes and functions; yet we can have no true conception of the human body without some idea of the human soul, and no true idea of the human soul without a conception of the human body. A knowledge of form always conditions a knowledge of its matter; and the reverse. A correct view of the parable can be obtained only by uniting the two methods. Still there is a difference of order. Taking a position within, and starting with the deep spiritual meaning of the parable, we may unfold its nature in the light of its outward form. Or, taking a position without, and carefully studying its outward form, we may get an idea of its nature in the light of its spiritual meaning. We propose to pursue the latter, as being the more natural and proper order of thought.

Approaching the general question, then, under this view, we may say that the parable, as to its form, is a figure of speech. The one is a species, the other the genus. To understand the nature of a species it is important to get a

clear idea of the genus. We shall, therefore, first institute a brief enquiry into the nature of a figure of speech.

The term *figure of speech* we shall use in a generic sense, reserving the words *metaphor* and *trope* to denote particular classes of figures. These, it is true, are also frequently employed as general terms, but we regard it as a more correct and consistent use of language to allow to them only a more limited or a *specific* signification.

A figure of speech is the expression of a conception or thought in improper language. A word may be said to be proper when, in any given case, it is the true form of the conception which it contains ; it is improper when it is not the true, but the assumed or imaginary, form of a conception or thought. A figure of speech is thus the expression of a conception in language which is not its true form, but the true form of some other conception to which it sustains some internal relation.

The basis of a figure is accordingly the internal relation which two things sustain to each other. An internal relation is objective ; it lies in and is determined by the nature of the things themselves ; and must be distinguished from an external relation, which is nothing more than a mechanical juxtaposition or a connection of two things brought about by an arbitrary imagination. An internal relation is of various kinds. It may be that of resemblance or contrast, of cause and effect, of ground and consequence, of a whole to its parts, or of a part to the whole, of the condition to the conditional, and the like. Here we find the general principle which determines the classification of figures. A figure belongs to one or the other class according to the nature of the relation upon which it is based.

Starting with this general principle it would be interesting and instructive to unfold a complete classification. But as we do not propose to write a treatise on figures of speech, but aim only at bringing out a definite idea of the parable, we shall limit our enquiry to that class which is based on the relation of resemblance—the class to which the parable belongs. It includes by far the most numerous, most important and beautiful figures.

A figure belonging to this class implies a comparison of two things which resemble each other. This resemblance, which is always assumed, is its principle. In every figure, accordingly, we have these two elements: a subject of discourse and an object of comparison, or, as they are sometimes called, a principal subject and a representative subject. The subject of discourse is supposed to be but imperfectly known—needs illustration or ornament; the object of comparison—that to which the subject is compared—is assumed to be well-known, and lends its light and beauty to the subject. The two things are held beside or against each other, the subject beside the object; and the one is thought and spoken of under the form of the other. The subject is seen in the reflected light of the object; or the subject may be said to put on the familiar and beautiful garments of the object. The object is like the sun which illumines a blade of grass and clothes it in living green; and the subject is in consequence seen more distinctly by the eye of the mind and looks more beautiful than if viewed in its own radiance. Or if it be desirable to degrade the subject, we clothe it in the filthy, tattered garments of some low, despicable object—a vagabond, a beggar, a convict, or any of the like—and we make it more despicable, or repulsive, or ludicrous, than it could be wearing its own dress, or than the object itself can be, whatever its native degradation.

This, then, is the general conception of a figure based on resemblance. It consists in the substitution of one thing for another—in taking, as the form of expression, the object which the subject resembles, instead of the subject itself. As this may be done in a variety of ways, we get a particular species for each essential variation in the mode of applying the general principle.

But before we proceed to unfold the nature of particular species of figures, we wish to add, in regard to the general principle of resemblance, that it is two-fold: it may be a resemblance of things—of the subject and object themselves; or a resemblance of relations, that is, the relation

of the subject to something else, is like the relation of the object to something else. The comparison on which the figure proceeds may be based on the one form of resemblance, or on the other, or on both together. If based on the mere resemblance of relations, or simple analogy, it excludes the resemblance of things. A figure implying only the former, can not, therefore, involve the latter. When Christ says: *I am the bread of life*, the expression rests on a mere resemblance of relations; the relation which bread sustains to the sustentation of natural life is like the relation which He sustains to the growth of spiritual life. Hence He calls Himself the true bread of which every man must eat in order to live. But it would be absurd to infer an implication of resemblance between Christ Himself and natural bread, or between the attributes of Christ and the properties of bread, in themselves considered. The reverse is true, however, when a figure is based on a resemblance of things; because a thing—an object—an act or transaction, necessarily involves, at the same time, the existence of various relations. Hence, when two things are like each other, it is true very often, that their relations are like each other also. A figure which rests on a resemblance of things does not, therefore, as a matter of course, exclude, but may include a resemblance of relations. It may, in fact, be based on both forms of resemblance.

In the latter case, the conception of one thing is expressed by language which is proper to another, because the two things themselves bear a resemblance to each other. In other words, the name of the object is substituted for the name of the subject, because subject and object resemble each other. In Luke 13: 32, our Lord calls Herod a *fox*, because the character of Herod bore a resemblance to the disposition of that cunning, crafty animal. Here we have an instance of what is properly a metaphor, or an exchange of verbal form.

In the former case, the conception of one thing—the subject of discourse, is expressed by a word which is the true form of another thing—the object of comparison—, because

the two things, or subject and object, are like each other in their relations; in other words, the name of the object is substituted for the name of the subject, because the relation which the one sustains to something else resembles the relation which the other sustains to something else. In John 10 : 9, our Lord says : *I am the door*, not because he bears any resemblance to a door as such, but because He sustains the same relation to the Kingdom of Heaven that a door does to a sheep-fold; He is the person through whom a sinner enters into the true Church and into Heaven. He uses the relation of a door to a fold, a common natural fact, as the form under which he communicates a profound spiritual truth.

There is no name for this particular species of figure. It is called indifferently a metaphor, a trope, or a figure. We should prefer calling it a *trope* to any thing else—a word whose etymology would fully justify such a restricted use, and which could easily be spared for this purpose without any loss to the language. Indeed such an application would facilitate the study of figures; for some of the best English writers unfortunately use *metaphor* and *trope*, *metaphorical* and *tropical*, as synonymous and interchangeable terms. In consequence we have different terms which we apply loosely to the same thing, and different things to which we apply the same term. Yet the distinction between a resemblance of things and a resemblance of relations is always important, and especially in the interpretation of the figurative language of the Sacred Scriptures. For the distinction must be borne in mind in the study of the allegory or parable, as well as in that of the metaphor or trope.

Here, then, we have a two-fold principle of resemblance which lies at the foundation of that whole class of figures which we are considering. As stated already, we get as many different figures as there are really different ways in which this two-fold principle may be applied; the metaphor or trope, the comparison, the prosopopeia, the parable, the myth, the allegory, the fable, and many others:

terms, however, all of which are frequently used without much precision ; some are even sometimes exchanged for each other, although none of them are properly convertible; for each denotes a species of figurative language which is really different from the rest. We shall confine ourselves to an analysis of those only which will assist us in getting a distinct idea of the parable.

We have already referred to the *metaphor*, *μεταφορα*, from *μετα*, *over*, and *φερω*, *to carry*. Resting on a resemblance of things, it substitutes the name of the object for that of the subject. This is not done in the parable. The parable, like every other figure, implies a subject of discourse and an object of comparison ; and, like the metaphor, may rest on a resemblance of things, or, like the trope, on a resemblance of relations; or it may rest on both forms of resemblance. But it always differs from a mere metaphor in this, that it keeps subject and object asunder grammatically, and simply deals in a more or less complete description or statement of the object in language appropriately belonging to it. The metaphor, on the contrary, unites subject and object grammatically, applying the name of the latter to the former. Instead of describing the object, it describes the subject, but in language appropriate to the object.

The three parables in St. John form an exception, because they are not pure, but are rather a mixture of metaphor and parable. The principal subject is, at the same time, the grammatical subject, whilst the predicate is expressed under the form of the object or representative subject. In this respect they partake of the nature of a metaphor. Vid. John 15: 1, 2, et seq. But as these figures proceed to describe the object with more or less completeness in language appropriately belonging to it, and thus illustrate the nature and relations of the principal subject, they partake also of the nature of the parable. It may be correct, therefore, to apply to them the name of *parable*, as the last characteristic seems to be most prominent ; but it does not follow from such application of the name that the metaphor relation of subject and object belongs to its essential nature.

The parable differs also from formal *comparison*. Comparison states or traces the resemblance formally between subject and object. It holds up the subject distinctly and lets the light of the object fall directly upon it, that it may be seen and admired in the reflected glory. The parable may also indicate the resemblance at certain points; but this is not essential. It may even not in any way intimate the existence of any resemblance, but simply narrate an event, or state a fact, without alluding to the real subject of discourse. It may deal altogether with the object, and not hint in a formal way in what sense the narrative is to be understood.

In this respect the parable resembles the *allegory*, though specifically different. The allegory—from *allos* and *αγορεύω*, to say one thing and mean another—keeps the principal subject entirely out of view and deals exclusively with the object of comparison. It is thus a statement or description of something under a borrowed form. The borrowed form is, however, not always purely such; for the attributes of the thing signified may, to a certain extent, mingle with or penetrate the attributes of the thing signifying, and thus modify and even distort the borrowed form. In other words, the object may appear with some attributes and under circumstances which are more appropriate to the subject than to it. As a consequence, the true sense and application of the allegory are indicated as the allegory advances, and may appear fully when it is complete, although the subject itself, or the thing signified, has not been mentioned. As a specimen we quote Psalm 80: 8-15, than which there is none more beautiful, rich and perfect to be found any where;* "Thou hast brought a vine out of Egypt: thou hast cast out the heathen, and planted it. Thou preparedst room before it, and didst cause it to take deep root, and it filled the land. The hills were covered with the shadow of it, and the boughs thereof were like the goodly cedars. She sent out her boughs into the sea, and her

Compare Isa. 5: 2-6.

branches unto the river. Why hast thou then broken down her hedges, so that all they which pass by the way do pluck her? The boar out of the wood doth waste it, and the wild beast of the field doth devour it. Return we beseech thee, O God of hosts: look down from heaven, and behold, and visit this vine; and the vineyard which thy right hand hath planted, and the branch which thou madest strong for thyself." This clearly illustrates the chief characteristics of the allegory as to the relation of subject and object, and the mingling of attributes. The principal subject is not mentioned at all; the object alone is described; but the description is of a somewhat mixed character. In the words: "She sent out her boughs unto the sea, and her branches unto the river," we see the attributes of the subject, the Jewish nation, the chosen people of God, almost displacing the proper attributes of the object, the vine.

The parable may also, it is true, keep the principal subject out of view and deal exclusively with the object of comparison. Compare the Prodigal Son, the Lost Sheep or the Sower. But it does not allow the attributes of the thing signified to penetrate and modify the attributes of the thing signifying. The borrowed form is such purely; that is, the object, or representative subject, is described with attributes and under circumstances which are altogether natural and proper. Were the parable of the Prodigal Son intended to be nothing more than the narrative of an actual historical fact, the language from beginning to end could not be more natural and proper than it is as constituting one of the most perfect, profound and comprehensive parables of our Lord. To render this point of difference evident, it is only necessary to compare this parable, for example, or that of the good Samaritan, with the allegory of the vine just quoted.

Besides, the allegory may introduce fanciful or arbitrary persons in the place of those which really belong to the object, or it may ascribe imaginary characteristics to real

persons, and cause them to occupy unnatural relations.* The parable always deals with the actual world as it is. It introduces such persons and things, and such only, as really belong to the object, and introduces them in natural relations and under natural circumstances. The form of the parable is throughout entirely consistent with itself.

But the principal difference lies deeper. The subject of the allegory, that is, the thing signified, is always the human under some one of its manifold aspects; a human judgment, human hope and fear, a human state, human conduct, a human idea of the divine and eternal, or a view of religion projected by unaided reason. Hence it is a marked feature in the productions of oriental nations, being the form under which their notions of God, of religion, the relation of God to man and of man to God, take outward shape and gain expression. But they have no parable in the New Testament sense. The subject of the beautiful allegory of the vine in the 80th Psalm, is the Jews viewed as the chosen people of God; not, however, simply as they are in view of the special interposition and favor of God; in this respect the divine plan was steadily unfolded with unerring certainty; but viewed as they became in consequence of their natural character and conduct; it is not the divine but the human side of the Jewish economy which constitutes the prominent aspect of the thing signified. The vine is Israel transferred to Canaan, prospering and extending, and then apparently destroyed in consequence of transgression. The resemblance, accordingly, on which the allegory rests is that which holds between man and the animal, man and the vegetable, between man in one relation of life and man in another, or between his own idea of supernatural things and his conceptions of the natural world.† But the subject of the parable is the supernatural,

* Crabb's Synonyms, p. 532.

† Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* is very properly called an allegory, not a parable, metaphor or myth. The subject is the life of the Christian; his awakening, conversion, trials, conflicts, perseverance, death and final triumph. This is not the supernatural or divine, but the human; the human as

the divine, the heavenly. The human may indeed come into view also and even prominently, but in its subordinate relation to the divine, whilst the allegory holds the divine relatively in subordinate relation to the human.

Or, we may say, in the parable the principal subject is always something connected with the Kingdom of Heaven, the Church, or some truth of supernatural revelation. This fact or truth may pertain directly to the fall, condition, wants or destiny of man; hence man comes into view with more or less prominence as a matter of course. See, for example, the parable of the Importunate Widow, or of the Pharisee and Publican. The resemblance, accordingly, on which the parable rests is that which holds between God and man, the supernatural and natural, between the Kingdom of Heaven and the kingdom of nature, or between the grace of God affecting and determining the life of man and some actual or possible event in the natural world. The reverse thus of the allegory. The allegory exhibits man or a human conception of the divine; the parable exhibits God, or some truth made known by divine revelation. Both take their outward form from nature as the object of comparison; but the one uses the natural in a somewhat unnatural way, whilst the other takes the natural in a natural way and fills it out with divine truth—spiritual realities.*

influenced, determined and unfolded by divine grace. The divine comes thus into view unavoidably, not as a prominent theme, however, but only as operating upon the human, whilst the human is throughout the principal subject. The allegory illustrates Bunyan's view of a man who is a true follower of Jesus Christ; and in consequence also the subjective side of Christianity.

* The allegory as a figure of speech is only one species of allegory. An allegory may also be a painting, a piece of sculpture, or some architectural work. Or it may lie in persons. Persons in the Old Testament, for example, may be at the same time both real and allegorical; that is, they may represent not only themselves as they are, but also something else which they are not. In this sense the Apostle Paul refers to Hagar and Sarah, Gal. 4: 24: *which things are an allegory*, 'Α τινὰ εἶναι ἀλληγορούμενα; (rendered by Robinson: "which things are allegorized, spoken allegorically, i. e., may be taken or used as an allegory." Lex. N. T., p. 33.); that is, the history is of an allegorical nature; it signifies something different from the literal facts; Hagar representing the ceremonial dispensation instituted on Mount Sinai, and Sarah, the free Gospel. Yet these different species of allegory are all intrinsically the same: one thing is held up to view, and another thing is signified.

A myth—*μῦθος*, word, speech, or discourse,—also implies the expression of some moral or religious truth or idea under a borrowed form. But the borrowed form becomes, as it were, the body of the truth. The truth and the improper form are completely blended, or merged, the one in the other; the improper form appears as the proper form; and that which is in reality only the representative subject is taken for the principal subject. In other words, all sense of distinction between subject and object, or between principal subject and representative subject, is lost altogether; and the myth, though as to form but a figure, stands out as a historical fact. A succeeding age may discover the idea concealed in the apparently historical fact, and separate the one from the other—may distinguish between matter and form. Accordingly we call the reputed facts relating to the gods of the Greeks and Romans—their birth, parentage, and achievements—*myths*, and their whole system of religion a *mythology*. Rationalists and infidels, apply the same name to the Mosaic account of the creation. And Strauss turns the life of Christ, his incarnation, miracles, sufferings and death, as recorded in the Gospels, into a myth. Whilst the narratives recorded in the books of Moses and the Gospels, are to all appearance veritable facts, they are held to be nothing more than forms of the imagination with which certain ideas have become so entirely identified that the difference between the original idea and the borrowed form is no longer perceived, the borrowed form being itself taken for the original idea.

In the parable, however, subject and object, the true meaning and the outward form, are kept entirely separate. Whilst they are internally connected, the subject being seen through the medium of the object, the one is not merged into the other. The object is not taken for the subject. Even though the import of the parable be not understood, the object is seen to be but the borrowed form of some spiritual truth, the literal historical sense of the narrative never being identified with the true meaning. And should a mistaken judgment regard the literal mean-

ing of the narrative as the only true meaning, it would still so far forth at least be in possession of the truth; for the object is either an actual or supposable natural event. The parable is the real in the sphere of nature taken as the form of the real in the sphere of spirit. On the contrary, the object, or representative subject, of the myth in which its true meaning is embodied, though seemingly a historical fact, is not such really, nor is it supposable as an actual event, but is the product of the imagination projected into outward shape.

The *fable* belongs to the same class of figures, but occupies a place and subserves a purpose of its own. It is a narrative in which the principal actors are men actuated by considerations of worldly wisdom, or animals or plants endowed with the power of thought and speech. Its design is to illustrate and enforce some truth of human reason, or some lesson of prudence. A natural truth is represented in a fictitious narrative.

The parable differs very widely from the fable, both as to matter and form. The parable clothes a divine truth in a legitimate earthly form; the fable clothes a moral lesson or a human notion in an earthly form, and permits the earthly form to be either legitimate or arbitrary. The parable illustrates a truth belonging to the kingdom of grace by a fact belonging to the kingdom of nature. The fable belongs to the kingdom of nature under every aspect; generally illustrating some truth relating to man by an imaginary event occurring in the animal or vegetable kingdom; it illustrates a higher by a lower order of nature.

In the parable, the object or representative subject belongs to the human kingdom; if the animal or the vegetable is introduced either by itself or in connection with man, it is done according to its real nature and relations; the animal never appears with human attributes or under any factitious circumstances. In the fable the animal or vegetable is introduced as possessing a mixed nature, partly its own and partly human, and under artificial circumstances; if men are introduced they do not manifest the presence

and influence of any supernatural agency, but speak and act according to the dictates of their natural judgment; or if imaginary deities have a place in the narrative their intervention is subordinated to earthly ends, to the illustration of lessons of human wisdom. Both as to matter and form, therefore, the parable is always the truth—the higher truth in the lower truth; but the matter of the fable is nothing more than the judgment of man, which may be false or true, and the form is not a legitimate but an arbitrary and fictitious transaction.

The parable, accordingly, is freely used as a medium of instruction by Him who spake as never man spake. Prophets use the metaphor, the comparison and similitude, the allegory, the proverb and other species of figures, but it is a remarkable fact that they do not introduce a perfect parable.* The prophet Ezekiel introduces a figure of speech which is an approximation to the parable (Ez. 17: 2 and 29: 3); but it must be regarded at most as belonging to an inferior class, and as sustaining a relation of subordination to the New Testament parable like that which the old dispensation itself sustains to the new; other figures, however, are as beautiful and perfect in the Old as in the New Testament. The word occurs also in our English translation of many other passages of the Old Testament,† but in a different sense, sometimes as synonymous with discourse or message, and at others as equivalent to illustration, metaphor or proverb. Yet as applied to any improper form of speech, it bears a faint resemblance to its peculiar nature as fully developed in the New Testament.

Perhaps it is more remarkable still that the Apostles, with the example of Christ before them, and enjoying the fullest revelation of divine things, do not employ the parable as a form of communication; not even John, who lived in most intimate fellowship and communion with our Lord.

* Robinson remarks: "This is a favorite mode of oriental teaching, and was much employed by our Saviour; so often in the first three Gospels, but not elsewhere in the New Testament." *Lex. N. T.*, p. 546.

† Numbers 28: 7, 18; 24: 3, 15, 20. Job 27: 1; 29: 1. Ps. 49: 4; 78: 2. Pr. 26: 7, 9.

The Acts of the Apostles, and especially the Epistles and the Apocalypse, abound with various rich and pertinent figures, but of this one we find no trace, not even in the discourses of Peter and Paul as reported by Luke in the Acts.

It was reserved for Him, who unites and harmonizes in his person the divine and the human, the infinite and the finite, the supernatural and the natural, and therefore comprehends and fathoms the supernatural and eternal in all its mysterious relations to the natural and temporal, and knows the origin, being and operation of the natural in its reciprocal relations to the supernatural—it was reserved for Him to exhibit the infinite fulness of the one in the outward finite form of the other with inimitable beauty and power, giving to the human and natural a depth and wealth of divine and spiritual meaning, which the Christian may approach, and into which he may sink, and bring forth as from an ocean many precious pearls, but which in the ages to come he will never be able fully to explore and exhaust.

The fable, on the other hand, is nowhere honored as the vehicle of divine revelation. No instance occurs in the New Testament at all, and but two, strictly speaking, but one complete one, in the Old. The complete fable is found in Judges 9: 8-15: "The trees went forth on a time to anoint a king over them, and they said unto the olive tree, Reign thou over us. But the olive tree said unto them, Should I leave my fatness, wherewith by me they honor God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said the trees to the fig-tree, Come thou and reign over us. But the fig-tree said unto them, Should I forsake my sweetness, and good fruit, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said the trees unto the vine, Come thou and reign over us. And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my vine, which cheereth God and man and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire

come out of the bramble and devour the cedars of Lebanon." The other is in 2 Kings 14: 9: "And Jehoash the king of Israel sent to Amaziah, king of Judah, saying, The thistle that was in Lebanon sent to the cedar that was in Lebanon, saying, Give thy daughter to my son to wife: and there passed by a wild beast that was in Lebanon, and trode down the thistle." These are the only instances in the sacred Scriptures; we have, therefore, quoted them entire. In the one case, Jotham, the surviving son of Gideon, the late king of Israel, sixty-nine of whose sons had been inhumanly slaughtered at Ophrah by Abimelech in order to usurp the throne, reproves the men of Shechem for their ingratitude to his father, and illustrates the folly of their conduct in making Abimelech king. In the other, Jehoash, king of Israel, to whom Amaziah king of Judah, elated by his recent victory over Edom, had sent messengers, saying, "Come let us look one another in the face," would teach him the folly of meddling to his hurt with a man who was greatly his superior. Both teach a moral lesson. There is a sense indeed in which these fables constitute a part of divine revelation, but there is another and a higher sense in which they do not. They constitute a part of sacred history, and serve to illustrate the spirit and character of particular men and particular times; but they are not the form under which an inspired prophet communicates the will of God to man. They help to bring out the human side of sacred history, but do not reveal the presence and power of the divine. In this respect, these fables are to be classed with the account of the cunning of Rebecca, the duplicity of Abraham in his conduct towards Abimelech, king of Gerar, and many other facts recorded in the Sacred Scriptures, which illustrate human character or the workings of sin, but are not, properly speaking, a revelation of the divine will.

We will yet endeavor to draw the line of distinction between the parable and the *proverb*. Derived from *pro* and *verbum*, the proverb signifies a word or a few words in common use, which are taken, instead of a full statement, to

convey a wide and comprehensive sense. Or, it may be said to be a sententious saying. Sometimes it is a particular proposition, stated either in proper or figurative language, and embodying a general meaning, that is, a meaning which is held to be common to all the particular cases arising under a given head. Though the word is not always used in the same sense, there is a general idea which it embodies in every instance, distinguishing it from every other peculiar form of verbal expression, namely: Much meaning in a few current words. The meaning may be true or false;* it may be a lesson of human or divine wisdom—"apples of gold in pictures of silver;" or it may be a current error passing for a truth. The meaning, if true, may have been ascertained by experience and observation or through the elevating influences of the Holy Spirit.

The difference of a proverb from a parable is evident. As to form, the parable is not a current sententious saying; it is the narration of an actual or possible natural event. Nor is it a particular proposition involving a general idea. The parable does indeed teach a general truth; but a general truth belonging to the sphere of the spirit, which is exhibited in an analogous fact belonging to the sphere of matter. A lower order of life is used to reveal a higher order of life. As to its substance, the parable always contains a spiritual *truth*, never an *error*. A proverb may be good or bad, wise or foolish; but the New Testament parable leaves no room for the distinction. To sum up the whole, we may say, the essence of a proverb consists in a few words or a short expression obtaining currency as the embodiment of a comprehensive sense, without respect to the nature of the sense as true or false; whilst the essence of the parable consists in the narration of a natural fact exhibiting the nature and relations of a supernatural or spiritual truth.

* Webster's definition is not accurate: "A short sentence often repeated, expressing a well-known truth or common fact, ascertained by experience or observation." The truth or falsity of a proverb is not essential, but altogether accidental, to its nature as such.

The idea of the New Testament parable, which we have thus endeavored to unfold, we conceive to be its true idea, viewed as a particular figure of speech in contradistinction from the metaphor, the comparison, the allegory, the myth, the fable, and the proverb. We do not wish to imply, however, that the word is always used in its specific sense in the New Testament. Like nearly every other word, it is used in various senses. Sometimes it has a much more general signification, comprehending the comparison or simile, and the proverb, as well as the particular figure which we call a *parable*. For example, it is said: And without a parable—*χωρις παραβολη*—spake he not unto them. (Matth. 13 : 34.) Here the word *παραβολη* must be taken to include all forms of figurative language which our Saviour adopted in imparting instruction to the people. We refer also to the use of the word in the thirty-fifth verse : "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables, *εν παραβολαις*; I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world." The passage quoted by Matthew is taken from Ps. 78 : 2, where the Hebrew word, rendered by *parable*, is *MASHAL*, meaning according to Gesenius, *similitude*, *sententious saying*, *apothegm*, then *proverb*, and finally a *poem* or *song* ; it is also the general title given to the Proverbs of Solomon. This illustrates the wide sense in which the word *parable* is employed by Matthew. In Luke 4 : 23, it is used directly as synonymous with *proverb* : "And he said unto them, Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, *την παραβολην ταυτην*, Physician heal thyself." Our Saviour makes use of the well-known proverb : *Physician heal thyself*, but calls it *παραβολη*, which our translators have correctly rendered into English by the word *proverb* ; for it is to such a sententious saying particularly that we apply the name of proverb, not of parable. But the use of *παραβολη* instead of *παροιμια*, the proper Greek word for *proverb*, shows plainly that the word has not only a general sense as comprehending various forms of figurative language, but that in its application to a particular species of figure it is

employed as a convertible term. Taken as a particular word it is applicable to different things. In this respect, however, the word is like many others, whether in the Greek or English language, which are employed in a general or comprehensive sense, and are, at the same time, susceptible of application to different particulars.

Apart now from the general sense of the word *parable*, and its susceptibility of commutation with other words, it has a sense which is peculiarly its own. It is the proper name for a specific figure of speech. As such we have aimed at developing its meaning in distinction from various other figures to which it is allied.

What we hold to be the specific idea of the parable is not to be found accordingly in every figurative form of speech to which the name is applied in the Gospels; but only in a particular class of figures. To this class belong the Sower, the Tares, the Mustard Seed, the Net, the Good Samaritan, the Pharisee and Publican, the Prodigal Son, and many others recorded by Matthew, Mark and Luke. These are parables in the specific sense of the word. And it is in the study of these, and all of this class, that we have sought to unfold the true idea of the New Testament parable. "It is remarkable that in St. John there are only three passages approaching to parables, which yet essentially differ from those of the other gospels. For the three instances are those in which our Lord compares Himself to a door and a vine; and where He describes Himself as the Good Shepherd. In no other parable is He one term of the comparison: and we may say, without danger of error, that these three comparisons of Himself to other objects ought hardly to be called parables. At any rate they form a separate class."*

In unfolding the true idea of the New Testament para-

* *Essays on Various Subjects by Cardinal Wiseman*, Vol. I, p. 160. The scope of the Essay on Parables is to show that no believer in Christ is in a position to understand them properly but a Roman Catholic. Though such a narrow view involves the author in many gratuitous assumptions against Protestantism, the Treatise is, nevertheless, an able and interesting discussion of the general subject.

ble in distinction from other figures, one fundamental point has all along been assumed. As the class of figures to which the parable belongs is based on the relation of resemblance, it has been assumed that the parable is based on the same relation—on the resemblance between the natural and the supernatural, between the human and the divine, the earthly and the heavenly. An important question which now arises is, whether such an assumption is correct. Is there an analogy between the order of nature and the order of grace? or, if it be admitted that such analogy is conceivable, is it real? Does such analogy exist only in the minds of men, or is it an objective verity? Our answer is implied in the position we have taken as to the nature of the parable. We must hold that the analogy is not a mere accommodation to the ignorance and prejudices of the people. It did not lie simply in the mind of Jesus Christ. It was not assumed for the time being as a convenient medium of instruction. But the analogy is real and objective. Nature in her whole organization is the image of that order of life which lies above and beyond it.

That this position is necessarily true could be established by a philosophical argument starting with the scriptural idea of creation, and negating on the one hand the eternity of matter, and on the other the pantheistic theory of emanation. It can be established also by a scientific enquiry into the relation which the lower forms of inorganic nature sustain to the higher forms of organic nature, and into the relation which the whole irrational creation sustains to the human reason. Nature unfolds herself, as it were, in circles, each higher one being both a repetition and a fuller manifestation of what is essential to the lower; so that each one to be rightly known must be studied both by itself and by comparison with another. The process culminates in the human reason, which though generically different is nevertheless the mirror which reflects all subordinate orders of creation. Its laws of thinking correspond to the laws of being in every

knowable object. Hence the vegetable kingdom, for example, is properly apprehended according to the laws of reason, and we get a science; and the vegetable kingdom in turn serves as a true illustration of the nature and laws of reason. For the one is analogous to the other. To say now that the kingdom of nature is analogous to the kingdom of Heaven is only a completion of this ascending process of reflection. Man is created in the likeness of God, capable of knowing, loving and adoring Him. In the nature of the case, the finite, created reason must apprehend the self-existent, infinite Creator according to its own forms of thought. This implies a correspondence of the laws of thinking to the nature and relations of the spiritual world. Thus we have a correspondence of the reason to objects in two directions—to a descending series of objects until we reach the lowest forms of inorganic matter, and to an ascending series of objects until we reach the personal, absolute Creator Himself. If, now, the laws of the material world correspond to the laws of thinking, so that the irrational may serve as a valid illustration of the rational; and if the laws of thinking correspond to the nature and relations of the Godhead, so that the created reason may obtain, though an imperfect, yet a true knowledge of the infinite Creator, it must follow that the natural world, including both the rational and the irrational creature, corresponds to the supernatural world, or that there is a real analogy between the two, in virtue of which the one becomes the true image of the other.

But we may reach the same conclusion in a more direct way. The nature and design of the parable itself implies such a true analogy. Our Lord used the parable as the medium of revealing and communicating divine, spiritual truth to the people. The people were taught to receive the truth concerning the person and work of Christ, the relation of God to man and of man to God, the way of salvation from sin and death by entering the kingdom of Heaven, as well as the state of man, whether good or evil, beyond the grave, under an imagery drawn both from human society and

from every department of nature. He held up to their view the supernatural and divine in the form of the natural and human; not only to the view of the disciples and the Jews but to the view of the Church in all ages. The Great Teacher, Himself the fullest revelation of God in man, causes the whole Church, to the end of time, to look at the one *in the light* of the other. This necessarily implies, not indeed an external, but an internal resemblance—a real analogy. Otherwise the light in which he teaches us to look at the supernatural would be false instead of true—would be a discoloration instead of an illustration; and the parable instead of being an exhibition would be a distortion of the truth.

A closer examination will afford us more direct evidence still. In a number of instances our Saviour says plainly that the kingdom of heaven is *like* certain natural events. "The kingdom of heaven is *likened* unto a man which sowed good seed in his field." (Matth. 13: 24.) "The kingdom of heaven is *like* to a grain of mustard seed." (v. 31.) "The kingdom of heaven is *like* unto leaven." (v. 33.) "The kingdom of heaven is *like* unto treasure hid in a field." (v. 44.) "The kingdom of heaven is *like* unto a merchantman." (v. 45.) "The kingdom of heaven is *like* unto a net." (v. 47.) Compare also Luke 13: 18-21. These instances may suffice. The Greek words translated *like* and *likened* are of course *ὅμοιος* *like, similar, resembling*, and the verb, *ὁμοιωω*, *to make like, to resemble, to assimilate*. Hence we learn that the nature and design of the parable does not only necessarily imply an analogy, but that in the introduction to many of His parables, our Saviour says in almost so many words that the kingdom of grace does resemble the kingdom of nature; and then selects a fact in the sphere of the one in order by it to teach a corresponding fact in the sphere of the other.

This view completes the idea of the parable. It is an earthen vase containing the ripe fruit of Heaven. It is a cup of gold putting the water of eternal life to our lips. The inward substance is spiritual and divine, but the out-

ward form is of the earth. This is true in a certain sense of the language of the Old and New Testament in general. It is the will and truth of God in the language of man. Infinite thoughts in finite forms. But the parable may be regarded as the culminating point, the flower, of the language of the Scriptures. The tree of revelation had been growing in the garden of the Lord for a period of four thousand years, putting forth leaves and branches and twigs, and giving promise of something better that was to come ; at length it blooms in the fulness of time ; and the beautiful flowers, that now cover its branches, taking up and unfolding the deepest sense of all language, exhibit the unsearchable riches of spiritual truth in an outward texture of nicest finish, in most wonderful accuracy and delicacy of outline, and in the greatest variety and brilliancy of color.

The idea of the parable is the key to its interpretation. But this branch of the subject we propose to consider in a subsequent article.

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ART. II.—HODGE ON THE EPHESIANS.

SECOND ARTICLE.

IN resuming this subject, it seems proper to bring into view again, in the way of brief recapitulation, the leading topics or heads of argument discussed in our previous article.

The New Testament Epistles in general proceed throughout on the supposition of two different sides in Christianity, which, to a certain extent, oppose each other, and yet are quietly presumed always to be equally essential to its true constitution. In one direction all stress is laid upon its supernatural distinction, the fulness of divine grace which is comprehended in it for the salvation of its subjects. In virtue of this, they are represented as having a present interest in the privileges of Christ's redemption, which sets them high above the common level of human existence, and involves for them potentially all that is required in order to everlasting life. All the blessings of the new creation in Christ Jesus are regarded as already theirs, with a form of real possibility, such as we have no right to conceive of as existing for the world in any other circumstances, or under any different view. This is one aspect of the case. In another direction, however, we are met with such a representation of the simply human and earthly side of the same Christian state, as seems at times completely to obscure the glory of the other conception, and to bring all down again to the range of the most common every day experience. The powers and possibilities of a higher world, are found to be strangely at the mercy of the sins and frailties of the present world. The opportunities of grace show themselves as liable to be neglected, frustrated, or abused, as the corresponding opportunities of nature. Thus it is, that heavenly and earthly, divine and human, move hand

in hand together throughout the whole economy of the Gospel, as it is here offered to our contemplation. So in the case of the Epistles of the New Testament generally; and so particularly, we may say, in the case of this Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians. It is palpably constructed on such a double or twofold view of Christianity, from beginning to end.

This being the case, it follows that no theological system or scheme can be relied upon as sufficient here for the purposes of exposition, which either fails to recognize at all the true and proper structure of the Epistle in this view, or brings with it no power to do fair and full justice to both sides alike of the peculiar hypothesis on which it is thus found to rest. The solution must answer to the nature of the problem, which requires to be solved. The key must agree with the wards and turns of the lock it is employed to open. The commentary must be as wide as the text it pretends to explain, meeting its requirements with equal readiness and ease all round, and satisfying them in a natural and harmonious way.

From the nature of the subject, there is room thus for exposition to become false and inadequate here in two general ways. The simply human and earthly side of Christianity may be allowed to throw into the shade entirely its proper supernatural significance and force; or the wrong may be reversed, by making all of this latter interest, at the cost of what rightly belongs to the first. In either case, we shall have an imperfect onesided theory of religion, that can never answer to unfold the full meaning of the sacred text. These two kinds of theological obliquity may be characterized by the terms Arminian and Calvinistic, as serving at once to express their general bearing.

The Arminian tendency makes no earnest account of the supernatural side of Christianity, the order of grace as distinguished from the order of nature. It confesses indeed the presence of the supernatural in its own way; but under the view only of such a relation to the constitution of nature as virtually resolves it into a mere abstraction, belong-

ing properly at last to the life of nature itself. No room is left thus for the conception of another economy, different from mere nature, above it, and yet joined with it in the way of inward lasting union, in the bosom of which the powers of salvation are to be regarded as permanently comprehended, under a form not known in the whole world besides. The distinction between the Church and the world on the outside of the Church, loses thus all proper reality, and resolves itself into a simple word or name.

Such a scheme can have no power of course to do justice to the double aspect, under which Christianity exhibits itself to our view in the Epistles of the New Testament; and it is very easy, accordingly, to convict of palpable and gross failure any Commentary, which may pretend to expound these Epistles by its aid.

The opposite Calvinistic tendency, however, is not for this reason any more worthy of regard or trust, in the same exegetical view. It affects to do justice to the strong terms in which the supernatural side of Christianity is spoken of; but in doing so, it wrongs its proper natural or human side. The work of redemption is taken to be, not for the human race, as such, but for a certain portion of the race elected from all eternity to such distinction; and in this view it is regarded as the irresistible execution or carrying out of God's decree for this purpose, in favor of those who are thus predestinated to everlasting glory. In this way, the transaction of salvation is not so much a real historical process in the world itself, as the playing into it rather of supernatural forces, which are supposed to be at work above and beyond it, and yet come not really to any true union with its proper life. Whatever of human activity may seem to be concerned in it, must be considered as phenomenal more than actual and real, the mechanical echo or reflection simply of the divine activity that sets all in motion from behind the scenes. The two worlds thus come to no organic conjunction. There is no bridging over really of the deep chasm which lies between them. Natural and supernatural, human and divine, are held apart for

the imagination, so as to exclude entirely the conception of any intervention, serving to mediate between them, and having power to bring them together in a real and constant way. It is taken for granted, that the action of the higher world upon the lower can be direct only, reaching over into this last under its own natural constitution, immediately and at once, without the help of any other constitution whatever. So we lose again the true idea of the Church; and for the conception of grace in its legitimate character, we are put off with what seems to be too often little better than the notion of magic.

This Calvinistic theory rules the thinking of Dr. Hodge. His Commentary on the Ephesians lives, moves, and has its being in it, from the first page to the last. It is an attempt throughout, to construct the sense of the Epistle according to this scheme. He does not extract his scheme, in the first place, from the text. It can hardly be said, that he pretends to do any thing like that. Most clearly, he brings it along with him to his work, as something already settled and fixed. The Calvinistic theology is to his mind one and the same thing with the doctrine of the Gospel; how may it be imagined then that St. Paul, rightly interpreted, should fail to agree with it in any of his Epistles? Thus it is, that the scheme, as an established preconception, is allowed to anticipate and forestall for the thoughts of the Commentator the general meaning of his text, and goes before him shaping the exposition of it everywhere into conformity with its own requirements. It is presumed, that St. Paul had in his mind exactly the same view of religion that is embodied in the writings of Calvin; that he was familiar with the same theological positions and distinctions; and that these, as a matter of course, were continually before him when he penned his Epistles; so that they must be considered to furnish now also the only key by which they can be properly understood or explained. The Commentary before us is a vigorous trial of this exegetical rule upon the Epistle to the Ephesians. The author shows himself in general true to his system through-

out; not shrinking to follow it out, as it would seem, even to the full length of supralapsarianism itself. The principle of the whole process of redemption is taken to be God's decree of election, in favor of a definite number of persons ordained from all eternity to salvation. Under such view, the process can have no reference really to those who are beyond the range of this decree. It carries with it the certainty of salvation for the elect, but includes no possibility of salvation, no actual provision of grace in order to salvation, for any others. All the arrangements of grace are at once bounded and circumscribed by the measure of the decree in whose service they stand, and can never have any force truly beyond the range of operation with which it is carried forward invincibly to its appointed end. The fall, it would appear, took place in subordination to this decree, to make room only for the restoration of the elect, while it served to doom all men besides to hopeless destruction. At all events, Christ became man, and died, not for the world at large, as the Scriptures seem to assert, but for the elect exclusively and alone. The promises are for them only. They alone can make any valid use of the means of grace; since to all others they are means in form and show only, and not so as to carry along with them any intrinsic significance really for the ends towards which they are made to look. The articles of the Creed are required necessarily to narrow themselves throughout to the same particularistic view.

Knowing the Commentary to be constructed on this scheme, we have a right to consider it a failure even before any more particular examination; just as we might come to a similar judgment by anticipation, in the case of a Commentary pretending to take the full measure of the Epistle, from the opposite stand-point of Arminianism in its vulgar rationalistic form. No such onesided view can possibly do justice to its twofold constitution. The true conditions of the problem to be solved are either misapprehended or ignored from the very start. How then should the solution be expected to succeed? In such circumstances, any Com-

mentary must, in the very nature of the case, prove wholly unequal to its proposed task. No ability or learning can help it.

The work before us corresponds in fact with this unfavorable presumption. As an exposition of the Epistle to the Ephesians, we cannot help feeling that it is lame and imperfect throughout. It fails to reach the deep sense of the Epistle, and comes short altogether of its grand and magnificent scope.

One general example and proof of its insufficiency meets us immediately, in the way it takes for granted everywhere that the idea of election, which plays so prominent a part in the Epistle, is of one nature precisely with the dogma of election as held by Calvin. We have taken some pains to show, that this imagination is wholly gratuitous and groundless. The two conceptions do not correspond at all. In saying this, no judgment whatever is pronounced upon the merits of the Calvinistic dogma, in itself considered. In its own form and place, it may be entitled to respect. The question here is not at all concerning the light in which it should be regarded as a point of metaphysical theology; but only concerning the use of it for exegetical purposes, in the exposition of the New Testament. Are the references to the idea of election in the New Testament such, as a general thing, that they may be fairly construed in the known and established sense of the Calvinistic dogma; or are they so circumstanced and conditioned as to require plainly a different interpretation? On this point, there is no room really for any serious doubt. The New Testament doctrine of election, as it meets us, for instance, in the Epistles of St. Peter, and rules continually the thinking and writing of St. Paul, is something essentially different from the doctrine of election which is presented to our view in Calvin's Institutes. The proof of this is found sufficiently in one single consideration. The Calvinistic election involves, beyond the possibility of failure, the full salvation at last of all those who are its subjects; there is no room to conceive of their coming short

of this result, in any single instance, made certain as it is in the form of a specific purpose and predetermination in the divine mind, from all eternity. Election and glorification, the beginning and the end of redemption, are so indissolubly bound together, that they may be considered different sides only of one and the same fact. The "elect," in Calvin's sense, have no power really to fall from grace, or to come short of everlasting life. But, plainly, the "elect" of whom the New Testament speaks, the "chosen and called of God" in the sense of St. Peter and St. Paul, are not supposed to possess any such advantage. On the contrary, it is assumed in all sorts of ways that their condition carries with it, in the present world, no prerogative of certain ultimate salvation whatever. They may forget that they were purged from their old sins, lose the benefit of their illumination, make shipwreck of their faith, and draw back to everlasting perdition. They have it in their power to throw away the opportunities of grace, just as much as it lies in the power of men continually to waste in like manner the opportunities of mere nature. Their salvation is after all hypothetical, and suspended upon conditions in themselves, which are really liable to fail in every case, and which with many do eventually fail in fact. Hence occasion is supposed to exist, in the sphere of this election itself, for all sorts of exhortation and warning to those who are the subjects of it, having the object of engaging them to "make their calling and election sure." The tenor of all is: "Walk worthy of your vocation. Only such as endure unto the end shall be saved. So run, that ye may obtain."

Plainly, we repeat, the two conceptions are not the same. The difference here brought into view is such as to show unanswerably, that the Calvinistic dogma is one thing and the common New Testament idea of election altogether another. The Calvinistic election terminates on the absolute salvation of its subjects; that forms the precise end and scope of it, in such sort that there is no room to conceive of its failing to reach this issue in any single case.

The New Testament election, as it enters into the thinking of St. Peter and St. Paul, terminates manifestly on a state or condition short of absolute salvation. Whatever the distinction may involve for those who are its subjects, in the way of saving grace, it does not reach out at once to the full issue of eternal life. The fact it serves to establish and make certain for them, is of quite another character and kind. It sets them in the way of salvation; but it does not make their salvation sure.

All this is so clear, that we may well be surprised to find no account whatever taken of it by Dr. Hodge; while it is at the same time of such far reaching import, that his want of attention to it must be considered as forming at once a fatal objection to his whole Commentary. He confounds here, from the very start, two materially different conceptions, in a way that cannot fail to bring uncertainty and confusion into every part of the Epistle he seeks to explain. Those whom St. Paul addresses as the subjects of God's election and vocation in one view, he considers to be addressed as the subjects of such election and vocation in quite another view. For the Pauline idea of election, he substitutes at once, as though there were no room to imagine any sort of difference between them, the idea of election as held by Calvin; and then proceeds, accordingly, to measure the mind and sense of the Apostle, from first to last, by this hypothetical theory alone, reducing all to conformity with it as he best can. What must be regarded as in fact a fundamental mistake, is made thus to condition and govern throughout the formation of his work. St. Paul writes to the "saints at Ephesus" under one view; Dr. Hodge has them in his thoughts under another view altogether. The case which is before the mind of the Apostle, as the general object of his address, is not the case which is before the mind of the Commentator, as the general object of his exposition. It is not necessary to say, that Dr. Hodge's scheme of election is anti-scriptural and false. We pronounce no such judgment upon it here. It is enough for us to know, that whether true or false, it is

not what was present to the mind of St. Paul, in writing this Epistle to the Ephesians. He was not thinking at the time of the metaphysical subtleties, since known as the theology of Calvin. These furnish, therefore, no true rule for the interpretation of what he has written. He wrote from a widely different stand-point. How is it possible then that Dr. Hodge, with all his learning and piety, refusing to see this plain fact, should be able to make us acquainted fully and fairly with the sense of the Apostle's text? Must it not be more or less travestied in his hands throughout? How shall it pass through such Procrustean exegesis, (forcing all ruthlessly to the measure of its own iron bed,) without being subjected to serious dislocations and wrested into all manner of false proportions?

Before proceeding, however, to notice farther the difficulties and defects that grow out of Dr. Hodge's system of interpretation, it may facilitate the order of our discussion to consider here more particularly what that election of grace is, (in distinction from the Calvinistic predestination to eternal life,) on which the whole doctrine of the Church is made to rest, with St. Paul, in this Epistle to the Ephesians, as well as in his Epistles generally.

It determines, we have just said, not the certainty of final salvation for its subjects, but only the possibility of it, in such a form as places it really and truly within their reach, while it leaves it in their power, notwithstanding, to come short of it altogether. In this view, their condition is represented to be parallel precisely with that of the ancient Israelites, who were chosen and set apart by solemn covenant to the possession of certain great and glorious privileges, in the way of possible future good, which yet carried along with them no sort of guaranty whatever, as was proved by the event on a large scale, that what was thus possible should at last become actual and real. All were under the cloud of the Divine Presence, we are told (1 Cor. 9: 1-5), and all passed through the consecrating miracle of the Red Sea; so as to be baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea. All partook moreover of the manna in the

wilderness, and of the water that flowed from the rock. Their relation to God, as his covenant people, was most real. Its privileges were such as to exalt them far above every other people. All was ordained and designed, at the same time, to bring them into the full possession finally of far greater blessings, the natural and proper end of the covenant, to which none might hope to come beyond the range of its peculiar grace. "But with many of them God was not well pleased, for they were overthrown in the wilderness" (v. 5); and now they are held up, in such view, as examples of warning and admonition, for those who have been chosen and called out of the world to enjoy the opportunities and privileges of the Christian state, under a like real view (v. 6-11). Indeed no parallel is more familiar than this to the mind of the sacred writers; and it is of itself sufficient to show at once, what view they were accustomed to take of the grace which was supposed to be involved in the Christian profession generally, for those who were "called to be saints," and distinguished as the "faithful in Christ Jesus." It was, in their way of looking at the subject, such grace as made room for salvation, opened the way to it, secured a full right and title to it, rendered it in all respects practicable and possible, while it allowed full occasion still for the exhortation: "Let us fear lest a promise being left us of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it!"

Here, however, all depends on having some right idea of what is meant by the real possibility of salvation, which is thus made to be the peculiar and characteristic distinction of the state in question.

It may be so taken, as to amount to little or nothing more than the relation of the world at large to the Gospel, so far as this has come to be published and known. There is a sense, of course, in which Christianity is for men in general, offering to all alike, wherever it comes, the opportunity of having part in its glorious benefits. So much the Arminian has full right to assert, over against the false particularism of the Calvinist, which seeks to restrict this op-

portunity to one part of the human race exclusively, in such a way as to place all the rest of it beyond the reach of salvation entirely. The commission which commands the Gospel to be preached to every creature, and which makes the obedience of faith also to be incumbent on every one to whom it is thus preached under pain of eternal damnation, is amply sufficient of itself to prove that what all are so required to believe is really and truly for all a divine fact that may and should be believed. It is no empty word merely sounding forth the phantom of a sense which is not in it actually and in truth, but in all respects, as St. Paul terms it (1 Tim. 1: 15), "a faithful saying," a word credible and "worthy of all acceptation," when we are told that "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners," and that God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son (John 3: 16), "that *whosoever* believeth in him shall not perish, but have everlasting life." We have no right to narrow the meaning and force of the Christian salvation a whit within these catholic limits. In its own nature, it is as wide as the power of the curse from which it proposes to set men free, as fully universal as the wants and necessities of our whole fallen race. Take men just as they are then, in the order of nature, all the world over, and wherever the Gospel is preached to them, we may say that in a most important sense it makes it possible for them to have part in its grace. Christianity is applicable to their circumstances, addresses itself to their wants, and verifies for them the full signification of that word: "Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down from above:) or, Who shall descend into the deep? (that is, to bring Christ up from the dead.) The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart; that is, the word of faith, which we preach: that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved" (Rom. 10: 6-9).

It may be supposed now, as we have already intimated, that this general relation of the world to the grace of the

Gospel, forming what may be denominated the opportunity of salvation in the order of nature, the possibility of redemption as it extends to the world at large along with the diffusion of Christianity, includes really all that is comprehended in the gracious condition or state of which we are now speaking, as that distinction of Christians on which so much stress is laid in the New Testament. To such rationalistic extreme the Arminian habit of thought always tends, running its natural course through Pelagianism out to the open, bleak and dreary waste of Unitarianism itself. Men may be regarded, according to this view, as possessing in the bosom of regularly organized Christian societies or churches, certain advantages and helps for the cultivation of religion, which they cannot have to the same extent in the surrounding world; just as they may be assisted in any other pursuit by similar organizations voluntarily formed for the purpose; but it is not to be imagined, that they should come thus within the range and scope really of a new and higher form of grace altogether, "powers of the world to come," means and appliances of salvation armed with divine virtue and supernatural force, for the action of which no room is to be found in the whole compass of the world's life besides. The conception of the Church falls, in this way, to the reigning level of man's ordinary natural existence. It is one simply among the other forms of its proper social order, the result of its general relation to the powers of religion; just as the organization of a school in politics or science may be considered the product of the general spiritual tendency it serves to represent. So far as the actual efficiency of the heavenly forces of the new creation is concerned, they cannot be said to be in the Church in any other sense than as they are in the world at large. Their relation to the world generally is taken to be immediate and direct, needing no intervention in any such form to make room for their saving action on the souls of men. The very notion of any such mediating constitution, indeed, is boldly repudiated, as something supposed to be fundamentally at war with the entire genius of the Gospel.

The order of grace, in such view, is confounded with the order of nature; the wall of distinction between them falls to the ground; in such sort that there ceases to be, for faith, any order of grace whatever in the Christian economy. All resolves itself into the life of nature, acted upon through its religious powers by influences supposed to proceed from a higher world. Looking at the subject in this way, the distinction of the Christian profession, of which so much account is made by St. Paul, must be considered more nominal than real; and it becomes necessary, therefore, to allow, that much of his language in regard to it carries with it a certain hyperbolical sound, which needs to be toned down exegetically to a much more moderate key, in order that it may suit fully for our common thinking the actual nature of the case. In the hands of a Commentator, like Paley, or Taylor of Norwich, this is done to some purpose. The "saints" at Ephesus or Philippi, we are told, are only those who have been gathered outwardly into the bosom of the Christian Church. So much is clear. But no such merely outward state, as such, can be supposed to carry along with it really any supernatural grace. What St. Paul seems to say of it, therefore, in such view, must be looked upon as a sort of figure of speech merely, a mode of thought transferred from the relations of the Old Testament to the different relations of Christianity, in conformity with the mental habit of the Jewish nation, for the purpose of effect. Election, vocation, translation from darkness to light, exaltation to heavenly places in Christ Jesus, sonship in the family of God, sanctification itself in the primary sense of the term, mean nothing more here than the powerless fact, that those of whom these high sounding terms are used have been led to make an outward profession of Christianity, and are to be regarded as having so far gone before others in seeking to improve the resources of salvation which it offers for the use of all in its proper higher and more spiritual form. The great things which are spoken of their state are either shorn thus of all proper significance, or come to be referred to an ideal Christianity,

whose actualization cannot be said to depend on the resources of this state in any exclusive sense whatever. The possibility of salvation which is secured to Christians in the Church, turns out to be at last nothing more than the general possibility of salvation which is set before men universally, wherever the Gospel comes with its message of grace and peace.

How little this agrees with the plain sense of St. Paul, we need not be at any pains to show. The Calvinist has a most perfect right, on his side again, to protest against it, as a view of Christianity which goes to destroy the idea of supernatural grace altogether; although he can have no right, for this reason, to force upon us his own theory of partial redemption, as if *that* were the only and, therefore, necessary alternative of what he feels thus bound to reject. The possibility of salvation which is put forward as the general distinction of the Christian state in the New Testament, is neither one nor the other of these antagonistic views, but carries with it a form which plainly excludes them both. It is not for those only who are predestinated to eternal life in Calvin's sense, and so have no power to come short of it in the end; for it is everywhere taken for granted, that the state or condition in question includes no such certainty of salvation whatever. And yet it is just as much taken for granted everywhere, that the condition is one which offers, not to some only, but to all who have part in it, a form of grace which is not to be found in the constitution of man's life under any other view, and in virtue of which salvation is brought nigh to them with such a character of real and full possibility as is not known in the whole world besides.

Those whom St. Paul addresses collectively as saints, chosen of God to be holy, partakers of the heavenly calling and heirs of eternal salvation, are not regarded by him certainly as the possessors of a merely nominal and imaginary distinction, over against the world at large with which their state is thus broadly contrasted and compared. It is not in the way of compliment only or conventional form, most

clearly, that he can be supposed to speak of it in such lofty terms. Nothing can be more plain, than that for his mind the difference between their condition and that of the world around them, was most substantial and real, and of a kind to warrant in full all the strength of language he was accustomed to use in regard to it. His sense of difficulty, in setting forth the significance of the distinction, is not that his terms are too high for his subject, but only that they come not up to the proper greatness of it, as he finds it overwhelming his own thoughts. It is no simply outward separation alone, no merely nominal peculiarity of position, which in the view of the Apostle goes to make up the true idea of the Christian profession, the state into which men are brought by entering the hallowed precincts of the Church. This state, as he looks upon it, sets all who are in it, whether the privilege be properly improved or not, in a relation to God which cannot be said to exist at all for others. The possibility of salvation here is made to assume a far higher form, than all it is ever found to be in the world at large. It is no longer the mere capability of being saved, but in a most material sense salvation already begun. The difference of relation to the powers of redemption is not merely in degree, but actually and truly in kind. A new order of life has been entered, the order of grace as distinguished from the order of mere nature. In this respect, the state includes a strictly supernatural character. Those who are in it stand, by virtue of their position, in correspondence with the powers of a higher world, the mysterious forces of the new creation in Christ Jesus, in a way not possible to men in any other condition. They are brought within the range and sweep of that victorious dispensation, which having run its course first in the person of the Saviour himself, is now revealing its presence in the world, through the Spirit, for the final and complete salvation of his people. To this salvation they have already a full title. It is theirs by covenant and promise, and they have full opportunity to come at last into its possession.

Such clearly is the conception of the Christian state, in its distinction from the general condition of the world, as it dwells in the mind of St. Paul. And this conception forms for him precisely the idea of the *Church*; the sense of which enters so largely into all his Epistles, but most of all we may say into this Epistle to the Ephesians; underlying as it does here the universal course of his thought, and forming in truth the key note around which it seems to proceed throughout, as a grand and magnificent anthem belonging not so much to earth as to the skies.

Answering to the view now described, the Church is regarded by St. Paul as a real constitution, of supernatural origin and force, existing in the world under an outward historical form, and comprehending in it the opportunity and possibility of salvation as they are to be found nowhere else. It finds its symbol or type in the Ark, which served in the days of Noah to save those who sought refuge in it from the waters of the deluge. So far as it lay in the power of the unbelieving and disobedient generally, at that time, to give heed to the Divine warning and betake themselves to the hope which was set before them in this form, it might be said that there was a possibility for them to be saved. But the possibility of salvation for those who had already entered the Ark, as we can see at once, was of a very different kind. It was not such indeed, in its own nature, as to make it absolutely necessary for them to be saved. There was no room, it is true, for any question in regard to the full sufficiency of the Ark for this purpose. But it was possible for those who were in it, to frustrate for themselves its merciful purpose and design. They might forsake it through unbelief; or staying in it, they might neglect the needful conditions of life, so as to come short finally of the proper end of their probation. Notwithstanding all this, however, their state was already one of glorious miraculous privilege, as compared with the condition of the world at large. It placed them in a new order of existence, and brought them into living actual communication with the scheme of grace which God had been pleased to

provide for the deliverance of his people. It was in such view this deliverance itself, already in sure progress towards its appointed end. In these circumstances, those who were in the Ark might be spoken of easily enough as possessing from the first the full and entire salvation which was really comprehended in its constitution for their benefit; although this was not yet reached, and might possibly never be reached by all of them in fact; since that must depend, in the nature of the case, on their own persevering use of the means they enjoyed for this purpose. Still all might be said to be theirs, as soon as they passed from the sphere of nature here into the sphere of grace. They were rescued from the general condemnation of the world. They were made secure from its impending destruction. They were prepared to outlive the flood. They might be said even to have a present footing on the shores of the new earth, which they were called to seek through its waters.

Behold a true figure of the Christian Church (1 Peter 3: 21), as it appeared to the mind of St. Paul. It stands as contrasted with the world in its natural character, under the most real view, as a different order of life altogether. The world in its natural character is fallen, alienated from the life of God, and literally under the power of Satan; who is styled, for this reason, "the god of this world" (2 Cor. 4: 4), and "the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience" (Eph. 2: 2). The redemption of man, in these circumstances, called for the intervention of grace under a wholly new form of existence. This was accomplished by the mystery of the Incarnation. Here the "Word became flesh"; in such a way as to bind heaven and earth together in a new mode of human life, which comprehended in itself supernaturally the power of surmounting and overcoming the evils that press upon this life in its natural and merely Adamic form. Christ came into the world, not simply to make known the will of God, and to preach righteousness, as the last and greatest of all the prophets; but primarily and mainly to actualize God's will, to create righteousness, to bring grace and truth for men into being. The salva-

tion of the world stood, first of all, in his own person. It was there as a real outward constitution, an act of self-revelation on the part of God, set over against the order of nature, the presence of a higher economy brought down into the midst of it from above, and making room within its bosom for all the grace that is comprehended in the idea of the Gospel. "In him was life; and the life became the light of men." He was himself the way to the Father, the absolute truth, the resurrection and the life. It is in this deep sense originally, that the Gospel is represented to be "a new creation;" for it is in fact no modification merely of the old Adamic order of man's life, but the introduction into the world really and truly of a new and higher mode of being, through the coming of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ in the flesh. The case required, however, that this new creation should not remain an isolated fact in Him, who was thus constituted its original ground and foundation. Hence the process of redemption, in the ordinary sense of the term, including the whole conflict of Christ with the powers of darkness, the satisfaction which he rendered to the broken law of God, his sufferings upon the cross, his voluntary bowing to the stroke of death, his descent into hades, his resurrection from the dead, and his glorious ascension into heaven; all designed to complete the full sense of the mystery which lay hid in his person, by advancing his Mediatorial life to its proper position of actual victory and superiority over the whole world of sin and death, that it might become thus for men generally, through the mission of the Spirit, the principle and fountain of life after its own kind, thenceforward to the end of time. Such is the order of salvation, as we find it embodied in the Apostles' Creed. The constitution of grace in distinction from the constitution of nature, as it appeared originally in Christ's single person, was never designed certainly to be a mere temporary fact, passing out of the world entirely when he was "put to death in the flesh," only in order that he "might be quickened in the Spirit," and so enter into his glory, and take possession of his king-

dom in its true and proper form. No thought could well be more remote than this from the habitual thinking of St. Paul. The constitution of grace, to his view, becomes fully established in the world, only after Christ's glorification; and then it is identical for him with the idea of the Church. He sees in the Church always, accordingly, a peculiar and distinct order of existence, an economy of life absolutely different from the constitution of the world under every other view, in which is comprehended the actual presence of forces and powers for man's salvation that are strictly supernatural; not belonging at all to the world in its merely Adamic life, and not to be measured by the capabilities of this in any way; but such as are derived wholly and entirely from the new creation in Christ Jesus, carried out to its proper completion in his glorification at the right hand of God. He reigns there as "head over all things to the Church;" which in this very view is denominated "*his Body*, the fulness of him that filleth all in all;" as being the form of his continual presence in the world, as well as the organ and medium of his grace through all time. Here he works with a power, which goes altogether beyond the strength of nature, transcending its whole fallen constitution, and producing results that cannot possibly be reached in any other way. The Church is the Home of the Spirit, and the true Ark of Salvation; offering to men under a real form the supernatural resources, by which alone it is possible for them, so to "pass the waves of this troublesome world, that finally they may come to the land of everlasting life."

So apprehended, the Church is found to be, in a most important sense, the necessary medium of salvation for men. How should it be otherwise, if it be indeed the constitution of grace itself, the only form in which the powers of the new creation are at work in the world; while all beyond resolves itself into that mere life of nature, from the weakness and curse of which it is the object of the Gospel to set men free? To say that no such intervention is needed, to make room for the course of the Christian sal-

vation, is virtually to deny and reject the truth of all that has now been said concerning the difference between the order of nature and the order of grace, and to hold that men may be saved absolutely in the order of nature itself without any order of grace at all ; which is such an error again, as necessarily involves at last, when carried out to its legitimate end, the denial and rejection of the whole mystery of the incarnation. If the grace by which salvation is made possible be in the world only as a supernatural system, flowing from Christ, and if this system be itself the Church, related to him as the body to the head, it follows forthwith that there can be no ordinary salvation out of the Church, that it is the first duty of all to seek refuge in its bosom from the wrath to come, and that those who do so are at once made to have part in such full power and possibility of being saved as may be said to be in fact salvation already begun. So much, accordingly, is involved everywhere for St. Paul, in his established idea of the Church. He has no difficulty whatever in assuming continually, that it sustains to the world a relation corresponding in full with all that the Ark was, in the days of Noah, to the men of his generation.

Apprehended as it is by St. Paul again, the Church has necessarily an objective organic life. It is in this respect a system or constitution parallel in full with the constitution of the world, under its simply natural form. It is made up of manifold forces and powers, working with a vast array of outward historical results, through successive ages, which are yet all bound together as one general movement, and capable of being referred to a common principle or source. That principle is Christ. The Church starts from him, and stands in him always, as its perennial undying root. Whatever of grace, power, opportunity and possibility, there may be in it, as distinguished from the universal range of man's life on the outside of it, all proceeds from the new order of existence which was introduced into the world by his incarnation, and in virtue of which he now reigns at the right hand of God. It is a

sphere of being, which refers itself back organically to the principle of the new creation in such view, even as the sphere of nature, with all its powers and possibilities, refers itself back organically also to the principle of the old creation, advanced to its highest form in the "living soul" of Adam.

Such in general is St. Paul's conception of the Church. It unites in itself at once the two sides of the peculiar and truly enigmatical hypothesis, on which we have found all his Epistles to be constructed; doing full justice to both, and causing their seeming contradictoriness to disappear; for which very reason also it offers to us the only satisfactory solution of their sense, the only key by which it is possible to expound them in any full and harmonious way.

It is easy to see, that no like idea of the Church is at all attainable for either of the onesided tendencies, which allow themselves, as we have seen before, to turn the true synthesis of the Christian mystery into a false antithesis, by separating its factors, and then exalting one at the sore cost and sacrifice of the other. It is very certain, on the contrary, that these schemes must lead necessarily, each in its own way, to a different notion of the Church altogether; and it is very certain, moreover, beforehand, that no such different notion can ever be made to square exegetically with the true meaning of St. Paul's Epistles, but must serve rather to involve the exposition of them in endless and hopeless embarrassment.

Neither the Arminian nor the Calvinistic extremes can make true earnest with the proper objective and historical character of the Church, regarded as a constitution of grace in distinction from the constitution of nature. Neither of them can do justice to the idea of its organic nature, the unity and continuity of its being, considered as the power of a new creation in Christ Jesus. With neither of them can it ever come to a true acknowledgment of the position which properly belongs to it in the supernatural economy of salvation, as a part of the "mystery of godliness," itself a mystery, and in such view fairly and of right an object of

faith, as it is made to be in the Apostles' Creed. For neither of them is the Church, in any sense, what the Ark was in the time of Noah, the bearer actually of the redemption which it offers to those who are invited into its bosom, the very organ and medium of grace, the home of the Spirit, the sphere of celestial powers, through whose intervention alone the blessings of the Gospel are made to be available and possible truly for any of the children of men. Both schemes are careful in fact to denounce the idea of all such interposition and mediation in any form, as interfering with what they take to be the proper freeness and directness of Divine grace, and as tending in their apprehension to rob religion of that character of inwardness and spirituality, which forms its highest distinction, and which it is held to admit only in the form of an immediate personal transaction between every man and his Maker.

In the case of the Arminian or Pelagian theory, (having its natural end in Socinianism,) all this is at once plain. It brings the whole economy of salvation, regarded as a process upon the earth, down into the order of nature, in such a way as to leave no room truly for any order of grace whatever. Grace, with it, is at best the presence of supposed heavenly forces, coruscations of power from a higher world, playing over into the world of nature in a purely magical way; which remains in such view throughout the real field of action, where all is carried forward and brought to its conclusion. The Church cannot be considered thus as any thing more, than a particular province of the general life of man, defining and taking in his religious relations, just as his social relations are variously embodied and expressed in other provinces of the same life, without its being imagined for a moment that these form in any separate view the actual ground of their being.

The Calvinistic theory, sublimating as it does the idea of grace, and laying all stress on what it conceives to be the strictly supernatural side of religion, would seem to offer room, on first view, for a much more honorable notion of the Church. Who can fail to be impressed by the well

known lofty and solemn terms, with which Calvin himself approaches the topic in the last book of his *Institutes*? "Coming to speak now of the visible Church," he says, chap. I, §. 4., "let us learn from the single title *Mother*, how much lies for us in the knowledge of it; since there is no other entrance for us into life, unless she conceive us in her womb, unless she give us birth, unless she nourish us from her breasts, unless finally she hold us under her tutelage and care, until having put off our mortal flesh we shall be as the angels (Matth. 22: 30). For our infirmity will not allow us to be discharged from school, till we shall have finished the whole course of life as pupils. Add, that beyond her bosom no remission of sins is to be hoped for, and no salvation." All this sounds like a true echo of the ancient faith, as it might have been pronounced with unfaltering voice by St. Augustine or St. Cyprian, the faith of the universal Church in the beginning, according to the plain sense of the Creed. It is, however, in truth, the old doctrine in sound only, and nothing more. Calvin's conception of the Church, after all, is by no means the same with that contained in the Creed; and it is easy enough to see, how his theological system is at war with this, and leads necessarily to a wholly different view. This comes out fully with Dr. Hodge. He too has much to say of the Church; and is forced to allow it a prominent place in his *Commentary*; as how indeed could it be otherwise, in endeavoring to explain an Epistle like that to the Ephesians, which is so full of it from beginning to end? But the article, in his hands, is conditioned by the Calvinistic notion of election and predestination, in such a way as to bear almost no resemblance whatever to the light in which it was regarded by St. Paul. A passage, quoted from his work, may assist us in coming to some right apprehension of this point.

"The purpose of election," he tells us, (pp. 30, 31), "is very comprehensive. It is the purpose of God to bring his people to holiness, sonship, and eternal glory. He never intended to do this irrespective of Christ. On the contrary

it was his purpose, as revealed in Scripture, to bring his people to these exalted privileges through a Redeemer. It was in Christ, as their head and representative, they were chosen to holiness and eternal life, and therefore in virtue of what he was to do in their behalf. There is a federal union with Christ which is antecedent to all actual union, and is the source of it. God gave a people to his Son in the covenant of redemption. Those included in that covenant, and because they are included in it—in other words, because they are in Christ as their head and representative—receive in time the gift of the Holy Spirit and all other benefits of redemption. Their voluntary union with Christ by faith, is not the ground of their federal union, but, on the contrary, their federal union is the ground of their voluntary union. It is, therefore, in Christ, i. e., as united to him in the covenant of redemption, that the people of God are elected to eternal life and to all the blessings therewith connected. Much in the same sense, the Israelites are said to have been chosen in Abraham. Their relation to Abraham and God's covenant with him, were the ground and reason of all the peculiar blessings they enjoyed. So our covenant union with Christ is the ground of all the benefits, which we, as the people of God, possess or hope for. We were chosen in Christ, as the Jews were chosen in Abraham. The same truth is expressed in 3: 11, where it is said that the carrying out or application of the plan of redemption is 'according to the eternal purpose which He purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord.' God purposed to save men in Christ, He elected them in him to salvation."

So Dr. Hodge expounds theologically the clause: "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world" (1: 4). All this means plainly, that the economy of redemption starts in God's absolute unconditional decree of election, terminating first of all on a certain definite number of the human race, singled out as individuals, without any respect whatever to the mode and manner of their salvation; for whom, and in whose behalf exclusively, it is then purposed to provide a Redeemer, who

should be constituted from all eternity, in God's mind, their federal head and representative, having authority to undertake for them in the covenant of redemption, and power to execute in full afterwards the terms of this covenant, by accomplishing all that their salvation required; in which view they may be considered to have been chosen in him to holiness and eternal life before the foundation of the world; just as he forms now actually in time the instrumental medium, through which the purpose of election in their case is carried forward to this its necessary end. Christ, in this view, is not first in the order of the decree, but only second. He is not the primary and main object of it, but only a subordinate provision brought in for the purpose of carrying it into effect.

Now the first thing that may well strike us with surprise here is, that this view does *not* correspond at all with the case which is brought forward by Dr. Hodge himself as its proper parallel, the relation namely of the Israelites to Abraham. "We were chosen in Christ," he says, "as the Jews were chosen in Abraham." Very true. But if so, then most certainly not in the sense of this Calvinistic decree. To bear out any such analogy as that, the Abrahamic covenant must be supposed to have sprung primordial-ly from an unconditional eternal purpose, on the part of God, to separate and call to the peculiar benefits of this covenant a certain fixed portion of mankind, chosen simply as so many individual units of the race, and without any reference whatever to their subsequent nationality as Jews; in the service of which decree then, Abraham himself was also preordained to be the instrument both of their national existence and of its covenant blessings; so that they might be said to have been chosen in him to Judaism and its privileges, before all time. Only so would the case offer a fair and true parallel with the other representation. But who seriously believes anything like this to be the actual signification of the Abrahamic constitution? Who does not feel rather, that the whole subject is caricatured by being placed in any such monstrous light?

Looking at the Abrahamic constitution in its true light, we have before us here, in fact, two altogether different forms of election. We may distinguish them as mechanical and organic. The scheme set before us by Dr. Hodge is strictly of the first character; the reigning Biblical scheme is altogether of the last. The difference between the two conceptions is so important, that we may well be at some pains to have it clearly in mind.

If a man should suppose a law in nature to be of one measure exactly with its phenomenal results, the numerical comprehension of these and nothing more, a mere term to express and set forth the general truth of their existence as so many separate facts, it would be an example of a mechanical notion coming short entirely of the real nature of its object. The case calls for an organic conception. Such a law is not the product merely of its own results, (a contradiction in terms,) nor yet an instrument simply for bringing them to pass; but the very power itself of their existence.

To bring the matter nearer to the case in hand, take now the common relation of a tree to its branches, blossoms and fruit. If these should be supposed to exist in any certain quantity and form aside from the tree itself, and there to be joined to it in an outward way, causing it to appear as the instrumental bond and bearer of their collective life, the conception would be again purely mechanical; whereas the actually existing relation itself, as all may easily see, is organic; the tree being in fact the true ground and foundation of all the life that is comprehended in its branches, blossoms, and fruit; to such extent, that they cannot exist at all, nor be so much as conceived even to exist, except through its presence and power.

Make such a case, in the next place, the object of God's decree; which must be considered in truth to extend to all his works; and we may readily see how there is room here again for the same difference of conception, accordingly as the decree may be taken to agree with one or the other of these views. What the tree is really, it must be consider-

ed in any right view to be ideally also in God's eternal purpose and plan. The order of its being, in both modes, must be intrinsically the same. The decree looks to the branches, blossoms, and fruit, only through the tree, which forms the whole ground of their being and life. They are viewed as being in fact a single constitution. To will their existence, is to will, not secondarily but primarily, the existence of the tree itself. In such sense only, may they be said to be chosen in it to what is at last their actual destination. The election, by which this is secured, is organic. Dr. Hodge, however, to be consistent with his own theological theory, would need to reverse the order of the conception altogether. The branches, the blossoms, the fruit, are to be considered as all predetermined to their existence in time, in the first place, just so many, neither more nor less; and then, next in order, and for the purpose of bringing this to pass, must be supposed to follow the preordination of the tree, fitted and contrived to serve as an instrumental medium for reaching the end in view. This is the mechanical notion of election. The two schemes, in this case, may be distinguished without any great difficulty; and it is by no means hard to say, which of them is entitled to the most respect.

Take now, finally, the natural constitution of the human race, flowing from Adam; which is so often referred to in the New Testament, and especially by the Apostle Paul, as forming a general parallel with the new order of life in Christ. All proceeds from God's eternal purpose or decree; and we may say of men universally, that they have been chosen in Adam before the foundation of the world, to become what they are actually afterwards in time. It makes all the difference in the world, however, in what sense this election may be taken. Conceive of it under the mechanical character which Dr. Hodge assigns to the corresponding election of grace, and it must be held to mean, that the decree starts with the purpose of calling into actual existence, under a human form, a distinctly settled number of possible beings, irrespectively altogether of any in-

tervening condition, and then falls upon the expedient or device of making the whole process centre in Adam, as it does now in fact; a view that is not likely to be entertained seriously here, we think, even by Dr. Hodge himself. The organic conception alone falls in rationally with the demands of the case. So apprehended, the decree coincides with what we are irresistibly constrained to regard as the world's actual constitution. The relation of Adam to men generally is seen to be an organic law; through the presence and power of which alone they come to be what they are; and aside from which, therefore, there is no room really to conceive of their existence at all. To be the object of God's purpose then in any way whatever, they must be regarded by it from eternity in this form and no other. The Divine decree terminates on the whole race immediately and at once, as a constitution derived from Adam, and holding in him continually as its natural root.

Such unquestionably is the eternally established order of the Adamic constitution, as it presented itself to the view of St. Paul; and with this corresponds in full also, we are bound to believe, his doctrine of election as applied to the new creation in Christ. The decree of creation, so far as the human race is concerned, looks to men as being in Adam, that is, as having part in the conditions, and qualities of humanity, the order or sphere of life that grows forth from him as its organic principle and root. He is the law, in which is comprehended the whole real possibility of their being. They are elected in him, so far as they are ever to exist at all, to whatever of worth and significance there may be in the simply natural life, into which they are introduced only by being born of his blood. And just so Christ is considered to be, only in a far deeper way, the principle and root of the new and higher order of life, which is supposed to be comprehended in the Church, as distinguished from the world. The "faithful" are held, by the very conception of their faith itself, to be in Christ; and with this order must be allowed to correspond also, in their case, the decree of salvation. It is strictly organic.

It looks to them only through Christ. They are chosen to salvation, not as being out of him and beyond him in the order of nature, but as being in him, and so in the order of grace.

It may be said, indeed, that even under this view it must be owing to God's purpose and election at last, that some are brought to be in Christ, and so to have part in the constitution of grace, while others fail to enter it and perish; just as it may be said also, that the specific results of any organic law in the sphere of nature are all numerically foreknown, and so necessarily foreordained, in the Divine mind, from all eternity; that every particular tree, for instance, and every particular herb and plant, produced by the law of vegetation, must be viewed as being chosen out of all possible entities, and determined to the order out of which it then actually grows and proceeds; or that, in the case of any single tree, its countless leaves, and buds, and blossoms, are all numerically willed to exist, and fixed to their several places, and ordained to their various individual contingencies and fortunes, from all eternity, in the same way. All this may be said; and we are quite willing to allow, that the metaphysical argument for predestination, when thrown into this broad and universal form, is one which it is by no means easy to meet. Three things, however, are to be observed in relation to it.

In the first place, this metaphysical view of foreordination, as it may be supposed to lie back of all organization, deciding and fixing in every case its precise contents and results, is not the view of St. Paul presented to us in the Epistle to the Ephesians. We do not say that it is one which he was not prepared to understand or acknowledge, in its proper place. That is another question. What we mean is, that it was not in his mind at all, not present to his thoughts in any way, in writing this Epistle; and that it cannot be used, therefore, as a true key to its sense.

In the next place, the conception in question does not offer itself as one that is peculiar in any way to the sphere of religion. It looks to the universal constitution of the

world. So far as it goes, the order of grace is viewed as being the real counterpart and parallel of the order of nature. That is just what it is made to be in the thinking of St. Paul. The one is to him as really as the other an objective constitution, having in itself its own laws and powers, and working organically for the accomplishment of its own ends. With what may be supposed to lie behind all this in either case, the metaphysical conception of the Divine decree, he does not allow his mind to concern itself in any way whatever.

In the last place, it makes a vast difference, whether this metaphysical conception be allowed to form directly one notion of election as in the mechanical scheme, or be simply thrown as an impenetrable mystery behind it, according to the organic view. In the first case, it becomes absolutely unconditional, having regard to no conceivable relations or qualities whatever; as being itself necessarily the ground and reason of all such distinction; in which view, we can think of nothing more perfectly abstract. In the other case, it is at once conditional; eyeing all existences from eternity as they actually are in time; seeing the whole always in its parts, and the parts in their whole, as well as in the relations they bear mutually among themselves; determining and fixing things concretely; the only way that can be said to answer truly at last to their being; the only way, indeed, in which they can ever be really and truly the object of either purpose or thought at all.

Such is St. Paul's idea of election, we repeat, as applied to the economy of the Christian Church. It is not mechanical but organic; not abstract, but concrete. It has to do with men, not in the general view simply of their common natural humanity, but under the conception of their being Christians, such as have come to stand, through the obedience of faith, in the bosom of the new order of life which is revealed in the Church; without any reference immediately to the way in which this may be supposed to have come to pass. What the Apostle has immediately in his eye, is not so much the election of men into Christ, as their elec-

tion in him; the heavenly prerogatives, the glorious privileges, possibilities, opportunities and powers, that are comprehended in the new creation of which he is the Alpha and Omega, and to which they are chosen in fact by being embraced in its organic sphere. Just as, by being in the vine, its branches may be said to be elected and chosen in it to all the fruitfulness, which is made possible for them in this way, and in this way alone.

The grand object of the whole purpose is primarily and fundamentally the Lord Jesus Christ himself. All else is seen as having place only in him and by him. What fills the soul of the Apostle with adoring admiration, is the thought of the glorious constitution of grace in his person, considered as present to the mind of God from all eternity, and as forming in truth the ultimate scope of all his counsels and dispensations towards the human race, though in the unsearchable depths of his wisdom it was not allowed for ages to come fully into view. Through all the graces of nature, made subject to vanity by reason of sin, its gloomy forebodings, and wild utterances of despair; through the long night of expectation that went before the Flood and followed after it; through the clouds and darkness, which shrouded the mysterious presence of Jehovah during the whole period of the Old Testament; this was the end, towards whose revelation, in the fulness of time, the universal plan of the world had been directed from the beginning, and in the advent of which alone was to be reached finally the full resolution of its inmost sense. All looked in this way to the new constitution which was to be ushered into the world by the glorious fact of the incarnation, carrying with it redemption and victory over the powers of sin and hell, for all who should come into its bosom, and use faithfully its grace. And now God's eternal purpose was fulfilled. The mystery of ages was no longer hid, but open. Christ had come in the flesh; and by his death and resurrection room was made for the Church, which now stood among men, accordingly, and was destined to do so to the end of time, as the comprehension of the unuttera-

ble blessings which had been procured for the world by his mediation. Into the bosom of this Divine economy, both the Apostle himself, and those to whom he writes, had been already brought. There was nothing doubtful or uncertain, to his mind, about the reality of their privilege in this view. They had submitted themselves, with the obedience of faith, to the authority of the Christian constitution, coming into its supernatural order by the holy sacrament of Baptism; and they were regarded as being, for this reason, certainly in the sphere of redemption, with a full title to all its privileges and powers. The Apostle does not allow himself to be disturbed for a moment, by the consideration that some of them, in all probability, were not what their profession called for, and that it was possible for such to come short of salvation altogether. He sees in them all notwithstanding, the subjects of a true heavenly distinction. Use it as they might, their Christian birth right was a present boon, the value of which was not to be expressed by any earthly arithmetic. They were elected in Christ to everlasting life; called and set apart in him to be saints; brought out of the order of nature, where neither sanctity nor salvation were possible, and placed in the order of grace, where there was room and power for both. What if some prove false to their vocation, faithless to the covenant of life in Christ Jesus? "Shall *their* unbelief make the faith of God without effect?" Shall it be said that there was no reality in God's purpose here, no actual meaning in the election of grace on his part, because men fail to "make their calling and election sure," and, it may be, turn his grace itself to the purposes of licentiousness and sin? God forbid: yea, let God be true, though every man be found a liar (Rom. 3: 4).

As viewed by St. Paul, the being of the Church, the power of Christianity, is not just the aggregate of actual piety which may be found among Christians at a given time; but something far wider than this; even as a true law of life in any case, forming objectively a new and distinct sphere of existence, must ever go far beyond the measure

of its actual products, quantitatively considered, being always in truth of endless force and fulness in its own order. It is a constitution, as real as the constitution of nature, starting from its own principle, and carrying with it a whole world of powers for its own purposes and ends. It is of itself a supernatural, or more than merely natural, condition and state, over against the vanity and misery of the world in every other view; and simply to be in it, therefore, is to be *ἐν ταῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν Χριστῷ*, with an emphasis of meaning that comes up fairly to the full strength of the expression itself. It is the sense of all this, reigning in the heart of the Apostle, that gives form and tone to his whole address directed to the "saints at Ephesus." In view of this, they are congratulated as the chosen of God, whom he has been pleased to "bless with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ." With reference to this, he prays that their understanding may be enlightened to know what was actually comprehended in the Christian calling, "the riches of the glory of God's inheritance in the saints, and the exceeding greatness of his power towards them that believe." On this, as a foundation, he rests the whole plan and scope of the Epistle, all its instructions and all its exhortations, from beginning to end.

With his Commentator, Dr. Hodge, all is different. He has in his mind another notion of election altogether; and along with this, consequently, an altogether different notion of the Christian Church. Such a notion in fact as really destroys the very being of it entirely, in any form answering to the idea of St. Paul. Christianity, with Dr. Hodge, is the product of a purely mechanical decree on the part of God, terminating at once in the eternal salvation of its objects, considered under the most abstract view, without the intervention of any really objective and concrete constitution of grace whatever. Of course, then, it can be only for the "elect" in this miserably narrow sense; having as little to do with others, as though they belonged to a different world altogether. It is easy to see, in these circumstances, what must become of the Holy Catholic

Church. It must resolve itself into an abstraction or an empty form. Regarded as the comprehension of those who are really so in Christ, as to be sure of final salvation, the case of the elect only, it takes necessarily the first character, being in truth but the generalization of this fact as it dwells in the knowledge of God. Regarded as the "body of those who profess the true religion," and nothing more, it just as necessarily takes the second character, being at best an outward show and name only employed to represent something which it is not in fact. The first conception is that of the invisible Church; and it is the only one which deserves, from these premises, to be considered valid; as it is the only also, indeed, with which Dr. Hodge pretends to make earnest, as answering at all to the "glorious things which are spoken of Zion" in this Epistle. The other notion is that of the Church visible or empirical; which, however, is not considered to exist necessarily under such view, in the form of any general organization, nor even in the form of any number of particular organizations as such; but if we are to believe Princeton, may be in the world without any organization at all, "so long as professors of the true religion exist" (Bib. Rep., Oct., 1856, p. 696), being the collective body only of such as own this faith in any and every way. So all runs out here again also into a sheer generalization, a mere word or notion simply employed to bring a certain class of persons outwardly under a common view. The whole theory, at the same time, is perfectly dualistic. It gives us in fact two totally different notions of the Church, instead of one; for there is no sort of common life really between the two spheres which are thus baptized with a common name, as though they were opposite sides merely of the same fact. There is not so much as the shadow of an organic relation, joining them together, and making them unitedly the subject of any common predicates whatever. Each has its proper being really on the outside of the other; and each moves in its own separate orbit, much as it might do if the other had no existence at all. Such duplication, however,

brings with it here no gain, but only wide and heavy loss. With its show of two Churches, the theory in effect leaves us none ;—none, we mean, that can be said to possess in any way the true and proper attributes of the Church, or to fulfil its needful offices and functions in the economy of redemption ; none answering in such view to the place which is assigned to the article in the Apostles' Creed ; none that could possibly have satisfied the mind of St. Paul. In neither view does it come before us in the character of a real constitution or order of grace, whose existence is at once objective, historical, organic, and concrete. In neither view can it be said to come between God and men, like the Ark of old, as the necessary organ and medium of their salvation. Nothing of this sort, indeed, is pretended or imagined on the part of those by whom the theory in question is held. It is one of the last things precisely, which they have any disposition to admit.

So far as the doctrine of Dr. Hodge is concerned, there is no room here for any mistake. Not only does it flow necessarily from his theological system ; not only does it lie before us plainly expressed in this Commentary ; but he has taken special pains besides to make the world acquainted with it, in different articles on the subject published in the *Biblical Repertory*. Many, we believe, have been dissatisfied with these articles, even in the Presbyterian Church itself. By some they have been considered well nigh scandalous, seeming as they do to betray the cause of Protestantism completely into the hands of its foes. It must be allowed, at all events, that the ground they take is exceedingly low. It is not saying too much to affirm, that Dr. Hodge has no faith whatever in the article of the Church, in the only sense in which it was held to be in the beginning a necessary part of the Christian Creed. We make the affirmation sorrowfully, but at the same time deliberately, and with the fullest conviction of its truth. The only marvel to our mind is, that one so wise should not himself clearly perceive the fact, or that one so good should be able to do so and not be seriously troubled with the

perception. He holds what he calls the doctrine of the Church in a certain sense of his own, and considers himself at liberty then to profess the old formula of the Christian faith with this in his mind; as though in doing so, he placed himself really on the same platform of belief. But to what can any such merely verbal correspondence amount, where there is no consent after all, in so material a point, with the actual meaning of the symbol itself? To receive the Creed truly, can only be to receive it in its own original and proper sense. That Dr. Hodge, with the Puritan world in general, does not do. The sense which rightfully belongs to the article of the Church in the early Creeds is by no means doubtful or obscure. It simply echoes what we may easily know, (if we *will*,) to have been the universal faith of the true Christian world in the first ages. It is in truth determined also by the position of the article in the Creeds themselves. Between this sense and the low Puritanic conception of Dr. Hodge, the difference is very wide indeed. The Church, in the old view, constitutes an essential part of Christianity; belongs to the "mystery of godliness;" is truly and properly an object of faith; includes in itself, as such, the presence of supernatural powers under a natural form; stands in the world, indestructibly, as the body of Christ and the home of the Spirit; and challenges the obedience of all men to its high claims, in such view, under pain of eternal damnation. All this is comprehended unquestionably in the article: "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church," according to the order it holds in the Apostles' Creed. For the whole mystery of salvation, as it takes its rise in the miraculous conception and birth of Christ, and flows onward to his resurrection and ascension, is there represented as afterwards descending upon the world, through the "coming of the Holy Ghost," in the constitution of the Church; which is then immediately made to be again the comprehension of its powers, and the orb of its whole celestial action, from the one baptism for the remission of sins onward to the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. Need we say, that

the Church, in which Dr. Hodge professes to believe, is of another order altogether? Under neither of its dualistic aspects, as they have come already under our consideration, can it be in truth the object of any such faith. His theory furnishes no clew for understanding at all its position in the Creed; as the whole architecture indeed of this grand and venerable symbol belongs plainly to another order of thought, and to be fairly comprehended must be seen and studied from a wholly different point of view.

But our business is not now primarily with the faith of the Primitive Church and the true sense of the Apostles' Creed. It may be said, that we are not bound here by the opinions of the first Christian ages; that their doctrine of the Church was extravagant and false; and that there is no good reason, therefore, why it should not be revised and improved, at pleasure, in the modern Puritanic and Baptist form. Let what we have just said on this subject pass, then, as merely spoken by the way. What we charge upon this low scheme of the Church at present is, that it is plainly at war with the doctrine of St. Paul. The Epistle to the Ephesians is constructed throughout on precisely the same view of the Church that is made to challenge our faith in the old Christian Creeds; whereas it wholly refuses to fall in naturally with the scheme of Dr. Hodge, and is put to exegetical torture only, in being forced, however skilfully and adroitly, into any such sense.

In the Epistle, the organic view of Christianity reigns throughout. With the Commentary, all is mechanical and abstract. In the Epistle, Christ is held to be the real root of the Church; which is then spoken of continually as an actual constitution in the world, proceeding from his person. With the Commentary, the notion of God's absolute decree is made to be the only principle of salvation; and the Church is nothing more at last than the fact of its execution in the case of the elect, a word, or at most a mere thought, employed to generalize its actual results.

The difference, in this view, between the spirit or soul of the text, as we may term it, and the spirit of the exposi-

tion, is of a kind to be felt almost everywhere. Take, for example, what is presented to us as the "analysis" of chap. 1, vs. 3-10. The Apostle blesses God, we are told, for the spiritual gifts bestowed upon his people. Of these, "the first in order, and the source of all the others, is election," vs. 3-6; the second is "actual redemption through the blood of Christ," vs. 7, 8; the third is "the revelation of the divine purpose in relation to the economy of redemption;"—as if all lay really in the form of any such logical mechanism! As if these were to be considered so many separate kinds of grace, externally brought together, instead of being taken to represent, as they do in truth, the proper wholeness, and full concrete unity, of one and the same grace. So it follows then in the particular exposition: Election first, a system purely abstract, and as such full and final in its own form. Then redemption, on the outside of this, to serve as an instrumental medium for carrying it into effect—another system, full also and final in its own form. And then, lastly, the revelation of all this, on the outside of both the other blessings, to make room for their subjective apprehension on the part of believers—still a third system, again full and final in its own form. It does not seem to come into the mind of Dr. Hodge, that both the election and the revelation of which the Apostle speaks are in Christ himself; that the mystery of election is in very truth the mystery of his incarnation and its glorious results; and that the true revelation of the Gospel is no written word or doctrine merely, no report made concerning Christ in any simply external way, but the very presence rather of what Christ actually is, under the view now stated, in his own person. Just as any living object in the world of nature, a plant, for instance, may be said at once to actualize its own idea, the thought from which it springs, and also to make this the matter of intelligence and knowledge as it can never be in any other way.

A still worse specimen of analytical logic, is presented to us in the Commentary on chap., 1, vs. 17-19, taken in connection with the verses that follow. "There are three

leading petitions," it is gravely declared, "expressed in the prayer here recorded. First, for adequate knowledge of divine truth. Second, for due appreciation of the future blessedness of the saints. Third, for a proper understanding of what they themselves had already experienced in their conversion." The first petition, according to this scheme, ends in the middle of the 18th verse, and is to be considered a prayer for spiritual illumination in general. The residue of the verse, "That ye may know what is the hope of his calling, &c," forms then a new petition; "having prayed that the Ephesians might be enlightened in the knowledge of God and of divine things, the Apostle here prays, as the effect of that illumination, that they may have a proper appreciation of the inheritance to which they have attained." Lastly. v. 19, "he prays that his readers may have right apprehensions of the greatness of the change which they had experienced." The mere statement of the scheme may enable us to presume, in what style it is carried out. "The hope of his calling," means the hope which true Christians "are now, on the call of God, authorized to indulge." There are two things which the Apostle desires they may know; first, the nature and value of this hope; and secondly, the glory of the inheritance in reserve for them. The "exceeding greatness of God's power towards them that believe," mentioned in the supposed third petition, is made to refer wholly to their experience of conversion, regarded as a past fact. "Grotius, indeed, and commentators of that class," we are told, "understand the passage to refer to the exertion of the power of God in the future resurrection and salvation of believers." But this is summarily denied. "It evidently refers to the past and not to the future." Then most characteristically: "The Apostle never compares the salvation of believers with the resurrection of Christ, whereas the analogy between his natural resurrection and the spiritual resurrection of his people, is one to which he often refers. This is the analogy which he insists upon in this immediate connection. As God raised Christ from the dead and set him

at his own right hand in heavenly places ; so you that were dead in sins, hath he quickened and raised you up together with him. This analogy is the very thing he would have them understand. They had undergone a great change ; they had been brought to life ; they had been raised from the dead by the same almighty power which wrought in Christ. There was as great a difference between their present and their former condition, as between Christ in the tomb and Christ at the right hand of God."

This, we say, is characteristic. Dr. Hodge, it would seem, has no sense for the proper wholeness of Christianity, as a fact reaching over in a real way from Christ to his people, and including in their case the entire process of redemption from the first germ of life in the soul to the full resurrection of the body at the last day. It does not occur to him, that the idea of Grotius need not necessarily be so taken as to exclude his own ; that the two things thus compared and opposed, sustain to each other the most intimate inward relation ; that the only true conception of Christianity must be allowed to involve them both at once, with all that lies between them, as going together to make up the concrete fact in which it consists. The bodily resurrection of believers, as it is to take place when Christ shall come in his glory, is not considered to be the continuation strictly of the process which begins with their new birth this side the grave—the last result of that "law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus," by which they are made free from the law of sin and death even in this world ; and it is only metaphorically, moreover, that their spiritual resurrection itself is represented as answering, in any way, to the natural resurrection of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The relation resolves itself, when all is said, into a mere "analogy" !

Afterwards, indeed, (p. 81), the representation is somewhat improved. Commenting on the words : "According to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead," v. 20, Dr. Hodge tells us they evidently mean two things. "First,

that the power which raises the believer from spiritual death is the same as that which raised Christ from the grave"; (just as one might say, we suppose, that the power put forth in the creation of Adam was the same as that employed in creating the angel Gabriel). "Secondly, that there is a striking analogy between these events, and an intimate connection between them. The one was not only the symbol, but the pledge and procuring cause of the other. The resurrection of Christ is both the type and the cause of the spiritual resurrection of his people, as well as of their future rising from the grave in his glorious likeness." This is well so far as it goes. But it falls immeasurably short of the whole truth, as it was before the mind of St. Paul. The causal relation allowed in the case remains after all instrumental only, mechanical, and outward. As for any proper apprehension of the true organic nature of the connection that holds between the resurrection of Christ and the spiritual life of his people, it would seem to be wanting altogether. Only so can we explain the truly surprising observation made on p. 82; where we are told that, the immediate subject of discourse in this chapter being the blessings of redemption conferred on believers, "the resurrection and exaltation of Christ are introduced *incidentally* by way of illustration"; and that having dwelt for a moment on the nature of this exaltation, and on the relation of Christ to his Church, (in the way of digression, we suppose,) the Apostle then, at the beginning of the following chapter, "reverts to his main topic"!

How differently all shows itself, when we take the right position for looking at it, and then simply allow the text to speak for itself. It is only strange how any one can commune with the spirit of this grand and magnificent passage at all, and not have the organic idea of Christianity and the Church irresistibly forced upon his mind. It is this precisely which imparts to the whole subject, in the mind of the Apostle, that character of greatness, which no language seems to him sufficient fully to express. What fills him with overwhelming interest, is the sense of the new crea-

tion, the mystery of godliness in its proper universal form, as it proceeds from Christ and runs its course in the Church. To his glowing contemplation, past, present, and future, rush together here with the power of a single glorious fact. The prayer with which he starts is not made up of three logically different topics, in the sense of Dr. Hodge; but wrestles throughout with one and the same general object of thought, only thrown rapidly into different aspects, till the whole loses itself at last in a sort of triumphant song of praise to the risen and glorified Christ, from whom the entire order of salvation proceeds. What he desires is, that those who have been brought to stand within the economy of grace, through the obedience of faith, may have their understanding enlightened to know, more and more, how much is comprehended in this high and glorious distinction for the purposes of life and salvation; as being not nominal merely, but replete with power; as serving to set them truly in communication with heavenly agencies and forces; as carrying with it potentially all the supernatural blessings of the new creation, from "the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost" away onward to the "resurrection of the body and the life everlasting." It was much to understand and appreciate the privileges of the Jewish covenant, in its distinction from the general life of the world; for even the Jewish covenant was by no means outward merely and nominal; but here is something which goes immeasurably beyond all that. Where Judaism had to do with shadows and types only, Christianity has to do with the very realities themselves to which these shadows and types referred. It is a constitution, which without any sort of figure may be said to carry in its own bosom actually the "powers of the world to come"—powers more than natural, having their principle in Christ, and able with him to triumph over the whole present world in every other view. All this of course, can never come within the range of mere natural observation and knowledge. How should any such intelligence transcend the order of its own life, so as to become truly cognizant of that which

is above it and beyond it altogether? The presence of such grace in the Church, as being not the shadow only of good things to come but their very image (*ωσπερ την εικονα των πραγματος*, Heb. 10: 1), is by its very nature such a mystery as can be really apprehended only by faith. Nor is it easy for believers themselves to maintain a steady practical sense of the mystery, over against the suggestions of the mere carnal reason; while the general apprehension of faith also is not of itself enough, to bring them at once to anything like a full and complete knowledge of all that is included in the mystery which they are thus enabled to own; even as it is not enough to be set down by the power of sense in the actual midst of the world of nature, that one may be prepared to take in at once the full sense of the manifold facts, relations, powers, and possibilities, which go unitedly to make up the conception of its vast and mighty organization. Therefore it is that the Apostle, here, and elsewhere, makes it the burden of his prayer for Christians, that they might be able to comprehend what was actually at hand for them in that new world of grace into which they had been introduced by their faith in Christ; that they might have some just sense of the relations of love and peace in which they were brought to stand with God, through the merits of his well beloved Son; that they might learn to think largely enough of the exceeding greatness of God's power embodied in the economy of redemption, not simply as measured by any particular effect already wrought in themselves, but more especially and mainly as taken in connection with the whole range of its action in the Church, and the glorious resurrection life of Christ in which it has its origin and source. For it is no outward analogy only, that holds between the life of Christ in this view and the mighty working of God in the Church. This last is nothing more nor less than the organic force of the new creation itself, in virtue of which Christ rose from the dead. To know what it is then in believers, and especially to know what the Church is in whose mysterious constitution it finds its enduring home in the world, we

must consider what it has been and still is in the Saviour himself. The power which appeared in his resurrection, and by which he now reigns "head over all things" at the right hand of God, is that which he puts forth by his Spirit also in the Church.

It might be interesting, as it would be easy also, to pursue still farther this sort of comparison, by bringing into view other examples of plain discordance between the true sense of the text and the sense assigned to it in this Commentary; all going to illustrate and confirm what we have already said of the different theories of religion, and different conceptions of the Church, which are involved in the case. But the length to which our article has already run, admonishes us to forbear. We may say in general, however, that wherever the text lays stress on any point under a churchly view, it is sure to be wrested by Dr. Hodge into some other aspect altogether, to suit the requirements of his own most mechanical and unchurchly scheme. The view, for instance, which is taken of the Christian ministry by St. Paul in chap. 4: 8-16, making it to be a strictly divine constitution derived from the ascension of Christ, and designed to carry forward the purposes of his glorious exaltation in the Church—a view which involves necessarily the idea of Apostolical succession, and of a true mystical force in the solemnity of ordination—fades with Dr. Hodge, we may say, almost into thin air. The ordinance of Baptism, which he allows to be the object of reference in chap. 5: 26, 27, is laboriously shorn in his hands of its true sacramental character altogether. As a matter of course again, in the exposition of chap. 5: 30-32, no proper justice is done to the mystical union and the doctrine of Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper. Here, however, it must be acknowledged there is an evident sense of difficulty, and no small amount of confusion, in the effort which is made to get through the deep meaning of the text.

On the subject of Calvin's view of the Eucharist, our author now says without any reserve: "Calvin did not hold that Christ's body was locally present in the Lord's Supper,

nor that it was received by the mouth, nor that it was received in any sense by unbelievers. He did hold, however, that the substance of Christ's glorified body, as enthroned in heaven, was in some miraculous way communicated to believers together with the bread in that ordinance. He, therefore, understands the Apostle as here referring to that fact, and asserting that we are members of Christ's body because the substance of his body is in the Eucharist communicated to us" (p. 341). This is just the view ascribed to him in the *Mystical Presence*. Dr. Hodge, however, rejects the whole idea of any such mystery, and denies besides that the passage here in question includes any allusion whatever to the Eucharist.

But what now, leaving the Lord's Supper out of view, is Dr. Hodge's own theory concerning the union of believers with Christ, as answering to the declaration: "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones"? The passage in which we have his reply to this interrogation offers too rich a specimen of his philosophical and theological style of thinking, not to be quoted here in full.

"The doctrine taught," we are told, "is not community of substance between Christ and his people, but community of life, and that the source of life to his people is Christ's flesh. In support of this interpretation it may be urged: 1. That it leaves the passage in its integrity. It neither explains it away, nor does it make it assert more than the words necessarily imply. The doctrine remains a great mystery, as the Apostle declares it to be. 2. It takes the terms employed in their ordinary and natural sense. To partake of one's flesh and blood, does not, in ordinary life, nor according to scriptural usage, mean to partake of his substance, but it does mean to partake of his life. The substance of which the body of any adult is composed is derived exclusively from his food and from the atmosphere. A few years after the formation of Eve not a particle of Adam's body entered into the composition of her frame; and yet she was then as truly as at the beginning, bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh, because derived from him

and partaker of his life. For the same reasons, and in the same sense, we are said to be flesh of Adam's flesh and bone of his bones, although in no sense partakers of the substance of his body. In like manner nothing is more common than to speak of the blood of a father flowing in the veins of his descendants, and of their being his flesh. This means, and can only mean, that they are partakers of his life. There is no community of substance possible in the case. What life is no one knows. But we know that it is not matter; and, therefore, there may be community of life, when there is no community of substance. There is a form of life peculiar to nations, tribes, families and individuals; and this peculiar type is transmitted from generation to generation, modifying the personal appearance, the physical constitution, and the character of those who inherit it. When we speak of the blood of Hapsburgs, or of the Bourbons, it is this family type that is intended and nothing material. The present Emperor of Austria derives his peculiar type of physical life from the head of his race, but not one particle of the substance of his body. Husband and wife are in Scripture declared to be one flesh. But here again it is not identity of substance, but community of life that is intended. As, therefore, participation of one's flesh does not, in other connections, mean participation of his substance, it cannot be fairly understood in that sense when spoken of our relation to Christ. And as in all analogous cases it does express derivation or community of life, it must be so understood here" (pp. 344-346).

We may be peculiarly constituted; but to our mind, we are free to confess, the mysticism of Olshausen is like the light of day, and as the genial breath of summer, in comparison with the hard, dry obscurity of this wonderful statement. We do not pretend to understand it, as applied to the subject in hand. It sounds to us absolutely unintelligible. Is the life of a man, then, no part of his substance? Are these two things extraneous each to the other? Or taking a man's *body* aside from his soul, does the "substance" of that stand only in what is derived "from

his food and from the atmosphere"? The law of life, the organic power, by which alone such material aliment is received, assimilated to its nature, and made to live in its constitution—is this indeed no part of its true substantial being? So Dr. Hodge would seem to think, if we may trust here the sound of his own words. For his argument allows nothing between the idea of life in its most spiritual form, and the idea of simple matter, which he takes to be synonymous with substance; and having satisfied himself that participation in the life of any one does not imply participation in his substance, under such view, that is, in the very matter of which his body is composed as such, he proceeds at once to draw what is in fact a far wider conclusion—this, namely, that it involves no participation whatever in the bodily side of his existence under any view. Making the body thus to be its own bulk of matter simply, and nothing more. As if such a man as Olshausen ever dreamed of taking the idea of corporeity (*Leiblichkeit*), in any such grossly Capernaitic sense!—But we drop the subject.

The two schemes before us, as they involve totally different conceptions of the Church, lead also to materially different notions of faith. With St. Paul, the Church, regarded as a real constitution of grace in the world, through which only the resources of Christ's resurrection life are made available for the purposes of man's "deliverance from this present evil world" (*Gal. 1:4*), is of course at once an object for faith, as really as Christ's resurrection itself. It is a constituent part of Christianity, answering truly to the position which is assigned to it under such view in the primitive Creeds. It is no abstraction, no mere generalization, resolving itself at last into the mental notion by which it is apprehended; but in some form the objective presence of a true concrete fact, whose authority men are required to own in an outward practical way, as well as with the inward homage of the spirit. This practical acknowledgment forms thus an important part of the true idea of the Christian faith; nay, we may say, it is the very form in which all such faith necessarily begins. For if

there be any constitution of this sort really in the world, the first duty of all men must be plainly to acknowledge its supernatural claims, and to place themselves within its bosom, in order that they may be saved; and it can never be anything better than folly for them to talk of believing and obeying the Gospel at other points, while they refuse to comply here with that requirement, which in the very nature of the case must be taken to underlie and condition all requirements besides, as offering the only way in which it is possible for them to be fulfilled; just as it would have been the folly of madness itself, for any in the time of the Flood to have professed faith in the Ark, and firm trust in its offers of grace, whilst they continued obstinately to stay on the outside of its walls. In this light, the sense of the Apostolical commission becomes plain. It ordains a constitution, not in the world before, flowing directly from Christ's glorification, ("all power is given unto me, &c."), through the Apostles, ("go ye *therefore*, &c."), organized and set off from the world at large as a distinct sphere of life, ("preach—make disciples—baptize"); to which, accordingly, all men are required to yield the "obedience of faith," not simply by consenting to what they may hold to be the truth of its doctrines in their own minds, but by actually bowing to its claims, and coming into its bosom, through the sacramental sign and seal of baptism. Hence also the stress laid on the significance of this sacrament throughout the New Testament, (as being the entrance or birth of men into this heavenly constitution, the laver of regeneration, the washing away of sins, the counterpart of salvation by Noah's ark and the passage through the waters of the Red Sea,) all in full conformity with what is well known, (by such as *choose* to know,) to have been the universal way of thinking and speaking about it in the first Christian ages. In the Epistle to the Ephesians, as elsewhere, St. Paul's idea of faith is plainly conditioned always by this reference to the Church, regarded as Christ's "body," the necessary organ and medium of the whole Christian salvation. It never enters into his mind, certain-

ly, that any proper use of his instructions and exhortations could be made by those who were not in the Church; that there could possibly be any room to talk of faith, spirituality, charity, and good works generally, in the Christian sense, so far as any were concerned who still, in this way, showed themselves "disobedient" to the heavenly vision of the Gospel, by refusing to come within the range of its power. He writes for Christians, for the baptised, for the faithful in Christ Jesus alone. All others with him are "children of disobedience", and for this very reason still under the power of Satan, whose kingdom is thus assumed to be commensurate in full with the universal order of the world's life on the outside of the Church (Eph. 2: 2). All this of course the Commentary now under consideration has no power to see or acknowledge; because it moves in a wholly different sphere of thought. The Puritanic notion of faith is really independent of the doctrine of the Church altogether.

"The word *απειθεια*," Dr. Hodge tells us on Eph. 2: 2, "means unwillingness to be persuaded, and is expressive either of disobedience in general, or of unbelief, which is only one form of disobedience. In this case the general sense is to be preferred, for the persons spoken of are not characterized as unbelievers, or as obstinately rejecting the Gospel, but as disobedient or wicked." This exegesis cuts the true nerve of the thought completely, and altogether obscures the primary sense of faith and unbelief as they were conceived of by St. Paul. "Disobedience," with him, is emphatically unbelief, considered not simply as an obstinate rejection of the Gospel in the Puritanic sense, but as the general opposite of that faith which brings men actually to bow to the authority of the Church. This is the radical sin of the world (John 16: 9), its true and proper condemnation (John 8: 19); just as faith, on the other hand, under the like practical view, is the root of salvation, the mother of all other graces and virtues belonging to the Christian life.

It is everywhere taken for granted by Dr. Hodge, in the common Puritanic style, that the presence and power of

the Spirit, which all acknowledge to be the medium of Christ's presence now in the world, are in no way bound to the Church, regarded as a fixed objective constitution in any view; that he works in the world at large; that faith in Christ may be complete, without reference to anything beyond the abstract thought of Christ himself, as having died to save sinners; that the Church indeed is only a name, used to denote collectively those who are considered to be already Christians under a different aspect altogether. No opportunity is spared of dealing what is held to be, in this view, a home thrust at the "Church system," as being supposed to obscure the proper freeness of the Gospel, and also to contradict the true conception of God's grace, by making it to depend on something beyond itself. "The only essential and indispensable condition of participation in the benefits of redemption," it is declared, "is union with Christ. And this union is effected or brought about, *by the Gospel*. It is not by birth, nor by any outward rite, nor by union with any external body, but by the Gospel, received and appropriated by faith, that we are united to Christ, and thus made heirs of God" (p. 166). "We have this access to God; we believers; not any particular class, a priesthood among Christians to whom alone access is permitted, but all believers without any priestly intervention, other than that of one great High Priest who has passed through the heavens, Jesus the Son of God" (p. 175). "This is the great question which every sinner needs to have answered: How may I come to God with the assurance of acceptance? The answer given by the Apostle, and confirmed by the experience of the saints of all ages is: By faith in Jesus Christ. It is because men rely on some other means of access, either bringing some worthless bribe in their hands, or trusting to some other mediator, priestly or saintly, that so many fail who seek to enter God's presence" (p. 176).

The general drift of all this is abundantly plain. It is the key on which the unchurchly spirit is ever ready to harp. To what, however, does it amount at last? A

mere play upon words, and nothing more. All depends, of course, on faith in Christ. So much was allowed even by the ancient Gnostic, as it is allowed now also by the Unitarian. But the question is always, What does such faith necessarily involve? His real coming in the flesh, we say at once, against the Gnostic. Even the Puritan will admit, however, that this again involves his life of sorrow, his death upon the cross, his resurrection, and his ascension to the right hand of God. And now the question comes, With what reason does *he*, the Puritan, require us to stop just there with our idea of what necessarily belongs to faith in Christ, and to shut off all that follows in the Creed as something to which it need not reach. As if it were possible to believe really in the Lord Jesus Christ on to the point of his glorification, and yet not take account of what this was to prepare the way for, the mission of the Holy Ghost, and the constitution of the Holy Catholic Church. It is at best only begging the whole matter in debate, when this mutilated notion of faith is held up to our view, as being all that is comprehended in the Formula: "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." In the sense of the Creed, beyond all controversy, such faith includes necessarily an acknowledgment of the Church, under the very view that Dr. Hodge so heartily dislikes; and St. Paul here, we have no hesitation in saying, agrees with the Creed.

Many thoughts, well worthy of attention, offer themselves here for consideration, growing out of the general subject of our discussion, and bearing on the doctrine of the Church, which, however, it would carry us altogether too far to notice now in any sort of detail. If we have succeeded at all, in bringing into view the form in which this great doctrine was held by St. Paul, and the place it occupies in his writings, it must be at once plain that it is not easy to lay too much stress upon the significance which properly belongs to it in the Christian system. It is found to take its position at once very near the centre, and not simply in the outward circumference, of the general scheme

of salvation ; in a way which answers exactly to the order of the Creed, and serves to justify in full also the method or plan of its construction. The very first object of faith, following the mission of the Holy Ghost, must be in the nature of the case, (if Christianity be no mere abstraction, and no modification simply of the life of nature, but really and truly a new order of existence in the sense of St. Paul,) just what it is made to be in the Creed. Not the Bible, but the Church ; not any particular doctrine, such as human depravity, for instance, or the atonement, but the fundamental fact of Christianity itself, on the ground of which only it is possible to hold any doctrine whatever with true Christian faith. The argument for the Church, in this view, is very broad. It lies in the organic structure of Christianity itself. Once fairly apprehended, as we have it in the Creed, this is found to involve the article as a necessary part of its general conception or scheme. We may say, indeed, that the article of the Church forms the very keystone of the grand and glorious arch, with which the mystery of the new creation is represented in the Creed to span the chasm, otherwise impassable, which separates between earth and heaven, creating thus a way for the ransomed of the Lord to pass over. Only to suppose it gone, is to turn the arch itself into a Gnostic vision. The argument for the Church, we say, is comprehended mainly in the organic constitution of Christianity itself ; and this is the form precisely, in which it is made to challenge our faith, and our obedient regard, in the New Testament. The doctrine of the Church is in the New Testament just as the other articles of the Christian faith are there ; not so much in the way of single naked texts, as under the general and broad view of necessary comprehension in the Christian system regarded as a whole.

That is a most lean use of the Scriptures at best, which affects to keep itself in any case to isolated texts, and overlooks the vastly more important significance of what lies in the organic relations of the facts themselves with which the whole revelation is concerned. What are the few testimo

nies which assert in an immediate and direct way the doctrine of the Trinity, or the doctrine of the Saviour's Divinity, in comparison with the vast body of evidence for both, which is involved in the representations and assumptions of the Gospel in its universal view? They underlie in fact the whole thinking of the New Testament, the entire universe of its gracious revelations, just as they are made to bear up the whole structure of the Creed.

And so it is with this article of the Church. There are single and separate texts which may be quoted, in proof of its being, its attributes, and its claims to regard; more than we are able to produce in such form for the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; more than we have for the inspiration and divine authority of the Sacred Scriptures. But it would be a great mistake, to think that the Scriptural argument for the article lies wholly, or mainly, in any such passages. The true force of this argument comes into view, only when we are brought to see how the truth of the article is everywhere assumed and taken for granted in the New Testament, as something necessarily involved in the very constitution of Christianity, and as little to be separated from the conception of the mystery in any case, as form from substance, or body from soul. Of this we have a broad and striking example, in this Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians. Strong testimonies occur in it for the doctrine of the Church, in the direct textual form; testimonies that may well embarrass the Puritan mind, so utterly foreign are they from its whole habit of thought. But these texts are, after all, only a small fraction of the evidence, which is really contained in the Epistle for the doctrine in question. That is found, not so much in what the Apostle directly asserts on the subject, as in what he presumes to be true of it, from the salutation with which his Epistle begins to the benediction that brings it to a close. The idea of the Church runs as a silent hypothesis, or underlying assumption, through all his teachings and exhortations. It may be said to be fairly woven into his whole scheme of religion. All that he says is conditioned and

ruled continually by the thought, that those whom he addresses stood not in the general world, but in the bosom of the Church; and that their position in this view served to place them actually, and not by figure of speech only, in correspondence with the powers of a higher world, under such form as was not possible elsewhere, while it was sufficient here to justify in full the strongest language he employs in regard to their privileges and hopes. This is in fact a constant practical recognition of the article in question, as it stands in the Creed; and a recognition of it also under the same general view, as being not simply an arrangement added to Christianity from without, but a true organic part of its actual substance and proper heavenly constitution, making it to be fairly and of right an object, not of opinion merely, but of faith, for all men in all ages of the world.

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ART. III.—BETHLEHEM AND GOLGOTHA.

FROM THE GERMAN OF RUECKERT.

In Bethlehem the Lord of glory,
Who brought us life, first drew his breath,
On Golgotha, O bloody story !
By suffering broke the power of death.
From western shores, all danger scorning,
I traveled through the lands of morning ;
And greater spots I nowhere saw,
Than Bethlehem and Golgotha.

Where are the seven works of wonder
The ancient world beheld with pride ?
They all have fallen, sinking under
The splendor of the Crucified !
I saw them, as I wandered spying,
Amid their ruins crumbled, lying ;
None stand in quiet *gloria*
Like Bethlehem and Golgotha.

Away ye pyramids, whose bases
Lie shrouded in Egyptian gloom !
Eternal graves ! no resting-places,
Where hope immortal gilds the tomb.
Ye sphinxes, vain was your endeavor
To solve life's riddle, dark forever,
Until the answer came with awe
From Bethlehem and Golgotha.

Fair Rocknabad, where ever blowing
The roses of Schiraz expand !
Ye stately palms of India, growing
Along her scented ocean-strand !
I see, amid your loveliest bowers,
Death stalking in the sunniest hours.
Look up ! To you life comes from far,
From Bethlehem and Golgotha.

Thou Ca'aba, half the world, benighted,
Is stumbling o'er thee, as of old ;
Now, by thy crescent faintly lighted,
The coming day of doom behold ;
The moon before the Sun decreases,
A sign shall shiver thee to pieces,
The Hero's sign !—' *Victoria!*
Shout Bethlehem and Golgotha.

O Thou, who in a manger lying
Wert willing to be born a child,
And on the cross in anguish dying
The world to God hast reconciled !
To pride, how mean thy lowly manger !
How infamous thy cross ! yet stranger !
Humility became the law
At Bethlehem and Golgotha.

Proud kings, to worship One descended
From humble shepherds, thither came,
And nations to the cross have wended,
As pilgrims, to adore his name.
By war's fierce tempest rudely battered,
The world, but not the cross, was shattered,
When East and West it struggling saw
Round Bethlehem and Golgotha.

O let us not with mailed legions,
But with the Spirit take the field,
To win again those holy regions,
As Christ compelled the world to yield !
Let rays of light on all sides streaming,
Dart onward, like apostles, gleaming,
Till all mankind their light shall draw
From Bethlehem and Golgotha.

With staff and hat, the scallop wearing,
The far off East I journeyed through,
And homeward, now, a pilgrim bearing
This message, I have come to you :
Go not with hat and staff to wander
Beside God's grave and cradle yonder !
Look inward, and behold with awe
His Bethlehem and Golgotha.

O heart ! what profits all thy kneeling,
Where once He laid His infant head ?
To view with an enraptured feeling
His grave, long empty of its dead ?
To have Him born in thee with power,
To die to earth and sin each hour,
And live to Him—this only, ah !
Is Bethlehem and Golgotha.

T. C. P.

ART. IV.—GERMAN REFORMED DOGMATICS.

It is a remarkable fact that no scientific work upon Systematic Theology from the Reformed stand-point has appeared either in Europe or America, within the present century. Other religious spheres of intellectual activity were by no means neglected. This was especially the case with Exegesis and Church History. Some of the most profoundly learned and original works upon these subjects were produced during this period, but nothing in a manner was done to advance the theology of the Reformed Church to a position to compare with the progress that had been made in collateral and affiliated studies. No one will pretend to say that the systems of divinity published in this country and Great Britain, within the last sixty years, are of this character. They are extremely popular, and for the most part are but one-sided reproductions of the particular views which belonged to a past age and a condition of things no longer subsisting. That this should continue to be the case would be a reproach to the Church, inasmuch as she would be deprived of the rich ripe fruit of modern Exegetical and Dogmatic historical research.

This has been prevented by the appearance of the able and learned works of Schweitzer, Lange, Ebrard and Schneckenberger, within the last ten years, which exhibit, in different forms, the peculiarities of the Reformed Confessions. Ebrard's "*Christliche Dogmatik*," especially deserves notice in this respect, as placing the German Reformed Church relatively in proper position. For this office he was well qualified. To a discriminating logical mind, well stored with various learning, he adds a thorough acquaintance with the whole field of Dogmatic controversy, and particularly with the objections which the ingenuity of the different classes of infidels have brought against Christian-

ity itself. He is also always consistently orthodox. He is sometimes found in advance of the old systems of Dogmatics, especially upon subjects involving questions of psychology, and other branches of philosophy, but is never at variance with the Confessional writings of the Reformation. He frequently presents a doctrine in new points of view, and enforces it by new arguments, but he is always soundly evangelical and sincere. For the reasons suggested by these remarks, it is thought that a free translation of a portion of his work referring particularly to the Dogmatics of the German Reformed Church, would not be unacceptable to American readers at this time.

B. C. W.

Theology has to unfold the *need* of salvation within the sphere of *illuminatio*, under the purifying and correcting influence of the sacred Scriptures, which in the Old Testament presents to us the history of its divinely directed development. The *fact* of salvation must be derived purely from the Bible. But here the subjective study of the Scriptures must be followed by a proper regard to the *objective* history of the knowledge of the sacred writings, that is: to *Exegesis* must be added *Church and Dogmatic history*. It is not just the individual, who has come, *pro virili*, to the knowledge of the Scriptures, but the whole Church, in her objective process of development, under divine direction, has been gradually brought to a more correct acquaintance with particular saving truths, in the course of the attacks which have successively been made upon them by heretics within, and infidels without the Church. Thus, by means of apologies and polemics, the *Dogmas*, i. e., the *established* doctrines of the Church, have been so perfected that the Church has consciously brought out the truth in opposition to error, and presented it in the form of *Confession*. But the Confession could only be taken from the Scriptures, and thus the authority of the Scriptures is paramount to that of the Confession; and as the Church organism has no promise of infallibility, the Church Dogma—

the *norma docendi*, must always be brought to the Scriptures, the *norma credendi*, as its test,—and the more the Church Dogma corresponds with them, the less it has to fear. It is an evasion of this, to admit in so many words the superior authority of the Scriptures, and then to assert the historical sense of the Scriptures as laid down in the Church symbols, as the absolute standard of interpretation for believing theologians in our day. But it is far worse, to give the Scripture meanings (?) of unbelieving men opposed to Christianity, now living, as authority over the united opinions of the Church of all ages and of believing theologians of the present time.

Scientific Theology may, accordingly, be divided into, a.) *Systematic Theology*, which exhibits the necessity of the biblical doctrine of the fact of redemption, by comparing it with the need of redemption; b.) *Ezegetical Theology*, which brings out the historical sense of the books of the Bible; c.) *Church Historical Theology*, which exhibits the history of the development of the Church and of its Confessions.

The chief object of Systematic Theology is the *fact* of redemption, Christ and his work. The plan of salvation, the work of salvation, and the appropriation of salvation are its principal parts. But there is a divine act at the ground of each of these. In connection with the plan, we have the act of creation, or the *glorification of God* as the author of all temporal things; as necessary to the work, we have the incarnation of Christ, or the *glorification of God in time*; and in order to the appropriation of salvation, there is the operation of the Holy Ghost, or the *glorification of God as the Finisher*. Theology may then be treated, a.) as Dogmatics, in which case, we proceed from God and his divine act; or, b.) as Ethics, and then we proceed from the nature of man;—both, however, essentially have the same contents. Dogmatics are not confined to God, but unfold the whole anthropological side from the nature of God in such way that the nature of man, the side of freedom, is not impaired; for if it were, it would be a predestination scheme destitute of moral character. And so others, pro-

ceeding from the nature of man, must have respect to its relation to God, to the fall and the restoration, or it will be a bald Pelagian moral system, without doctrinal character. They should differ only in form. Dogmatics, for instance, should enquire in reference to sin, how the permission of the fall is to be harmonized with God's holy will, and in what the relation of man to God has been changed by the fall; Ethics, in what light, sin, as the corruption of the individual life sphere, is to be regarded?

Having shown that the *idea* of Christian Dogmatics proceeds from Christian Theology, and having ascertained its object, we are prepared to enquire as to the manner of accomplishing this object. It would not be impossible to construct a method almost *a priori* from the fundamental idea. But if it is supposed, that the individual engaged with Dogmatics, should be ruled by a certain stand-point, by categories belonging precisely to his own time, and still more to his own peculiar habit of mind, the construction under such circumstances would inevitably be of a very subjective character, and could never, and in no way, be objective. It would exhibit, not the idea corresponding with the nature of the subject, but as apprehended by the person himself. In this we see the necessity of proceeding in a *historical way*. We must ascertain the different methods of treatment, which have been one after another suggested by the idea and nature of Dogmatics; that is, in what way the idea of Dogmatics has evolved itself in its *objective completeness*. More is here meant, certainly, than a mere aggregation, or enumeration of these several methods. The historical evolution, in its synthetical unity, is to be derived from the subjective idea possessed, and in this way the subjective idea must correct, and perfect, and establish a *method*—not one to be classed with others already in use—but one that is related to all others *organically*, as ahead of them, and superior to them. But before we proceed to the method of Dogmatics, we must advert to its history.

Here we meet at the threshold the antithesis of *two*

periods, that of the authority of the Scriptures, and that of the authority of *subjective criticism*—Orthodoxy in its widest sense, and Rationalism. The Reformers opposed the authority of the Scriptures to that of the Pope. This, from the stand-point of bald Rationalism, is sometimes regarded as *accidental*; as if the sage idea of rejecting, at the same time, the authority of the Bible had never come into their minds, or as if they acknowledged the authority of the Scriptures, which was equally admitted by the Roman Church, solely because it afforded them a convenient appeal in their controversies against Popish doctrines and views. Aside from the silliness of such a moral and intellectual position, the notion is historically untrue. There were sects enough which rejected the *Bible*. The Anabaptists tore it in pieces and tramped upon it, when Zwingle quoted it against them; and Servetus, and many other fanatics, spurned its authority. The Reformers, accordingly, must have been fully assured of the grounds upon which they rejected the authority of the Pope and of tradition, whilst they held fast to the authority of the Bible, making it the ground of their Dogmatics, and opposing it to a purely inward spiritual illumination as fanatical. They opposed Popery by no means merely because it was unscriptural, but precisely for the reason also that it placed the human understanding above the Scriptures. Do we ask now for the positive grounds upon which the Reformers came to the acknowledgment of the absolute truth in the Bible, we will find that both in Switzerland and Saxony they were these, that they received the sacred writings as the *word of Christ*, and still more, as the word of reconciliation through Christ, and the only way of peace and holiness. The *synthesis* between the need of redemption, as to an atonement, and the *redemption through Christ*, revealed and offered in the word of God, constitutes the basis upon which they first came to the knowledge of the absolute truth of the redemption, and then also to the acknowledgment of the authority of the Bible, as the original announcement of it. When I thirst, and a cup of water is

given me, and I find the water refreshing, and pure, I safely conclude that the cup itself was pure.

But that synthesis at first was immediate and only *felt*, and there was no occasion, over against the Roman Church, to raise it by reflection to full consciousness, or to exhibit it in ideas. The Reformers and the Theologians of the Evangelical Church after them, *felt*, each for himself, immediately, the law immanent in man to love God, and the historical apostacy from that law. So they *felt* also the truth, sufficiency and satisfying power of the Gospel of redemption; but they did not exhibit them intelligibly—did not refer to those facts of consciousness to prove them. They had this *synthesis* in feeling, in experience, but not in system. Their business, as they thought, was not to show in *what way* the redemption through Christ, together with his word, was the absolute truth, and that this redemption, and this redemption only, but this fully, met and answered the *need* lying in the facts of consciousness—and, accordingly, not to comprehend Christianity in its *necessity*;—but as the authority of the Scriptures, and the truth of the redemption which they taught were confirmed to them by immediate feeling and were also admitted by their *opponents*, so they regarded this truth as a settled proposition, and they simply enquired what the Bible taught concerning redemption. The business of theology, and especially of Dogmatics is, not to investigate Christianity in its inward necessity, but to exhibit the *material* it *furnishes*, to explain, to arrange and define it as it respects outward categories, i. e., to bring out a *new scholastic*.

This scholastic of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was advantageously distinguished from that of the Middle Ages in this respect, that it had for its material, not the word of man, but the word of God, and yet, as in the case of the medieval scholastic, this material as *at hand* and externally objective, had to be externally made use of. Exegesis and Church History assumed again a mere *tributary*—not an organic, productive, radical relation to Dogmatics—and thus failed to harmonize with the higher psychol-

ogy, with the facts of consciousness, with inward experience. In this way the science fell away from the life and lost its power to pervade it. The life flitted about here and there in Germany and England, even out of the Church among the sects, and as the Church gradually declined and lost its vitality, the question arose, Whether the orthodox Church views of Christianity were true, and whether indeed Christianity itself was true?

Both these questions are not only proper, but it is in fact the business of theology to proceed from them, and the whole of theology should be an answer to them. But to be this, it must be the *intelligible synthesis* of the need of redemption and the fact of redemption, and to be this again, there must be the *immediate synthesis* of both as a life and heart experience already at hand (just as the naturalist must first *see*, before he can investigate the laws of optics, and the physiologist must first *breathe* before he can establish the theory of the functions of the lungs). In this, however, it fails. Those who have this synthesis of feeling never raise these questions; those who do, know nothing of the experience. The questions are proposed by practical, not theoretical skeptics, and the result is, not the admission of Scripture authority, but the *denial* of it. At first they only deny the Christianity taught by the Church, and array against it a so called Biblical Dogmatic as contradictory to it. But it soon appears that the so called natural exegesis, upon which this Biblical Dogmatic rested, was artificial, and becoming bolder, they discard the authority of the Bible itself, and set up the abstract objective reason, emptied of all historical contents, as a criterion superior to the Bible. And finally, when the folly of such an historical reason, rejecting, as it does, the judgment of the whole past, was made to appear, they admitted Christianity to be true, but not as philosophically shown from the need of redemption, and constructed the redemption itself *a priori*, changing it, however, at the same time, from a historical fact of absolute significance into an idea. At length, after making a long circuit, Theology and Dogmatics attained

to such a position, by means of these various phases of Rationalism, that those theologians, who had *experienced* the synthesis of the need and of the fact of redemption and needed no proof for themselves, were sufficiently disinterested to exhibit the genesis of their faith in intelligible reflections.

Positive gain for any one method of Dogmatics can only be obtained from such other methods as start from the stand-point of the authority of the Bible. The rationalistic period of Dogmatics furnishes nothing more than this one negative, although important inward principle of Dogmatics, that we should never be content with *what* the doctrine has exhibited, but with that which, *in its inward necessity* is indicated by the whole structure of the doctrine of the Gospel, as well as by all its parts, and that must be tested by the subjective need of redemption. As it regards the older Dogmatics of the period of the authority of the Scriptures, their methods must be severally examined, i. e., the history of Dogmatics for that period must be investigated. But here we meet with another antithesis, that of the *Reformed* and *Lutheran Dogmatics*. Bearing this in mind, we will take our stand-point upon the Reformed confession, and will just enquire concerning the Reformed Dogmatics.

That which is peculiar in Reformed Dogmatics is not to be ascertained by abstract reasoning *a priori*, but by a purely historical enquiry into the history of the Reformed Church, with a full appreciation of all its factors, national and theological, personal and providential, accidental and religiously essential. The Reformed Church did not spring into being as a part, nor as the work of a single individual, but as the result of a combination of three altogether different elements—brought about less by any human purpose, than by a divine interposition. Entirely independent of Luther, and without a knowledge of his movements, Zwingli commenced the work of the Reformation in Einsiedeln in 1516, and in Zurich in 1518. The whole process of his humanistic training differed from that of Luther, and so

did his general views. If Luther, by inward, *subjective* experience discovered that the penances prescribed by the Church brought no peace to his conscience, Zwingli, by the study of history, and a profound historical insight into the *objective state* of things, was equally satisfied, that the way of salvation pointed out by Rome was false and wrong. Whilst Luther insisted upon the *justification of the conscience by faith*, in *contradistinction to justification by works*, Zwingli contended for the *justification of our sinful race through Christ*, in opposition to *justification by Church ordinances of human invention*. In either case, the principle was the same, only that with Luther it was in the subjective form, with Zwingli in the objective; conducting both to the authority of Scripture as the formal rule. From this point Luther first proceeded to reform the doctrines of the Church, as his subjective religious feelings seemed to require, and afterwards to the correction of its morals. Zwingli, on the contrary, first attempted the reformation of the objective state of the Church, and then of its doctrine. Thus it happened that the discipline of the Lutheran Church was fragmentary and incomplete, whilst its Dogmas at an early period were perfected with scholastic accuracy. The reverse was the case with Zwingli. With him, cultus and discipline were energetically reconstructed, whilst but little attention was given to doctrine, and his early death prevented further progress. This is evident in the controversy on the Lord's Supper. Luther, with bold and pious zeal, seized upon the whole contents of the ordinance in its profoundest and most mystical depths, without troubling himself about its exegetical grounds. Zwingli adopted a more correct exegesis, but was very careful not to take up from the *anal. fidei*, a deeper idea than was contained in the letter of the exegetical passages. By Zwingli's influence, there arose, in addition to the Church of the Augsburg Confession, in the empire, a *Reformed Church* in German Switzerland.

With this Church, the friends of the Reformation in the Romanic nations of France, Spain, Italy, Belgium and England, had little or no connexion. This was owing

partly to the influence of Luther's writings, but still more to the spirit of the age tending to a reformation in an independent way. These friends were fearfully persecuted by the civil authorities, and the Inquisition; but the thousands of congregations which they established, constituted a *diaspora*, of which it would be scarcely a reproach to say, that the opposition which they exhibited in some instances to every thing Popish, was thoroughly puritanic. This character was already deeply impressed upon these congregations before they had any thing to do with the Swiss Reformation. This was done in two ways. In the first place, the French Reformer, *Farel*, combining his Zwinglian training with puritanic fanatical zeal, carried the Reformation, under the protectorate of Bern, into French Switzerland. In the second place, the French refugee, *Calvin*, detained in Geneva by Farel, formed a spiritual point of union for all the Romanic Reformed congregations; and in fact reflected the most powerful spiritual influence upon eastern Switzerland. If, however, Farel impressed more deeply upon the French Reformation, the negative, puritanic character, which it already possessed, Calvin, on the other hand, worked positively and systematically. He was not simply the author of a strictly scientific Theology, Exegesis and Dogmatics—he not only prepared a most admirable and appropriate discipline for the persecuted Reformed Church of the Romanic nations; but whilst he concentrated and formally organized the peculiarities of the Romanic Reformed Church, on the side of the proper *Church life*, so on the other side, that of doctrine, he surmounted the existing opposition between Luther and Zwingle. Cherishing for Luther the highest esteem, whilst he was far from entertaining the same measure of respect for Zwingle, his scholastic education inclined him of course to agree with the former. Besides this, he had spent several years in Germany, where he appeared as the theologian of the Augsburg Confession and the bosom friend of Melancthon. Agreeing with him upon the doctrine of the Eucharist, he was only advantageously distinguished from him by the

more open and fearless assertion of his views. In this way, by a manly, but dispassionate attack upon Zwinglianism, he succeeded in establishing in Zurich the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper, modified by himself and Melancthon. Thus the Romanic Reformed Church, together with the Zwinglian Reformed Church, *harmonized in doctrine* with the Church of the Augsburg Confession, so far as it received Melancthon's type of doctrine, together with that of Luther, and differed only in its cultus and discipline.

But Calvin himself laid the foundation for a new confessional difference in his doctrine of *absolute predestination*. He held that, as no man was able by faith to receive the grace of Christ, nor even to persevere when he had received it, but is indebted for both to the operation of the Holy Ghost, we must conclude in reference to those who remain in unbelief, either that God withheld the grace of the Holy Ghost from them, or that he granted it only for a time, and accordingly predestinated them to unbelief and destruction. Calvin came to this false view, in part, by insisting upon man's natural incapacity for good, and the subjection of his will, which he also improperly expanded in a state of grace, and partly again, by his apprehension of particular Scripture passages, as for instance, Rom. 9. Zwingle, indeed, and Luther also, taught the doctrine of absolute predestination, but in a different way. In a sermon which Zwingle preached at the Conference of Marburg, upon providence, the theme of which was given him by the Elector Philip, he, without preparation, and evidently without any decided views beforehand, wavered between deterministic and dualistic views, without being called to account by Luther, who was a hearer upon the occasion. It is simply a fact that *the doctrine is no where prominent in Zwingle's Reformation writings, much less is it the principle of his system*. Luther was in controversy with Erasmus upon the freedom of the will, and expressed himself in more decided terms upon absolute predestination than ever Calvin did; but he *only made use of it in scientific discussion, and attached to it*

no importance in his Reformation writings. Calvin, on the contrary, worked it up in his system, insisted upon it as orthodox doctrine in his ecclesiastical discussions, and bequeathed it formally to the Romanic Reformed Church as an *articulus fidei*. It also indirectly influenced his doctrine of the Lord's Supper. If the everlasting destiny and the inward development of man was predestinated from eternity, then, of course, the individual inward conflict, and with it the sacramental efficacy of the Lord's Supper was of less significance, and this was precisely the case with the Calvinistic theory of the Lord's Supper, which afterwards justly gave offence to the Lutherans. Through Melancthon's influence the doctrine of absolute predestination was rejected by the Lutheran Church, and the more correct view that the predestination of God was regulated by his knowledge, from all eternity, of man's own free determinations, came to prevail. Thus the doctrine of predestination, from the time of Calvin, constituted a distinguishing feature between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches.

If the state of the Churches had remained as we have represented, i. e., if the Melancthonian doctrine of the Lord's Supper had continued to be tolerated in the Church of the Augsburg Confession, and had become the ruling view; and if the Romanic Reformed Church, together with the Zwinglian Church of East Switzerland, had differed from the Church of the Augsburg Confession only as to the erroneous theory of predestination, the Church of the Augsburg Confession would unquestionably have been right over against the Calvinistic Reformed Church. But the state of things was changed by the introduction into the Reformed Church of a third principal element. Western Germany, especially the Palatinate on the Rhine, and Hesse, was brought over to the cause of the Reformation, more by Melancthon's than by Luther's influence, and held his view of the Lord's Supper. As to cultus, she was far from Puritanic, and was throughout Lutheran. Of the doctrine of predestination, nothing had been said. But by the zealots of the Jena school, the whole Melancthonian, or as it was

called, the Philipistic school, and of course the Palatinate, and other small provincial Churches of Germany, were excluded from the Church of the Augsburg Confession, which segregated itself in the narrow sense of the Form of Concord as the *Lutheran Church*; and the Augsburg Confession, which had been drawn up by Melancthon, and which as *invariata*, included Luther's, as well as his own type of doctrine, received in the Form of Concord, an interpretation, according to which, to be a Lutheran, it was not enough to believe that Christ was present in the *transaction* of the Lord's Supper, and united his body and blood with the communicant; but it must be held that the body and blood of Christ were united with, and present in the bread and wine, and together with them were eaten with the mouth. The West German Churches, thus excluded from the Church of the Augsburg Confession, were afterwards joined by the Brandenburg Churches, and connected themselves as Melancthonian Reformed, or German Reformed, with the Calvinistic and Zwinglian Reformed, and in this way, the Reformed Church acquired its greatest strength, inasmuch as to her more intellectual acuteness, there was added the German depth of feeling. At first, the German Reformed Church held itself passive, as respects the influence of the Calvinistic (Romanic) Church already consolidated, and the doctrine of predestination gradually obtained foothold as belonging to Reformed orthodoxy. But after a while the calm, quiet, deep influence of the Church began to show its mighty power, and the view of predestination, which might in its consequences have been fatal to Reformed theology, was so modified and restricted by the Palatinate and Hessian divines, that it was at least harmless. Still more important was the influence exerted by the German Reformed Church in the practical depths of the Heidelberg Catechism. This Catechism, which is free from predestination, and moreover was prepared before the Palatinate Churches attached themselves to the Reformed Church, pursues in a pure Lutheran, Melancthonian way, an anthropological course, and with Luther, proceeds from

a *subjective sense* of the need of salvation. Whilst the scholastic theologians were insisting most strictly upon the doctrine of predestination in their compendiums, the Heidelberg Catechism was quietly working its way into the congregations, and into the practical church services. In it the *anthropological subjective idea* of the Reformed views of Christian doctrine, thus far wanting in the Reformed Church, was fully brought out as a delightful complement. But, it was not just as a book for Catechetical instruction, that the Heidelberg Catechism was of service in the congregation—nor yet as a confessional standard that it secured a significance and circulation, such as no other confessional writing ever did in the Reformed Church; but it also, at the same time, exerted a mighty retroactive influence upon theological science. Along side of those peculiar, scholastic compendiums containing predestination views, there appeared also a whole row of theological commentaries upon the *Heidelberg Catechism*, of great significance, and in which may be seen some of the finest fruits of Reformed theology.

The three principal elements, or influences already mentioned, clearly account for the peculiarities of the Reformed system of Dogmatics. In the first place, it is owing to the mode, introduced into Switzerland by Zwingle, and perpetuated by Calvin, of apprehending the salvation of Christ more in its objective aspect, that the *systematic*, and with it, the *synthetic* treatment and disposition of Dogmatics came to prevail. Whilst the Lutheran divines (so far as they were no longer under the influence of Melancthon, or under the reflex influence of the Reformed Church itself, as was the case with Chemnitz and Leyden) pursued the *local* method, carefully elaborating particular doctrines, and then systematizing them, the Reformed theologians, on the other hand, *developed* their doctrine from the *system*, and followed in the system itself, almost without exception, the *synthetic*, or inferential method, i. e., they proceeded from God as the original cause, passed over to the revelation of God *ad intra*, the Trinity, then to his revelation *ad extra*, the coun-

sel of God, *decretum*, and so on to the fulfilment of the same in *creatio*, *redemptio*, *sanctificatio*; or when they did proceed from *anthropology*, they at least did not start with the *subjective experience of salvation*, but with the objective idea of the Church. With this are connected three other phenomena. *First*, it is owing to the systematizing method of the Reformed divines that the several dogmas are always treated differently, according to the plan of their different systems, in the use of different terms and in different categories (formally different) and receive a more *free, complete and comprehensive exposition* than is the case with Lutherans; with whom a distinct and peculiar type of doctrine is developed for each peculiar dogma. *Secondly*, the Reformed, as they derive their several dogmas, less from the subjective principle of the justification of the conscience by faith, than from the objective revelation of the grace and righteousness of God in Christ, are enabled and have occasion, to introduce the objective *historical* development of the salvation of the old covenant in their Dogmatics and in this way to give to them a more biblical, historical character. *Thirdly*, it is owing to this process of systematic deduction, that the Reformed divines made use of their material in a more *speculative* way, as appears already in this, that from the time of Peter Martyr, they were accustomed strictly to distinguish between the doctrines to be inferred from the facts of consciousness, the being of God and the need of salvation, and such as could only be known by divine revelation in a narrower sense, as the Trinity and the fact of redemption. In this distinction between *theologia naturalis* and *revelata*, or of *articuli mixti* and *puri*, was to be found the preparation and commencement of a correct *synthesis* between the need and the fact of salvation. The Reformed theologians sought to exhibit Christianity in its actual necessity, and it is evident that the Reformed Church and theologians, upon the whole, were more successful in keeping clear of Rationalism than the Lutherans.

The introduction of the doctrine of predestination into the Reformed Dogmatics—their shadowy side—is to be as-

cribed to Calvin. In this way the *synthetic* of the method was still more advanced. The theologians, especially of Switzerland and Holland, loved to give prominence to the *Decretum Dei*, and to refer every doctrine relating to the historical development of salvation to it. Thus the significance of *history* is destroyed. It is reduced to a mathematical *fact* of the eternal factor, the *Decretum Dei*; and in itself is without meaning. It constitutes a *particular, scholastic* school, and derives the whole of Christianity from the divine decree. But this school is, by no means, to be identified with Reformed Dogmatics. Within the bosom of the Reformed Church itself, there arose three powerful influences to oppose it. The first proceeded from that *biblical, historical* character, peculiar to the Reformed Dogmatics, which would not permit itself to be silently thrust aside, but was exhibited in the energetic and efficient resistance of the followers of *Cocceius*, or the *Federalists*, over against the Scholastics—a resistance which fully appreciated the historical development of the *Fœdus Dei*. The *speculative* character of the Reformed Dogmatics, at one time prevalent, and never to be obliterated, expressed in the opposition of the *Cartesians* to the Scholastics, was the second; and the third was the German Reformed Church.

The influence of the Heidelberg Catechism, i. e., of the Lutheran Melancthonian, anthropological—subjective stand-point, upon Reformed Dogmatics, originated with the Palatines, and was expressed in Commentaries upon the Catechism, less in the way of opposition, than of friendly complement. It has often been cast up to the Reformed Church in the tone of reproach, that for the good she has, for instance, her purification from the errors of the doctrine of predestination, and of the Lord's Supper flowing from it, she is indebted to the Lutheran. The Reformed Church, however, may with greater right take to herself the credit (humanly speaking) of maintaining those noble truths of Melancthon, which the Lutheran Church rejected. It is certainly more praiseworthy to accept any thing good, from an adversary, than to throw away that which we ourselves possess. In this we see the mild, pliant, tractable disposi-

tion of the Reformed Church, of its Theology, and Dogmatics, always inclined to union (an actual sincere union, not one decreed by the State); and without giving up her peculiarities, ever making advances towards the Lutheran Church.

This then, finally, is the result of the combination of those three original elements, the Zwinglian, Calvinistic and Melancthonian, that the Dogmatics of the Reformed Church are not confined to the limits of a single school; but comprehend the true wealth of various schools beyond her proper boundaries. We can, therefore, do the Reformed Church no worse service, than with *Schweitzer*, to affirm that the principle of one of these schools, the predestination-scholastic, is absolutely that of her Dogmatics, and then ignore that of all the rest; and in this way too, irrespective of the particular interest he had in view, introduce a deterministic-pantheism into the Reformed Dogmatics. That we may appreciate the influence of these several schools, we now revert to

THE PERIOD OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE REFORMATION.

The first Dogmatic written during the Reformation period was by Melancthon, and this must not be overlooked, inasmuch as Melancthon, as to his school, if not his person, belongs to the Reformed Church. As his work grew out of a practical church necessity, so its method was prescribed by the same emergency. In the *sententiis* of the mædieval scholastica, the material was so arranged into system, that many of the doctrines, which, during the Reformation, were considered all important, in controversy, are either not at all, or only incidentally alluded to, for instance, *de justificatione, de lege et evangelio, de ecclesia*. Each of these was now discussed in a separate chapter, or so called *locus*. Hence the name, "*Loci Communes, sive Hypotyposes*." The first edition appeared at Wittenberg in 1521. The *loci* were arranged methodically after the plan of the Epistle to the Romans. This method, though apparently synthetic, i. e., proceeding from "God," was, nevertheless, anthropological and analytic. The doctrines

of the Trinity and of the person of Christ were not in the first edition.

Precisely the reverse, Zwingle, in his *Commentarius de vera et falsa religione*, 1525, proceeded from no practical-church want, but sought to represent the evangelical doctrine in its proper scientific light. Hence, in the true sense, his synthetic, intelligibly consequential method. He begins with an introductory section, *de vocabulo religionis*, defines religion as the reciprocally related relation between God and man, and commences in the first chapter *de Deo*, to show, not so much the nature of God, as formally to unfold the knowledge of God. He proves that the human understanding is just as little able to comprehend the nature of God, as an insect is to conceive the nature of man, and hence the necessity of a revelation. He next proceeds to show from Ex. 3: 14, that God is the *I am*, the *self-existent*, and that as such, he is the *good*, and accordingly the *living*, personal, wise, almighty; finally, he is the Holy One, and is love. All the revelations of God are, therefore, revelations of *grace* which must be received by *faith*. This leads him to the second chapter, *de homine*, in which, however, he does not place the original state of man, and his present fallen condition along side of each other, but considers man, as to his existing, concrete appearance, as absolutely sinful and *blind*. It is only in the third chapter, *de religione*, that he goes back to the *status integritatis*, and the actual fall, and shows that now no other religion than that of redemption and atonement is possible. In the fourth chapter, *de religione christiana*, he exhibits the fact of redemption, the work of Christ; in the fifth, *de evangelio*, the doctrine of the atonement; in the sixth, *de penitentia*, the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation; in the seventh, *de lege*, and the eighth, *de peccato*, the doctrine of sanctification, and the relation which the law sustains to it; in the ninth, *de peccato in spiritum sanctum*, the doctrine of unbelief as the chief sin, the only truly damning sin. This leads, in the tenth chapter, *de clavibus*, to the difference between the divine judicial authority and the human churchly office. In the eleventh,

he develops the doctrine *de ecclesia*, with which is connected that of the sacraments, and finally in the concluding chapters we have his controversy against praying to the Saints, Purgatory, the Anabaptists, and other forms of heresy. Each particular point is carefully elaborated in connexion with the whole and its several parts, and is sustained by appropriate Scripture texts. The plan is imposing, but towards the close it is deficient in order. In the controversial parts, the definitions are not comprehensive. Every thing moves in a continuous flow. We meet with a wealth of speculative ideas, but not a single well constructed dogma. The whole work is more suggestive than instructive.

Both sides, the Zwinglian systematic speculation and the smooth dogmatic reasoning of Melancthon are remarkably combined in Calvin's *Institutio christianae religionis*, a work which the Reformed Confessions properly regard with great satisfaction. Calvin places, at the ground of his system, the Trinity, i. e., the trinitarian *manifestations* of God, in creation, the work of Christ, and the appropriation of salvation; and inasmuch as he here separates the subjective, inward appropriation of salvation by the individual, from the Church, as the complex of the objective, external means of grace, he gains a fourth part, *de externis mediis, vel adminiculis, quibus Deus in Christi societatem invitat, et in ea retinet*.* These four parts are subdivided into chapters, in each of which, the material from the Holy Scriptures and the *anal. fidei*, constitute the first part. We then have, either a special argument respecting disputed points, or a careful exhibition of some particular theory. This is followed for the most part by a section, *de usu*, i. e., concerning the religious application of the doctrine referred to, and finally a practical polemic against false doctrine.

Calvin generally is very strict in his definitions and distinctions, but they must still be sought in the flow of the general discourse, and it must be carefully observed wheth-

Predestination is exhibited, not as *decretum Dei*, but quite anthropologically!—as *electio Dei* in the third part.

er they intend to express the idea in all its bearings, or have their form merely in particular propositions. It is owing to this that Calvin is frequently misunderstood. Besides, he is too active a spirit to be always bound by his own definitions. He often uses the same term in different or modified senses, and this sometimes leads to confusion. His greatness, for this reason, lies much less in his punctuation of particular doctrines, than in the construction of his system. There is a great stride from the vacillating, indistinctness of Zwingle to Calvin's clearly defined particular Dogmas. Calvin always furnishes all the ideas necessary to the construction and comprehension of his Dogma. With Augustine, he belongs to those working spirits, whose wealth it will take many generations to exhaust. That which he organically produces, they must arrange and dispose of methodically.

Melancthon, Zwingle and Calvin, in a limited sense, are the original Dogmatics. To them, however, during the period of the gradual separation of the two Confessions, several other Dogmatic schools must be added, which, in a wider sense, must also be considered fundamental, inasmuch as the principal methods of discussion subsequently were very much influenced by them. We begin with that of German Switzerland. *Peter Martyr Vermilius*, an Italian, liberally educated in a convent in his own country, advanced to high office, and then banished, with others, on account of his evangelical faith, labored in Strasburg, with Bucer, Capito and Calvin as theologians—fled during the Augsburg Interim to England, and from thence, at the recommendation of Bullinger, was called to Zurich. He was engaged with an edition of *locis theologicis*, and was relieved from his labors by death. The French preacher in London, *Robert Massonius*, collected from his posthumous works, the material for his Dogmatics, published in England. A more complete edition was afterwards published in Zurich in 1580, by Antistes Gualter, under the title: *Petri Martyris Vermilii loci communes*. Peter Martyr, in many respects occupied the Zwinglian stand-point.

Bullinger, the friend and follower of *Zwingle*, as *Antistes*, a decided man, to whom the Church of Zurich is indebted for its organization, and who embraced and introduced the Calvinistic theory into his Church, wrote a *Compendium religionis Christianae*, &c. In *Bullinger* we have already the full type of the German *Swiss* school. Absolute predestination is not only not the principle of the theological doctrine, *de decreto*, but it is passed over in the soteriological part, and modified in the Lutheran sense. The object and contents of predestination is Christ. Of an election, or rather of a reprobation of individuals, there is not a word. The spirit of *Bullinger's* Dogmatic, like that of the *Heidelberg Catechism*, is anthropological—soteriological. Its form is compendious, strict, decided. He does not trouble himself with abstruse questions. What he undertakes to discuss, he treats with great acuteness and precision, and in such way, that in its systematic connexion with the whole, light is thrown upon every part.

To this German *Swiss* school belongs *Wolfgang Musculus Dusanus* from Lorraine. He was preacher in *Augsburg*, and was driven away during the interim. After the fall of the ultra *Zwinglian* party in *Bern*, in 1549, he was called to be Professor of Theology, and died in 1563. The appellation *venerandus senex*, given him by the *Bernese*, shows his standing. He wrote *loci communes theologici* (*Basel*, 1564, *Bern*, 1573) somewhat similar to *Bullinger's* *Compendium*, breathing the same anthropological spirit. *Benedict Aretius*, also a *Bernese* theologian was a man of a polemical spirit, as may be seen in his writings. *Stephen Szegedin*, a *Hungarian*, published in *Basel*, 1585: *Theologiae sinceræ loci communes de Deo et homine*, &c., a commencement of scholastic discussion. *Polanus von Polensdorf*, professor in *Basel*, also published in 1609, a *Syntagma theologiae Christianae*, evasive of predestination, which, as a compendium, was for several decennaries, the basis of the lectures delivered at the University, until in 1626, *Antistes John Wollebius*, wrote his celebrated *Theologiae Compendium*. This last work, as to form, is simple and very short, but as to contents, most

excellent. Wollebius is decidedly one of the most *spirited* Dogmatics that ever lived, a real Peter Lombard, or *magister sententiarum*, for the Reformed Church. In twelve sheets duodecimo, he gives in short theses, an amount of deeply significant ideas, an inexhaustible fund of available material. The Reformed scholastics, in fact, in most points, wrote upon the foundation laid by Wollebius. He constituted the transition from the compendium form to scholasticism.

Allied to the Zurichers, the Basler and Bernese schools is the *German Reformed*, and most conspicuous are the Palatinate theologians. At their head stand the two compilers of the Heidelberg Catechism, Ursinus and Olevianus.

Zach. Ursinus was born in Breslau in 1534, was the pupil of Melancthon at Wittenberg, 1550-57, then went to Heidelberg, Strasburg and Basel. In Geneva he was the friend of Calvin, in Zurich of Bullinger, and then became Professor in Breslau. Involved, however, in the controversy on the Lord's Supper in 1562, he voluntarily relinquished his place, and soon afterwards was made Professor of Dogmatics in Heidelberg.

Caspar Olevianus was born at Triers in 1536. Embracing at an early age the evangelical doctrine of the atonement, he spent his youth at Frankfort, in the study of the law, and on reading Calvin's writings became acquainted with the Gospel. Induced by appalling misfortunes to become a theologian, he studied with Calvin, Beza, Bullinger and Peter Martyr, returned to Thiers, labored for the Reformation, and after many severe trials, became Professor of Theology at Heidelberg in 1561. During the first year of his residence there, in connexion with Ursinus, he wrote an *explicatio catechesis*, and in 1574 a Dogmatic monograph of great excellence, still extant in German. In the same year appeared the "Confession of the Theologians and Church officers at Heidelberg, of the one true God, the two natures in Christ, and the Holy Sacrament of the Supper of our Lord Jesus Christ." In 1575, Olevianus wrote his work on the "Words of the Lord's Supper and their true meaning." Although these three works partake more

of the character of apologetic-polemic monographs, than of Compendes of Dogmatics, they are still of great value for the history of Reformed Dogmatics and a proper appreciation of the spirit of the Palatinate school. We learn from them the Melancthonian, anthropological spirit of the Dogmatics, apprehending redemption from its subjective side, and become acquainted too with Calvinism in a limited sense, essentially complementary. But there proceeded also from this school, a particular Compend: *Synlogma theologiae*, by the Heidelberg Professor, *Keckerman*, breathing the same spirit in the form of comprehensive paragraphs. Keckerman was philologically and philosophically learned, and perfectly familiar with Aristotle; but in Dogmatics was simple with all his acuteness, and avoided abstruse questions. Akin to the Palatinate school was that of Hesse, prominently represented by their great theologian, the Marburg Professor, *Andreas Hyperius* (properly Andrew Gerhart of Ypern). A contemporary of Calvin, liberally educated, distinguished for his beautiful Latin, and still more so as a practical theologian, especially in Homiletics, he wrote his *Methodus theologiae*, &c., which he was not permitted to finish, but which in its imperfect state appeared after his death at Basel in 1568. He proceeded systematically, but in such way that the anthropological side at the same time decidedly preponderated. It was less the subjective appropriation of salvation, than—pure Reformed—the idea of the objective Church which constituted the basis of his plan. Hyperius evades predestination, and so does the whole Hessian school after him. As belonging to it, we must also mention *Henry Alsted*, with his *Theologia didactica*, Hanover, 1618, which constitutes already the conscious transition from the systematic compend form to the scholastic free construction of particular Dogmas. He was a member of the Synod of Dort, but was as free from predestinationism as was Hyperius himself. Among the Hessians was the Holland theologian, *Henry von Diest*, with his *Theologia biblica*, Deventer, 1643, as to material regulated pretty much by the Synod of Dort, but as to form, still that of simple compend.

At this period we see that two thirds of the Reformed Church were *entirely free* from the obliquity of absolute predestinationism, and that not more than one third, the Calvinistic, embraced it. To it belonged particularly *Theodore Beza*, a French refugee, distinguished as an *Exeget*, who was received by Calvin at Geneva. He wrote *Questionum et responsionum christianarum libellum* in the strict predestinarian sense. Geneva, 1580. To the same school we must also reckon Peter Ramus, who fell a martyr on the night of St. Bartholomew, the Geneva theologian, *Daniel Chamier* and *Bened. Pictetus* (Professor at Geneva). Akin to these, are the Lausanne professors, *Bucanus*, *Antoine la Fage*, professor in Geneva, and finally, the Scotch theologian, *John Scharpius*, professor in France, with his *Cursum theologicum in quo controversiæ omnes, de fidei dogmatibus inter nos et pontificios, pertractantur, et ad Bellarmini argumenta responditur*—Geneva, 1620.

ART. V.—THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE first impulse of the human reason is to believe; then it becomes an effort to know in the strength of its belief, or of its intuitive primary ideas; that is, to form a conception of its objects or to hold single things in the sphere of thought as they exist in reality. This incipient knowledge, however, does not by itself satisfy the deeper demands of the reason. It only prepares the way for a higher kind of knowledge. It serves to unfold the impulse of the reason to know according to a two-fold order of law; first, according to the laws which underlie and determine the essential nature and relations of being; and secondly, according to the laws which determine the activity of the reason or the laws of thinking. Thus we get the conception of Philosophy; which is the deepest and most comprehensive form of knowledge.

Philosophy as a form of knowledge implies a peculiar relation of subject and object, of that which knows and that which is known. The subject is the human reason, or that which thinks. The reason thinks, or is active, from a necessity of its nature, impelling it to approach, enquire into, and reproduce its object according to its intuitive ideas and its own laws. These intuitive ideas are the inner forms of objective existence which the reason in the process of normal development evolves out of itself. Its laws are each a necessity determining the manner of its activity; and are called the laws of thinking. It cannot think of any object but in conformity to these laws. Freely obeying the impulse to know, the reason finds the counterpart or prototype of its intuitive ideas in its objects, and reproduces them or gives them an existence in itself, the process of reproducing them, or of giving the object a place in the

subject, being determined by the laws of thinking. Philosophy derives its *form* accordingly from the ideas and laws of the human reason.

The *matter* of philosophy is the object of the reason reproduced according to the laws of thinking. As constituting the matter of philosophy the object of the reason is being; not a single thing, nor a class of things, nor even various classes of things in their reciprocal relations, but being as such, that is, being in its necessity and generality. For the reason does not only assume that there is an objective existence, but that this objective existence is an organic order of things resting on an absolute ground in virtue of which the organic order is what it is.

The *necessity* of being consists in this, that it is itself and can not be any thing but itself. Necessity is absolute or relative. An absolute necessity—*absolute*, from *ab* and *solvere*, to be loose or free from every thing but itself—is predicable of a being that, grounded in itself, is not determined nor conditioned by any thing but itself. Such necessity holds only in God. A relative necessity—*relative*, from *re* and *ferre* to bear or carry back to something else—is predicated of a being that is derived; the necessity of its nature and relations being determined by that from which it is derived. Such necessity holds in every created object. Philosophy has to do with being, both in its relative and its absolute necessity; but it always seeks to resolve the relative into the absolute, or to know the relative as determined by the absolute; for it is the tendency of the reason to reduce all its objects to their ultimate ground, and from this to deduce their nature, essential attributes and relations.

The *generality* of being is that which underlies and identifies all particular entities or phenomena in every objective sphere. In virtue of this, individuals are reducible to species, species to genera, genera to more comprehensive genera; or genera are reducible to classes, classes to orders, and orders to kingdoms or grand divisions. The objective is susceptible, however, of still further reduction. In every

objective subordinate sphere or grand division of being, the less general is successively reducible to the more general, until it resolves itself into that which is most general and comprehensive, and therefore common to all the individuals belonging to the given division. And all spheres or grand divisions of created being, whether rational or irrational, are in turn reducible to that which is deeper and broader than themselves—to that consequently which is common to and pervades all created objects. In virtue of a common principle which is thus discoverable in these innumerable objects, they constitute, when taken as a whole, a unit, or the universe, which in all its departments and single parts is the embodiment and expression of the wisdom, power and goodness of the Creator. These attributes are again reducible to the Divine Will; which, as it brought the universe into existence out of nothing, has left its impress no less upon the worm or a blade of grass than upon the noblest man or the most exalted angel. The process of generalization recedes thus from the lowest through ever widening circles until the reason is able to hold all circles of entities, whether organic or inorganic, material or immaterial, natural or moral, each in its coordinate and subordinate relations to others, under one most comprehensive conception. Until the reason can comprehend each circle of entities, or sphere of being, in its relation to its principle and to all others; or until it can comprehend all spheres of being, each in its relation to the rest and to an absolute principle, which pervades them all in common, its deepest wants are not satisfied; for it is the tendency of the reason not only to reduce each object and sphere of being to its ultimate ground, but also, what is its correlative act, to discover the identity of all specific differences or to determine the unity in the greatest multiplicity.

Necessity and generality do not cohere but inhere in being. They are not separable attributes. The one is the correlate of the other. Necessity is general, and generality is necessary. Implying each other, they are but different aspects of a unity; and in their union may be said to constitute the *law* of being.

The matter of philosophy as including the necessity and generality of being, arises under a three-fold enquiry : what ? why ? how ? corresponding to the three-fold fundamental activity of the reason : conception, judgment and reasoning.

1. What? or what is it? The understanding seeks to bound off each object from all others; and thus forms a definite conception of it. This conception *includes* all its essential, in distinction from its accidental attributes; and at the same time *excludes* the attributes which are essential to other objects. With a correct answer to this form of enquiry any particular investigation of philosophy begins. The reason must accurately and clearly distinguish the object of investigation from every other. Without such distinction any attempt at inductive or deductive reasoning involves thinking in confusion.

2. Why? or why is it? The reason enquires spontaneously: What is the principle or ground, and what is the end or design of the object? To have a definite conception of an object does not suffice. It strives to know the nature of things. To know the nature of a thing is to refer it to its proximate generality, or to know it as the individualization of some general law or principle. Any thing short of this is not satisfactory. The perception of an oak simply as an isolated object possessing solidity, size and form, is only conditional to an enquiry into the nature of the oak—into that which is more general than itself. For the general constitutes the nature of the particular. The nature of the oak is that of the tree; the nature of the tree that of the plant; and the nature of the plant that of an organism. Each is a modification of what is more general than itself. The reason forms, therefore, on the one hand, a conception of the single oak, and on the other, seeks to know it as a tree; then seeks to know the tree as a plant, and the plant as an organism; for only when it refers the individual to the species, and the species to the genus, does it see clearly why the essential attributes of the individual are what they are. It knows that which underlies the single object and determines it to be itself. This is its nature.

Thus to refer the individual to the particular, and the particular to the general is to judge. Judgment consists in distinguishing the particular from the general and holding both together as a whole. When the particular is the subject, the general is the predicate; and judgment is inductive; as, The lily is a flower. When the general is the subject, the particular is the predicate; and judgment is deductive. A regular series of inductive judgments is retrogressive; the reason looks at each conception successively in the light of one that is deeper and more general, thus running back until it forms a judgment whose predicate can not in turn be recognized as a particular and taken as the subject of another more general judgment. This predicate then becomes the ultimate and most satisfactory answer to the question, Why?

8. How? or how is it? An enquiry into the necessity of a thing is associated with another. The reason has an idea of mode of being, of manner of development, or of a way in which a thing comes to be what it is, and of a relation which one thing sustains to another, as well as of a ground principle from which it is unfolded. For simple existence implies a mode of existence, development a manner of development, and succession an order of succession. Both enter into the nature of a thing. And the demands of reason are not met until it has a knowledge of both as united in its object. Hence when philosophy enquires: Why? or what is the ground principle? What is the necessity of a thing? it enquires also: How? or what is its mode of existence or activity? What is its manner of development, or the order of succession? Or how does it come to be what it is? These two forms of enquiry are not identical; neither are they separable; but one implies the other. The matter of philosophy does not arise accordingly under three separate questions which are mechanically connected; but it arises under a three-fold form of one enquiry of the human reason, each form presupposing in order to a correct and complete answer the necessity of an answer also to the other two.

This last form of enquiry corresponds to and calls forth an act of reasoning. The reason draws a conclusion. In answer to, what? it acquires a definite conception of a given particular. In answer to, why? it discovers the necessity of the particular, or the general in which the particular is grounded. In answer to how? it discovers the manner in which the predicate of the general becomes the predicate of the particular. Just as the question, how? implies the question, why? and *vice versa*, so does an act of reasoning, or a conclusion, imply an act of judgment. The reason must distinguish the particular from the general before it can ascribe the same predicate to both. And an act of judgment completes itself in an act of reasoning. Comprehending the particular under the general, the reason seeks to ascribe the same predicate to both, that is, to identify their attributes: a result that is reached by the process of reasoning.

The result of this three-fold enquiry conducted according to the laws of thinking, is a scientific knowledge of the essential nature and relations of the object of reason. This is philosophy. The object may be the reason itself. Philosophy then becomes the science of the reason—a particular branch of philosophy; and as such, is required to determine what the reason is, why it knows, how it knows, and solve all the problems which arise under these general questions. Or the object may be the outer world, the visible creation as a whole, or any part of it, as the earth, the vegetable or animal kingdom, or any subordinate division. Philosophy then becomes the science of nature, of the earth, of plants or of animals, or Natural Science, Geology, Botany, Zoology, and so forth. But the object may also be the universe viewed as an organic totality, including the reason, the outer world as well as all possible orders and forms of existence. This is philosophy as such, or philosophy taken in its widest sense; and may be defined to be *the science of being*. As the Science of Being, philosophy is required to determine the necessity and generality of the universal order of things: the relation of each single thing to the

subordinate order of existence in which it inheres, the relation of one subordinate order to another and to all others, and the relation of all orders or systems of things to their common ground. Fundamental to the solution of these problems is the position of the human reason itself. What is the relative position of the human reason in the universal system of things? What is its relation to itself and to all knowable objects? With the solution of this problem, philosophy, in order to be legitimate, whether true or false, must begin. The solution becomes the principle that permeates and modifies every investigation, and determines the character of all its results.

Defining philosophy to be the Science of being, we have three elements accordingly which enter into its nature: 1. Its *form*, which is derived from the human reason. The reason knows, and can know only, according to its primary ideas, and laws of thought. Its knowledge of objective existence assumes shape and order therefore under its own moulding power. Hence philosophy is Science in the highest sense of the word. 2. Its contents or *matter*, which is derived from, and determined by, the nature of the object. Subject and object, or the reason and its objects are not identical, unless the object be the reason itself; but even here we must distinguish between the objective nature of the reason as a being and the laws of its activity according to which it becomes conscious of itself. The matter of philosophy is not, therefore, the ideas of the human reason, but being as it is in itself. 3. The legitimate *union* of form and matter. This depends upon a correspondence or reciprocity of subject and object, or of the laws of thinking and the laws of being. To know a thing according to the laws of thought is to know it also according to its own nature. Philosophy is, therefore, being as it is in itself, or the necessity and generality of being, existing under the form of the human reason.

Such is the nature of *true* philosophy; though, strictly speaking, there is no room for the distinction between true and false philosophy. For philosophy is true philosophy

in the nature of the case. If it be not true as to form and matter, it can not properly be called philosophy; it is only a system of vain speculation, or philosophy "falsely so called." Yet as there are many false systems of speculation which pretend to be true philosophy, it is necessary and proper to endeavor to draw the line of distinction between a true and a false system.

As philosophy is the product of thinking, and thinking is the activity of reason, it follows that a true system of philosophy hinges on the true position of the human reason. As the reason sustains a relation to itself, to the world and to God, and has in consequence a fixed relative position in the objective order of things, it must occupy a place corresponding to this three-fold relation in a true subjective system of thinking. To determine the true position of the human reason becomes, therefore, the fundamental problem in philosophy. This resolves itself into three primary questions: What is the first principle of philosophical thinking? What is a true conception of the human reason? And what is the relation of reason to the outer world, or of reason to its objects? A true system of philosophy presupposes a correct answer to this three-fold enquiry.

We will consider the first two questions together. The first principle of philosophy is not the human reason; for it is not the common centre or ultimate ground of the universal whole. Though a philosophical knowledge of the universe to the degree that it is attainable, is its own legitimate product, as the acorn is the product of the oak, yet, objectively considered, it is but a part of the universal whole; it is a subordinate order of created being; and must, therefore, to be true to itself and its relations, have a conception of itself corresponding to its objective subordinate relation to the absolute ground of all things. This absolute ground is God, the Creator alike of the outer world and of the human reason. God is, therefore, the first principle of philosophy, whom the human reason must know in order to a true scientific knowledge both of itself and of all other orders of being. For it can be laid down

as an axiom, that what is the ultimate ground of the objective order of things must constitute the first principle in a valid subjective system. Otherwise any system of philosophy is destitute of all truth—nothing but a web of abstract speculation woven by an arbitrary imagination, and producing more confusion than unthinking ignorance itself.

An answer to the first question, prepares the way for an answer to the second. As the author of the human reason is God, the reason must be referred to God as the ground from which it derives its nature. It can not be known from itself; no more than a tree can be known without a conception of the vegetable kingdom. A true idea of the reason depends accordingly upon a true idea of God. The nature of philosophy itself drives us to this conclusion. Philosophy proceeding according to the laws of thinking, always refers a species to its genus, an effect to its cause, a consequence to its ground, and determines a conception of the latter by that of the former. In reflecting on itself the reason must proceed according to the same laws. It is a particular order of created spirit. God is the infinite creative Spirit. On the same principle, therefore, that reason refers a particular to a general and a consequence to a ground, must it refer itself to God; and on the same principle that a conception of a vegetable is conditional to a conception of a tree, or a conception of a ground to that of its consequence, is a true idea of God, the Creator, conditional to a true idea of the human reason. To admit the principles of a sound Theism, and yet seek to evolve a true idea of reason from itself, and refuse to view it in the light of its absolute ground, is in effect to make it, instead of God, the common centre of all orders of being and thus violate the very laws of thinking, conformity to which all philosophy presupposes.

Taking a true idea of God as the first principle, and determining the idea of the reason and of its relative position by the idea of God, a true system of philosophy becomes possible. The ultimate ground of the reason and of the universe, is then the point of observation from which the

reason views itself, the outer world and God. Reason is held consciously in its normal subordinate relation to the first principle of philosophy. In other words, the position which God holds and the human reason holds in idea, corresponds to the position which God and the human reason hold respectively in reality. Reason may then go forth on its high mission, roaming through the illimitable regions of objective existence, and every where, to the extent that it can answer its enquiries, come into possession of the truth. The true philosopher—to take an apt illustration—is like the astronomer who, contrary to the apparent position of the earth, believes the sun to be the centre of the planetary system; the real centre of the objective order of nature becomes the point of departure in the science of nature, the earth being regarded but as a subordinate orb, upon which the light of the sun shines directly and its rays are reflected also from innumerable other worlds. Although his abode is upon the earth, yet as he takes the sun to be the principle of his system and knows the relative position of the earth, he can make correct observations upon the heavens from a subordinate sphere and construct a true system of astronomy. He knows the true relative position of the earth because he knows the central relation of the sun. Astronomy, or a true science of the heavens, then becomes possible.

A true system of philosophy depends, therefore, upon a correct Theology. The reason must know God before, properly speaking, it can know itself or the outer world philosophically. If it does not know God or has a false idea of God, it can not know itself truly, nor can it form a correct conception of its relative position. A false system of philosophy follows as a necessary consequence. Taking itself as the centre of its system of thinking, it stands in a false relation to God and to all other objects of thought. Its views are distorted. It looks at every thing under a false aspect. The system may proceed strictly according to the laws of thinking; it may be logical throughout; yet the final results will be false, because the point of observa-

tion is false. A false philosopher is like the man who believes the earth, the orb on which he lives, to be the centre of an order of worlds, because the sun, moon and stars apparently revolve around it. With this idea, as the principle of his system, he may make careful observations upon the heavens and conduct his calculations strictly according to the laws of Mathematics, yet all his deductions, his views of his own position, the position of the sun, the real centre of things, and his views of the relative position of every star, must be false. To say that the earth must be the point of observation and the centre of a rational system because it is the place of his actual abode, passes for nothing with every scientific naturalist. An observer can not know the relative position of the earth, just because he does not know nor acknowledge the central relation of the sun. The parallel holds good throughout. To say that because philosophy is the product of thinking, the reason must ignore the central relation of God and start with its own hypotheses of itself and its objects, thus making itself, a subordinate order of existence, the centre of its system of ratiocination, should also pass for nothing with every consistent scientific theist; for it involves the very absurdity with which the man is chargeable who presumes to make scientific observations upon the heavens on the assumption that the earth is the stationary centre of the universe.

But it is necessary to advance a step further. How shall we obtain a true idea of God? The question demands a solution; for it involves the *sine qua non* of philosophy. Nature or the outer world is indeed a revelation of God; but the history of man proves incontrovertibly, that, left to his own powers, he derives a false conception of the Supreme Being from his observations upon nature. Nature does not suffice. The human reason, or man himself, is a higher revelation than nature, but we have already shown how, on the principle of a theistic view of the universe, the nature of philosophy itself demands a reference of reason to its original ground; the reason can not even form a correct conception of reason but in the light of a true idea

of God ; much less can it form a true idea of God, the Infinite Creator, from itself, that is, from its imperfect conception of a finite spirit, or from the reflections of its own uncertain, flickering light. In addition to this we must make due account of the presence of moral evil or sin, which has enfeebled, darkened and disordered the whole human constitution. However clear and consistent the intuitions of man were in his original and normal condition, they are now nothing more than the confused utterances of a being struggling in his weakness to extricate himself from painful contradiction, and reaching out unceasingly to lay hold of the absolute Good, but always grasping the shadow instead of the substance. That there is a God sounds continually from the profoundest depths of human rationality ; but to the question : What is God ? there comes forth no satisfactory response. The human reason was like a quiet, placid lake that reflects a beautiful and true image of the sun ; but now lashed into foam by the winds and casting up mire and dirt from beneath, the reflections are indeed innumerable but all are distorted and delusive.

Hence we assume the necessity of a revelation different from and higher than that which nature and man afford—the necessity of a supernatural revelation in order to a true idea of God ; not only the necessity, but without further argument we assume the fact also. There is a supernatural revelation, exhibiting the divine, the human, and the natural, each as it really is in itself, and all in their objective reciprocal relations to each other. That revelation is at hand in the person of Jesus Christ. The Christian Religion is a system of various facts constituting one harmonious whole ; but the meaning of all from the creation down to the resurrection and the final consummation of all things culminates in Himself. Very God and very man in one person, He reveals a true idea of God—of His attributes and works ; and a true idea of man—of his constitution, his fall, his wants, his capacities, and his relations to himself, to the world and to God. A correct conception

of creation—of the material and immaterial—depends on a true idea of God and His infinite attributes. Christ as God reveals God ; God as the Creator ; and in consequence also the relation of spirit to matter and of matter to spirit. Christ as man reveals man, as to body, soul and spirit ; reveals him as he was, originally right, pure, and in possession of truth, capable of knowing as he was known ; and reveals him as he is now, depraved and ignorant, yet salvageable, that is, susceptible, through Him, of being restored to a position in which he can attain to true and boundless wisdom. In Him, as in a polished mirror, man may see man, may see himself, in all his normal objective relations. It is in Christ, therefore, that the true idea of God and of man appears to the eagle eye of reason. He becomes, accordingly, the first principle of all legitimate metaphysical enquiry. A correct Theology depends upon a sound Christology.

To sum up the results of the argument : A true system of philosophy must take the absolute ground of the objective universe as its principle. The origin of the universal whole is the true point of departure in a subjective system. As that absolute ground is God, reason must possess a true idea of God as essential to the validity of the final results of inductive or deductive ratiocination. A true idea of God is not derived from nature nor evolved out of man's being, but is brought to light alone in Jesus Christ, who is the organic union of God and man, and therefore, the most perfect revelation both of the human reason or of humanity, and of God, the absolute ground of all things. It follows that valid metaphysical enquiry depends upon a belief in and a knowledge of Christ ; that is, if the human reason start with the idea of God which is revealed by and in Christ, it becomes possible, so far forth at least, to unfold a true philosophy. If this idea is ignored or rejected, the first essential condition is wanting, and the very possibility of a true philosophy is out of the question. No logically consistent metaphysician can take any position short of this who believes that Jesus Christ possesses sufficient

claims to be regarded as the Author of the only true Religion, as the Son of God, the Word made flesh. For as such He is not only the principle of theology and the only Redeemer of men, but He is the concrete resolution also of all possible problems in philosophy.

Not wishing to make this article longer than it has become already, we shall not enter upon the discussion of the question: What is the relation of the reason to the outer world or to its objects? the answer to which constitutes the third essential condition of a true system of thinking.

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VI.—HUGH MILLER.

MY SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLMASTERS: or The Story of my Education. By HUGH MILLER. Author of "Old Red Sand Stone," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1854.

SCENES AND LEGENDS OF THE NORTH OF SCOTLAND. By HUGH MILLER. Author of "Footprints of the Creator," &c. Cincinnati: Wm. H. Moore & Co. 1851.

EVERY instance of signal achievement by native genius, unaided by any merely circumstantial helps, is an object of special interest to the world. Real power, indeed, always challenges regard, even though it develop itself amidst all the auspicious advantages of birth or position; and though assisted by all the established helps of society, it will, if not suicidal to itself, rarely fail to command the obeisance of mankind. We need not, whilst magnifying the triumphs of self-developed and self-taught intellect, necessarily underrate the importance of those established

methods of civilized society designed to aid systematically the development and culture of the general intellect,—the methods embodied in educational institutions. Depreciatory sneers at College Faculties, and University lectures, generally come either from shallow pretenders, or from men whose minds, though exhibiting unmistakable signs of a certain wild, incoherent power, are one-sided and imperfectly balanced. Because some college students are sumphs, and an occasional untaught shoemaker, tailor or pedlar astonishes the world by the sudden outburst of his genius, it is a very hasty and unwarrantable conclusion that, therefore, all college bred men are sumphs, and the true repository of the intellectual power of the race is among the uneducated classes. But there is something specially significant in the spontaneity of power and genius,—the uprising of the mind by the force of its own expansiveness, throwing off in its way the repressing burdens and obstacles of adverse circumstance, and breaking from its limbs the conventional trammels of society, like Sampson his withs, and standing forth at last in the recognized sublimity of its own conquests. Such spectacles proclaim alike the inherent capability, and the essential brotherhood of the race, and are prophetic of the still greater possible achievements and fraternizations of the future.

Besides, merely as a dramatic scene, a chapter in human life and experience, the uprising and expansion of an intellect of native power amidst the depressing difficulties of poverty, and toil, and social Pariahism, until it comes to claim and receive side by side with the equally gifted heir of fortune and nobility, the equal meed of recognition and homage, is a scene, if truthfully portrayed, of surpassing interest, and mayhap of pathos. It has come to have the triteness of a truism that "truth is stranger than fiction," but it is undoubtedly a most veritable and weighty fact. And the only reason why its full verity is not always seen and felt, is because the truth in all its strangeness, is not at all times easily obtained. Could we have the exact story, in all its essential parts, of the struggling development of

a gifted mind starting from an obscure social position, and have a perfect daguerotype of its soliloquies, its wonderings, its thinkings, its purposes, its resolves, its misgivings, its despondencies, its encouragements, its rebuffs, its struggles, its sufferings, its triumphs,—it would be a more irresistibly tentative tale than any which fiction may weave. And we hold that any man who has risen up through such a pathway to a position of power and fame, confers lasting obligation upon his generation by daguerotyping for it his inward and outward history:—a task to which there is often a very strong disinclination, and which must at best be very imperfectly accomplished, because a large part of the most valuable elements of it must have irrecoverably vanished long before the determination could be entertained to give them expression and permanence.

The instances of intellectual achievement from the starting-point of humble life are more noticeable in a country where there exists a strong body of hereditary aristocracy, to whom may have been practically conceded, to a large extent, a monopoly of talent as well as of wealth. It cannot have escaped the careful student of English literature how much more inseparable from its literary names is the idea of their birth-position, than in any other country having a different social constitution. He cannot think of Robert Burns, of James Hogg, of Allan Cunningham, of Motherwell, Bloomfield, or Tannahill, without connecting with the image of the man the thought of the social stratum from which he sprung, and the struggles of his early career. The Scottish people have given to the world some of its finest instances of self-developed genius and power. And perhaps their instances are more numerous than those of any other country of equal population; and this for two reasons, first, because the average intellectuality of the common people of Scotland is unusually high, and, second, because there are in the Scottish character elements of endurance and indomitable resolution and perseverance, which serve to raise out of obscurity many a man, who otherwise, though rich in nature's finer gifts, would sink overborne by

the difficulties of the ascent. These traits of Scottish character, give to some of the Scottish men who have achieved their own fame, a certain ruggedness and strength of feature, a sturdy and manly self-reliance, which appear in them the counterpart of the qualities which have made Scottish captains and soldiers the best in the world for a sudden and effective onslaught. And indeed the heroism in the one case is even a higher heroism than in the other.

To the number of those Scotchmen whose posthumous fame, gained by their own native strength and endurance, the world will delight to cherish, must now be added in sadness another name—HUGH MILLER. It is but a few months since the scientific, the religious, and the general reading worlds were equally startled by the news of his death,—for he had bound himself strongly to them all. We need not detail here the tragic circumstances of that death. Suffice it to say, that he died by his own hand, but a hand misguided by the wild throes of insanity. His brain had been over-worked. The same thirst for knowledge, the same assiduous application which carried him up to his high elevation, and which his strong physical and mental constitution long sustained, at length prostrated the fleshly media of his massive intellect; and, deluded by the spectres of his delirium he turned against himself the fatal instrument of death. We know not a sadder spectacle. And the reader of his Autobiography, fascinated as he will be at every point, will find hovering before him a dark, ominous cloud into which that strange life at length plunges, and which he cannot but regard as a most anomalous and rueful terminus. Like the pierced eagle balked in his flight, he falls helplessly from his giddy empyrean. But it is of small account how a man dies, so as he dies not in moral degradation and guilt,—and in this case we cannot for a moment attach the guilt of the suicide. His life is of greatly more importance; and it is upon this that history sets up the monument of Hugh Miller and its broad shadow covers all that lies behind it.

But what a warning have we here for the students and

thinkers of the age; and especially those whose lives have been diverted from manual occupations. We observed, when at college, that the stout muscular youth who came from the farm or the anvil and sat down assiduously to the pursuits of learning, neglectful of regular exercise and confident of their physical vigor, soonest grew pale, and dyspeptic, and languid, and perhaps broke down in the middle of the course. The transition from one course of habit in which the body is vigorously exercised, to another course of habit in which the mind is exclusively exercised is always perilous. And the imprudent zeal which, aiming to accomplish too much, overtaxes nature, has now sacrificed one of its lordliest victims. It is to be hoped it will have no such second.

Hugh Miller was decidedly and distinctively a Scot. By his father a Saxon, by his mother a Celt, he seems to have combined in himself many of the most admirable traits of both races, and being thrown in early youth, after the death of his father, entirely amongst his mother's Highland relatives, he caught, in a high degree, the spirit of intense, enthusiastic nationality which breathes in Highland tradition and song. This spirit, he tells us, was first aroused in him about his tenth year by reading a legendary life of Sir William Wallace, and "the consciousness of his country," remained tolerably strong in him ever after. In the strong individuality and hardy independence of his character he reminds us somewhat of Robert Burns and the Ettrich Shepherd, the representatives of a certain type of the self-made men of letters of Scotland. But his mind was better balanced, and more firmly set, even as his triumphs lie in a different sphere, and hence he escaped much of the suffering, inward and outward, which fell to the lot of the author of the *Cotter's Saturday Night*, or of *Kilmeny*.

At the time of his death he was generally regarded as one of the most remarkable men in Scotland, and by the Free Church he was regarded as its ablest champion. He was emphatically *the* "man of the people." Not, indeed, an aspiring demagogue, who is often so designated, and

who is a man of the people only so long and so far as he can make the people serve him, but he was a man of the people because he was one of themselves, and continued so to the last, thoroughly in sympathy with them, thoroughly familiar with the beatings of the popular heart, deeply read in the intricate anatomy of the condition and wants of the common mind, and ever ready to give expression to and espouse the cause of the people, whenever that cause demanded expression, in calm and sober earnest. He had a high idea, the result of his own observation and experience, of the capacity and earnestness of the popular mind, and hence, as Editor of the *Edinburgh Witness*, a semi-religious, semi-political organ of the Free Church of Scotland, which post he occupied for some seventeen years, prior to his death, he always addressed the people under the consciousness of this idea. "All the attempts", says he, "at originating a cheap literature that have failed, have been attempts pitched too low: the higher-toned efforts have usually succeeded. If the writer of these chapters has been in any degree successful in addressing himself as a journalist to the Presbyterian people of Scotland, it has always been, not by writing *down* to them, but by doing his best on all occasions to write *up* to them; and by addressing to them on all occasions as good sense and as solid information as he could possibly muster, he has at times succeeded in catching their ear, and perhaps, in some degree, in influencing their judgment." "Beyond all comparison, out of the Church Courts," says the Scotsman, another Free Church paper, in commenting upon his death, "Hugh Miller was the most popular champion the Church possessed. At the time of her triumphant exodus, when her ministers and members assembled in Cannon-mills Hall, in the full flush of victory and freedom, the appearance of none of her defenders, amidst that vast and animated throng—where Chalmers, and Welsh, and Gordon, and Cunningham, and Candlish stood conspicuous—elicited plaudits louder and longer than when Hugh Miller was seen lifting his stalwart form and noble head amongst the people."

In this popular power alone, and the wisdom with which he wielded it, he is an object of admiration and study,—especially in view of the career by which he rose to it. The elements of his mental nature seem to have been adjusted with most consummate skill for the attainment of a wide and permanent influence. The perceptive and logical faculties seem to have been combined in him in the most admirable and efficient proportions for the securing of sure and abiding results. He has not the rapidity of the merely intuitive man, nor the dry dullness of the mere logician, but with strong and clear perceptions, and a steady cautious logic, each mutually giving and receiving aid,—his intuitions now furnishing data for his logic, his logic by and by grasping the heart or centre of affiliated or organic truth, and widening the field of his perceptions—he steers through the intricacies of a difficult question, like the sailor who has his compass well set and the helm grasped by a steady hand. To this general conformation, schooled under the most practical teachers, he owed the amazing accuracy and strength of his Saxon common sense,—to use a popular, though not philosophically accurate term. In him the national characteristic of the Scottish people seems to have obtained its intensest embodiment, and this perhaps more than anything else, brought him at once, so soon as known, into their confidence and affection. He is given to no follies, no vagaries, no impracticable dreams. He seems to detect at once the plausible errors on both sides of every question which he has given himself the trouble to investigate. His practical judgment has all the certainty of the most accurate touchstone. In addition to this the transparent honesty and truthfulness of his nature captivated and delighted his countrymen. No qualities of his character were more conspicuous than these. They saw in him not only an able man, but a truthful man, a sincere man, an earnest man, an honest man, a man devoid of guile, and they both loved and trusted him, no less than they were proud of him. His written style also was admirably adapted to popular effect. His language was a perfect vehicle

of his thought,—and indeed perhaps the same may be said of every man. It exhibited an ease, a richness, an accuracy of expression, a graphic power of portraiture, a trenchant vigor, which could only have been of native growth, and which could not fail to rivet the attention of a large circle of intelligent readers. As specimens of effective and powerful controversial writing, perhaps his articles in the *Witness* during the time of the ecclesiastical troubles in Scotland which resulted in the successful establishment of the Free Church, are unequalled in the history of religious journalism.

But not only as a man of popular power, or as a self-made man in the walks of literary, or religious authorship, was Hugh Miller remarkable. His most permanent fame rests upon a scientific basis. Amongst the practical geologists and paleontologists of the age he took rank with the very first, and as a scientific controversialist he probably had no equal. In the domain of science he was an original explorer and discoverer,—a domain into which he appears to have been led by an instinct as irresistible as that which takes the duckling to the water. Long before he had seen a geological book, or a living geologist, he had made very considerable progress in the examination and classification of the geological and paleontological phenomena of his native district, and to the day of his death he continued to rise steadily in accomplishment and authority in the scientific world. The last agonizing throes of his over-worked mind were spent in producing a distinct work upon the theological bearing of the discoveries of Geology. But of him in this department more hereafter,—we have before us first the personal Hugh Miller.

He was born at Cromarty, a sea-port town of the north of Scotland, Oct. 10th, 1802. By his father's side he was descended from a long line of sea-faring men, remarkable for their great physical strength, their dauntless courage, and their skill in seamanship, and of whom in the earlier generations some had been bold and not overscrupulous buccaniers of the Spanish main. Of this roving race the sea was

the family burial ground. For more than a hundred years not a male of the name had been buried ashore. His father, his grandfather, his two grand uncles, one of whom sailed round the world with Anson, and others of his more distant relatives all sleep beneath the green waters ; so that in some of his fugitive verses, written on ship-board he could exclaim,

" Grave of my kindred, of my sire the grave,
Perchance, where now he sleeps, a space for me
Is marked by Fate beneath the deep green wave."

His father was but an infant when his grandfather was struck overboard, during a sudden gust, by the boom of his vessel in the Frith of Cromarty and never rose again. He was put on shipboard as a cabin boy, and there amid the hardship and rough usage of a sailor's life he grew up a broad-shouldered, deep-chested, strong-limbed man, so compact of bone and muscle that in a ship of the line, in which he afterwards sailed, there was not, among five hundred able-bodied seamen, a man who could lift so great a weight, or grapple with him on equal terms. In the action with the Dutch fleet off the Dogger-Bank, he had a station assigned him at his gun against two of the crew and during the action he actually outwrought them both. And when by dint of energy and thrift he came to possess a sloop of his own and to drive a thriving business in the coasting trade, and when with his sloop he perished in a storm when his son Hugh was five years old, the neighbors used to condole his sorrowing widow with the consolation that he was "one of the best sailors that ever sailed the Moray Frith." From this hardy and vigorous race Hugh Miller derived the physical frame which enabled him to raise breast high the "great lifting stone of the Dropping Cave," and to protect himself by the "noble art of self-defence," against insult and imposition during fifteen years of the rough life of a North Country mason, and trusting to which with mistaken confidence he performed for twenty years double intellectual labor, until he perished by a sadder death, than any of his sea-buried kindred.

By his mother he was descended from a characteristic and somewhat noted Highland family. Her great grandfather was Donald Roy of Nigg, a man whom tradition has invested with a somewhat fabulous character, as a seer and prophet, but who, from being a wild and reckless youth and the best broadsword-man in the district, became, after a season of fiery trial, a man of austere and simple piety,—a legacy which descended in his family for successive generations. Old Donald once appeared before his Presbytery, as they were about to settle, in obedience to the “powers that be,” in an empty church, an obnoxious presentee upon the absent people, and told them with such solemn emphasis, that they stopt short appalled in their work, that “if they settled a man to the *walls* of that kirk, the blood of the parish of Nigg would be required at their hands,”—an incident which Dr. Hetherington and Dr. Merle D’Aubigne both record. From this side of the house did Hugh Miller derive, if the law of descent can be trusted here, his earnest religious spirit, and his zeal in the defense of the Church of his fathers.

In the sketch which he has given us of his ancestry, in his autobiographical volume, there is much that is truly picturesque, and, making all reasonable allowance for the partiality of affection, one cannot help feeling that here was a good vigorous stock from which one day or other something more than ordinary might be expected. And in the picture he gives us of his two maternal uncles, James and Alexander (or Sandy) Wright, under whose more especial influence and guidance his youth was spent, we recognize men of no common stamp. We are not disposed to undervalue these antecedents in the history of a remarkable man. Though neither genius nor dullness are always hereditary, yet there are laws of mental as well as physical transmission which cannot wholly be ignored. And to the budding genius there is a quickening inspiration in memory of an ancestry of nature’s noblemen. One of young Miller’s first efforts in verse was an affectionate tribute to the memory of his father, from which we quote a single stanza:

"Who guides that vessel's wanderings o'er the wave?

A patient, hardy man of thoughtful brow;

Serene and warm of heart and wisely brave,

And sagely skilled when burly breezes blow,

To press through angry waves the adventurous prow.

Age hath not quelled his strength, nor quenched desire

Of generous deed, nor chilled his bosom's glow;

Yet to a better world his hopes aspire.

Ah! this must sure be thee! All hail my honored sire!"

Of this autobiographical volume, the title of which stands at the head of this article, we may here say briefly, that it is one of the most charming books of the kind in the whole round of English literature. As there have been few Hugh Millers whose biographies were to be written, so there are few biographies like his. Written in his fifty second year, from data jotted down at an earlier period, it is an account of his whole life anterior to the period when public reputation evoked him from obscurity,—closing with his thirty-eighth year when he arrived in Edinburgh as editor of the *Witness*. It is written with all his peculiar skill of composition,—vividness of imagery, picturesqueness of description, accuracy of detail, suggestiveness of thought,—as well as healthiness of tone; and embodies an unusual amount of incident and anecdote. To the general reader it will perhaps be a little tedious in its scientific details, but this is no fault in the book itself, but was inseparable from the history of the man whose life it gives us. It is, moreover, written with a distinctive purpose. It is not primarily a history of his life, but a history of his education. It was designed more particularly for the workingmen of Scotland, that by the teaching of his example they might learn what it was possible for industry and perseverance to accomplish in the face of apparently untoward circumstances. Consequently it embodies not a few reflections upon the general subject of education, and educational institutions intended especially for the working classes; and in these reflections he generally stands upon independent and original ground. Of course a man for whom the ordinary schools did little or nothing cannot be expected to bestow upon them a great

amount of eulogy ; and on the other hand, it is not to be expected that the popular mind generally will be very successful in learning in his schools.

Like all other children of the intelligent laboring classes of Scotland, to which his kindred belonged, young Hugh was early sent to school, first to a dame's school, and thence transferred to the grammar school of the parish. But in the ordinary methods of study he made most discouraging progress. He was regarded as in many respects an incorrigible dunce, but wondrously given to story-telling and tricks. In the dame's school, however, he managed to reach "that grand acquirement of his life,—the art of holding converse with books ;"—in the slow acquirement of which art he toiled on wearisomely, in utter ignorance of whither it tended, until suddenly his mind awoke to the comprehension of the story of Joseph, and he made thus the astonishing discovery that the art of reading was the art of finding stories in books ! From that happy day his trouble in learning to read was over, and he soon became an insatiable and omnivorous reader, devouring all kinds and qualities of books which he could get hold of, from Jack the Giant Killer, to Pope's *Odyssey*, and *Iliad*, and the British Essayists from Addison to Mackenzie. In the interval of school hours and terms he was delving along the sea shore, roaming the hills, scaling the crags, exploring the caves of the Cromarty Frith, drinking in delight from every scene of beauty which opened itself to his eye among the hills, and continually bringing home curious specimens, mineralogical, botanical, and conchological, much to the astonishment and delight of uncles James and Sandy. He was rapidly pursuing his studies in the school of surrounding locality and circumstance, with small aid from the village pedagogue, and laying deep and broad the foundation of those habits and acquirements which have since given him his place among celebrated Scotchmen. His amusements were not like those of other boys. He kept away from cock-fights and all cruel and vulgar sports. If he read a description of an ancient tower or castle, he set about con-

structing a miniature one like it. If he read of a siege, he immediately built and fortified a miniature city, and then sacked it, and blew it up, or took it by storm. If he read of a vessel different in construction from any that came into the port of Cromarty, he made one to answer the description. His battles, however, were not all imaginary. As years and strength increased the blood of the buccaneers began to show itself. Though not a vicious boy he was no believer in non-resistance, and he got into sundry quarrels and scrapes, ending, with the end of his school-boy days, in an attempt to flog the schoolmaster, for an unjust attempt at punishment, in which he was unsuccessful and got severely flogged himself—to revenge which he wrote a pasquinade in verse upon the pedagogue.

Having thus severed his connection with the ordinary methods of education in his native town, the grave question of a future career presented itself before him, and his friends. To the eye of a superior intelligence discerning in the sailor's son by far the most gifted boy in Cromarty, the decision of this question would have been regarded with anxious solicitude. But the sequel proved that for the accomplishment of ultimate results, in a life career, human sagacity is often at fault in estimating the initial stages. The lad had made two or three visits to his kindred in the Highlands, and having found there a cousin George, whose calling was that of a stone-mason, and who had considerable taste for literature and the natural sciences, which he found abundant opportunity to indulge during the long winters when his hammers and chisels must necessarily be laid aside, he became greatly enamored of the trade of a mason. It would take him constantly among the wildest and most romantic scenery of his native isle, it would perpetually supply him with rocks and minerals, it would give him large leisure for general reading. He would be a mason. Uncles James and Sandy were sorely disappointed. They had anticipated for him a college life, towards which they freely offered their scanty means. But he demurred. For law or medicine he had no taste or fitness, for the min-

istry he had no *call*. They yielded;—"better be a poor mason," said the great-grand sons of Donald Roy, "better be anything honest, than an *uncalled* minister." He got himself a suit of strong moleskin clothes, and a pair of heavy hob-nailed shoes, and in his eighteenth year, commenced work, as an apprentice to the husband of a maternal aunt, in the Cromarty quarries.

Has the world any regrets to sigh forth over genius and power thus consigned to obscurity? Is not Pegasus hopelessly harnessed to the plow? Ah no! We regard the fifteen years of Hugh Miller's mason life as the sublimest of his earthly career. Nor did he himself, when raised to a higher social position, look back upon them with aught but manly pride. "Noble, upright, self-relying Toil!" we find him saying. "Who that knows thy solid worth and value, would be ashamed of thy hard hands, and thy soiled vestments, and thy obscure tasks,—thy humble cottage, and hard couch, and homely fare! Save for thee and thy lessons, man in society would every where sink into a sad compound of the fiend and the wild beast; and this fallen world be as certainly a moral as a natural wilderness." In entering this hard, but instructive school, Hugh Miller still kept before him the fondly cherished dream of a higher vocation. He "dared to believe that literature, and, mayhap, natural science, were, after all, his proper vocations, and he resolved that much of his leisure time should be given to careful observation, and the study of the best English authors." "Labor shall not wield over me," said he to himself, "a rod entirely black, but a rod like one of Jacob's peeled wands, chequered white and black alternately."

But let no one affect to suppose that Hugh Miller's mason life was that merely of a scientific amateur who consented to companion for a while with untaught and vulgar men, and to work a little now and then, that he might have opportunities for making scientific observations, and collecting scientific facts. It was to him, for the time being, a most serious reality. During his apprenticeship he

often lay down at night with wandering pains in his joints, and peeled and blistered hands, from too hard work for his immature frame. And during his journeyman life, which had for him all the seriousness of the only source of his daily bread, he worked under all the hard conditions peculiar to the life of the mason in the north of Scotland, housing in barracks and bothys with large squads of workmen, taking his turn in cooking porridge and baking oat-meal, working in ditches and dykes until the blood oozed through every finger end, and feeling all the burning indignation which glows in the breast of the honest laborer when he finds himself slighted and looked down upon by those self-constituted aristocrats, who, with far less brain, happen to be covered with the accident of a better coat. And yet nobly, patiently, contentedly, and with stalwart arm did he work, always giving his employer "the cast of the baulk," i. e., more than just measure, and never wanting an honest shilling in his pocket.

It is obvious, however, that between him and his fellow-workmen there existed very little sympathy of feeling. There were in every "squad," one or two congenial spirits, with whom there could be mutual appreciation, and he succeeded in meeting quite a number of these in the ranks of the laboring classes, but with the majority of his companions in labor he seems to have had but little intercourse, and to have been regarded by them with undisguised dislike. He seems to have been to most of them a puzzle; to have stood apart a silent, thinking man, always reading strange books, when they were carousing, and picking up queer things among the stones, which they thought of no manner of use, and yet quite too broad of chest, and too determined of aspect to be made safely the butt of ridicule. But yet the pictures of real friendship, and hearty affection which sprung up between him and those of his fellows with whom such things *were* possible, and the sketches of remarkable characters whom he met among laboring men, are among the most delightful features of the volume from which these details are drawn.

We observe in this mason-life one of the obvious peculiarities of his mind. He was always a dull scholar at first. So long as he worked from the outside, as it were, of any art or science, endeavoring to master its details separately, he got on badly enough, but so soon as he reached and apprehended its fundamental ideas, and worked outward, as it were, from its centre, he made astonishing progress. Two or three months of his apprenticeship were spent in awkwardly attempting to imitate the movements of his instructor, much to the trying of "Uncle David's" patience, when suddenly he caught up the knack, and one morning astonished the said "Uncle David," by setting himself to compete with him, and by hewing nearly two feet of pavement to his one,—after which his aunt was duly told that her "stupid nephew" was to turn out "a grand workman after all." The same general process was repeated whenever he had to learn any new feature of his art, or to attempt any kind of work, mouldings or tracery, to which he was before unaccustomed. But he succeeded in becoming a workman of more than ordinary skill, and when introduced to a new "squad," he always found himself, after the first few weeks, entrusted with the higher and finer kinds of work.

But it is to the side views given us of his engagements and pursuits during this laborious life, that the chief interest attaches. He assiduously kept up his habits of observation and reading. Wherever his work called him he was careful to note accurately the geological features of the district, and to collect and bear home all the new specimens of fossils he could find; and his busy mind, all alone among the hills, ignorant that any human being had done so before, adds speculation to speculation upon the wondrous possibilities, probabilities and certainties, which these things suggest, running away back through the Pre-Adamite ages. And he never fails to pick up in his way curious and valuable books, and manages to read them in circumstances in which one should think no mortal man could have kept heart in the pursuit of knowledge. Take

a brief specimen of the "pursuit of knowledge under difficulties." "Candle light is a luxury in which no one ever thinks of indulging in a barrack: and in a barrack such as ours at this time, riddled with gaps and breaches, and filled with all manner of cold draughts, it was not every night in which a candle would have burnt. And as our fuel, which consisted of sorely decayed wood—the roofing of a dilapidated outhouse, which we were pulling down—formed but a dull fire, it was with difficulty I could read by its light. By spreading out my book, however, within a foot or so of the embers, I was enabled, though sometimes at the expense of a headache, to prosecute a new tract of reading which had just opened to me."

Year after year did he carry on this pursuit of literature and science amidst this life of toil, to such purpose, that at length his wonderful acquirements dragged him forth from his obscurity. And when he came to Edinburgh and began the publication of his Geological observations, it was found that the Cromarty stone-mason could teach Agassiz and Buckland much they never knew before, and in the field of general literature could vanquish the most cultivated savans of the modern Athens. We know nothing more curious and interesting in the whole range of biography than the process of the development of the mind of this man, by the unaided force of its own spontaneity, as modestly detailed by his own pen. He is besides a great antiquary and enthusiastic patriot. Wherever he goes he visits old castles, and ruins, and battle-fields, and graveyards, and collects legends as zealously as he does fossils,—stores up in his wonderful memory tales of ancient valor, and traditions of ancient glory, heard from the lips of old men who had been in the bloody field of Culloden, or grandames to whom they had been sung in the cradle in the wild strains and speech of the Gael. A collection of these legends he gave to the world as one of his first public literary efforts, in the volume which is named second at the head of this article.

And the side views which he gives us of the Scottish

common people, and the portraits of remarkable characters which he met, are exceedingly interesting. Amongst his east coast fishermen, and sailors, Highland farmers, north country masons, south country masons, and Lothian colliers, we cannot but feel at least that we are among a remarkable people. And with his gipsy outlaws, and maniacs, and eccentrics, we have before us, drawn to the life, some strange specimens of Scottish and other humanity. And his *individuals* are admirable portraits. There is old John Fraser, shrewd and sarcastic, with the most thoroughly mathematical head he ever knew, a prince of the mallet, who could do with ease the work of three ordinary men; there is Charles, the hero of the south-country squad, a noble nature wrecked into a blackguard; there is William Ross, his bosom friend, a pale, sickly painter, but a born child of genius; there is "the immortal Peter McCraw," the tax-gatherer of Leith; there is the nervous, unhappy, gray-haired mason's laborer, between whom and the earldom of Crawford intervened only the absence of a needed marriage certificate, and to whom the workmen would call from the walls twenty times a day, "John, Yearl O'Crawford bring us anither hod o lime;" and there is "Uncle David" so insensible to danger that when his overloaded boat was sinking in the waves of the Frith, himself submerged to the throat, called out, "Od, Andro, man, just rax out your han' an tak in my snuff-box." And this by no means completes the list. We cannot refrain from appropriating his bird's eye view of a brother of John Fraser.

"David Fraser I never saw; but as a hewer he was said considerably to excel even his brother John. On hearing that it had been remarked among a party of Edinburgh masons, that, though regarded as the first of Glasgow stone-cutters, he would find in the eastern capital at least his equals, he attired himself most uncouthly in a long-tailed coat of tartan, and, looking to the life the untamed, untaught, conceited little Celt, he presentrd himself on Monday morning, armed with a letter of introduction from a Glasgow builder, before the foreman of an Edinburgh squad of ma-

sons engaged upon one of the finer buildings at that time in the course of erection. The letter specified neither his qualifications nor his name: it had been written merely to secure for him the necessary employment, and the necessary employment it did secure. The better workmen of the party were engaged, on his arrival, in hewing columns, each of which was deemed sufficient work for a week; and David was asked, somewhat incredulously, by the foreman, "if he could hew?" "O yes, *he thought* he could hew." "Could he hew such columns as these?" "O yes, *he thought* he could hew columns such as these." A mass of stone, in which a possible column lay hid, was accordingly placed before David, not under cover of the shed, which was already occupied by workmen, but, agreeably to David's own request, directly in front of it, where he might be seen by all, and where he straightway commenced a most extraordinary course of antics. Buttoning his long tartan coat fast around him, he would first look along the stone from the one end, anon from the other, and then examine it in front and rear; or, quitting it altogether for the time, he would take up his stand beside the other workmen, and, after looking at them with great attention, return and give it a few taps with the mallet, in a style evidently imitative of theirs, but monstrously a caricature. The shed all that day resounded with roars of laughter; and the only thoroughly grave man on the ground was he who occasioned the mirth of all the others. Next morning David again buttoned his coat; but he got on much better this day than the former: he was less awkward and less idle, though not less observant than before; and he succeeded ere evening in tracing, in workman-like fashion, a few draughts along the future column. He was evidently greatly improving. On the morning of Wednesday he threw off his coat; and it was seen that, though by no means in a hurry, he was seriously at work. There were no more jokes or laughter; and it was whispered in the evening that the strange Highlander had made astonishing progress during the day. By the middle of Thursday he had made up for his two days'

trifling, and was abreast of the other workmen; before night he was far ahead of them; and ere the evening of Friday, when they had still a full day's work on each of their columns, David's was completed in a style that defied criticism; and, his tartan coat again buttoned around him, he sat resting himself beside it. The foreman went out, and greeted him. "Well," he said, "you have beaten us all: you certainly *can* hew!" "Yes," said David; "I *thought* I could hew columns. Did the other men take much more than a week to learn?" "Come, come, *David Fraser*," replied the foreman; "we all guess who you are: you have had your joke out; and now, I suppose, we must give you your week's wages, and let you away." "Yes," said David; "work waits for me in Glasgow; but I just thought it might be well to know how you hewed on this east side of the country." "

After working six or eight years as an ordinary stone hewer, working mostly in dusty sheds, and inhaling the small particles driven off by his chisel, Hugh Miller began to feel the approaches of that disease, affection of the lungs, which he tells us cuts short the average life of the Scottish stone hewer to about forty five years. He prudently suspended labor and returned to Cromarty to recruit. After a season of rest his vigorous constitution threw off the disease, but meantime during his convalescence, he gradually fell into a change of employment. Deeming it more remunerative and less prejudicial to health, he applied himself to the work of furnishing and lettering gravé stones, and the making of such fancy articles as stone dial plates, in which he speedily found sufficient occupation. Soon after this change of employment, which was less fatiguing and afforded more leisure, he made his first advances upon the notice of the public as a literary man. He commenced by publishing letters and verses in the local journals, which did not fail to attract the notice of discerning eyes; and shortly afterwards ventured upon a small volume of poems, sent forth as "written in the leisure hours of a Journeyman Mason." This at once drew all eyes upon him. It

was criticised in all directions, by the public prints, and in all manners, but, with few exceptions, consigned by the critics to oblivion as devoid of merit. One of the most notable of these exceptions was a critique by Dr. James Browne, of Edinburgh, Editor of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which avowed that "the pieces contained in the humble volume bore the stamp of no ordinary genius, and were bespangled with the gems of genuine poetry." It is very true Hugh Miller will never be known to the world as a poet; but in proof that he had true poetic genius, we may cite one of his pieces, addressed to his little sister when apprehending a fatal termination to his disease, and which, had it appeared in the pages of Burns, would have been thought equal to his best.

TO JEANIE.

Sister Jeanie, haste, we'll go
To where the white-starr'd gowans grow,
Wi' the puddock-flower o' gowden hue,
The snaw-drap white and the bonny vi'let blue.

Sister Jeanie, haste, we'll go
To where the blossom'd lilacs grow,—
To where the pine-tree, dark an' high,
Is pointing its tap at the cludless sky.

Jeanie, mony a merry lay
Is sung in the young-leav'd woods to-day;
Flits on light wing the dragon-flee,
An' hums on the flowrie the big red-bee.

Down the burnie wirks its way
Aneath the bending birken spray,
An' whimples roun' the green moss stane,
An' mourns, I kenna why, wi' a ceaseless mane.

Jeanie, come : thy days o' play
Wi' autumn tide shall pass away;
Sune shall these scenes, in darkness cast,
Be ravaged wild by the wild winter blast.

Though to thee a spring shall rise,
An' scenes as fair salute thine eyes;
An' though, through many a cludless day,
My winsome Jean shall be heartsome and gay

He wha grasps thy little hand
 Nae langer at thy side shall stand,
 Nor o'er the flower-besprinkled brae
 Lead thee the low'est an' the bonniest way.

Dost thou see yon yard sae green,
 Spreckl'd wi' mony a mossy stane?
 A few short weeks o' pain shall fly,
 An' asleep in that bed shall thy pair brither lie.

Then thy mither's tears awhile
 May chide thy joy an' damp thy smile;
 But sune ilk grief shall wear awa',
 And I'll be forgotten by ane an' by a'.

Dimna think the thought is sad;
 Life vex'd me aft, but this mak's glad;
 Whan could my heart, and clos'd my ee',
 Bonny shall the dreams o' my slumbers be.

It was indeed as a poet, prior to the publication of his volume, that he first attracted public attention in his native place. As such the ladies and literati of Cromarty began to lionize him. Hour by hour would they,—amongst them his pastor the Rev. Alexander Stewart, whom he pronounces to have been, with the exception of Chalmers, the sublimest of Scottish preachers—come and sit beside him in the church yard whilst engaged in his humble occupation of lettering grave stones. By and by men of eminence from abroad, when visiting Cromarty, began to inquire for the stone mason, and rarely failed to manifest a special interest in him. Then invitations came dropping in upon him from noble ladies requesting his presence at their mansions, and on two or three occasions, after declining similar invitations not a few, he ventured to accept for a week this generous hospitality, and on each occasion felt compelled by his manhood to decline the acceptance of a purse which was pressed upon him. He preferred to retain the noble consciousness of never having spent a shilling for which he had not labored. Nor did these flattering attentions of the great at all disturb his equanimity in his humble employment. Unlike Burns, he was not spoiled by the hospitalities which, whilst given in genuine kindness, ought not to be relied on as a sole support. "There is no more

fatal error," he concluded, "into which a working man of literary turn can fall, than the mistake of deeming himself too good for his humble employments; and yet it is a mistake as common as it is fatal. I had already seen several poor wrecked mechanics, who, believing themselves to be poets, and regarding the manual occupation by which alone they could live in independence, as beneath them, had become in consequence little better than medicants; too good to work for their bread, but not too good virtually to beg it; and looking upon them as beacons of warning, I determined that, by God's help, I should give their error a wide offing, and never associate the idea of meanness with an honest calling, or deem myself too good to be independent." And so after appropriately expressing his sense of obligation to Miss Dunbar of Boath, and turning his steps from her stately mansion, he buckled on his mason's apron and sat down to commemorate, in suitable inscriptions, the virtues of the good deceased people of Cromarty. At this period also he steadily declined all entreaties to change his occupation for one more distinctively literary. Though conscious that he was accumulating a storehouse of literary attainment and scientific fact which might one day justify him in stepping upon a different platform, he was not in haste to draw upon that growing fund. "And so I determined that, instead of casting myself on an exhausting literary occupation, in which I would have to draw incessantly on the stock of fact and reflection, which I had already accumulated, I should continue for at least several years more to purchase independence by my labors as a mason, and employ my leisure hours in adding to my fund, gleaned from original observation and in walks not previously trodden,"—a resolve as admirable as it is unusual in the circumstances.

Now a bachelor, turned of thirty, and heretofore stiffly obdurate to all the charms of the gentler sex, he at length becomes inveigled in a prospective matrimonial alliance with a young lady of intelligence and refinement, and occupying a social position considerably above his own,—his

account of which inveiglement is a very handsome episode. Feeling that the rough life of a mason would be unsuitable for *her* companion in life, he casts about seriously for some congenial change, and thinks favorably of emigrating to the backwoods of America, where he supposed his stalwart arm might do good service in felling large trees and cultivating rich prairie. But this again would be unsuitable for *her*. In the midst of these cogitations he is unexpectedly, and without solicitation, offered the post of accountant in a bank, about being established at Cromarty, which he accepts, and for several years applies himself, not without result, to both the practical and theoretical in banking—still carrying on his side studies in the department of literature and natural science. Here indeed the careful reader will note the commencement of that mental overwork which ultimately wrecked his strong nature. Heretofore it had been nightly mental labor added to daily physical labor, but now it was daily mental labor, of a very exhausting kind, with nightly study superadded; and we find him complaining of fits of lassitude, and inability to relish his favorite pursuits. But his strong will, and native ardor in these pursuits, kept the powers of his nature to their utmost tension, and the world only knew the work of ruin which was stealthily progressing, when it was too late to do ought but lament over it.

Meantime his interest in ecclesiastical affairs had been gradually strengthening. He was a thorough Church of Scotland man, and as she was now engaged, under the pressure of somewhat of a revival of her old evangelical and self-asserting spirit, in that memorable struggle with the law courts upon the question of what was technically called "Intrusion," or the right of the civil power to require the settlement of a minister against the wishes of the people over whom he was placed, and being a thorough-going non-intrusion man, his anxiety became deeper and more intense as he saw decision after decision going against the Church; first that of the Court of Session, in March, 1838, and next that of the House of Lords, in May, 1839;

and saw, as he supposed, the Church of his fathers fast sinking into the hide-bound position of a State-ruled ecclesiasticism. The Highland blood of Donald Roy was all alive within him, and "for at least one night," he tells us, "after reading the speech of Lord Brougham, and the decision of the House of Lords in the Auchterarder case, I slept none." Tossing wakefully throughout that long night he formed the determination to write, and rough-sketched the plan of, a letter to Lord Brougham, setting forth the grievances which he and his fellow members of the Church who felt like him, were called upon to sustain under the decision to which his Lordship's speech had contributed. Next morning he set to work; and snatching every hour he could save from his banking occupations, he was able in about a week to dispatch to a friend in Edinburgh the manuscript copy of his pamphlet. His friend showed it to his pastor, Dr. Candlish, who, with others, not only decided upon its immediate publication, but discovered in its author a remarkable man who might do signal service, in another sphere, to the non-intrusion cause. Here is the man, said they, for the editorship of our new organ, the *Edinburgh Witness*! A letter was dispatched post haste to Cromarty requesting the writer to lose no time in coming to Edinburgh. There, without much loss of time he appeared, and in solemn conclave of the Non-Intrusionist leaders he was duly installed in his new chair,—and to the general manner in which he discharged its duties, we have previously referred.

His "Letter to Lord Brougham" created quite a sensation. It ran through four successive editions of a thousand copies each. It was hailed with delight by the most intelligent portion of the Scottish people. It was regarded by Lord Melbourne and others as the production under a *nomme de guerre* of one of the Non-Intrusion leaders of Edinburgh. It was praised by Daniel O'Connell, though not sympathizing with its ecclesiastical views, for its "racy English," and it was averred by Mr. Gladstone to show a mastery of pure, elegant and masterly English, such as even a trained

Oxford scholar might have envied. As soon as its authorship was known Hugh Miller's reputation was made, in the new sphere in which he was placed, and in that sphere he never allowed that reputation to sink.

In addition to his editorial and scientific labors, he found time to write a considerable volume, the result of a vacation tour, entitled "*First Impressions of England and its People*," which we may readily believe, as we are told, contains not a few characteristic, original and humorous observations upon the habits, traits and doings of the denizens of the southern section of the British isle. He has also more recently published a critique upon Macaulay's depreciative view of the Scottish Highlands and of Scottish Presbyterianism. This critique we have not seen, but without pronouncing upon the merits of the case, we may say that such critical work could have found no more competent hand.

Little is said directly in the volume before us on the religious history of its author,—almost nothing on his experience in the sphere of religious feeling. On this subject he seems to have much of the Scotch reserve. His religious character seems to have been a gradual growth, an organic development of seed very early sown, and passing over by almost imperceptible stages to full consciousness. He seems to have been ruled at all times by a high-toned conscientiousness, which carried him above all the grosser temptations to vice; and he possessed a strong hereditary attachment to the Church of his fathers, which always led him to take sides with religious people when assailed by the scoffing or the vicious. From the point when his religious impressions began to assume a more positive form, we quote his own words:

"And yet my religion was a strangely incongruous thing. It took the form, in my mind, of a mass of indigested theology, with here and there a prominent point developed out of due proportion, from the circumstance that I had thought upon it for myself; and while entangled, if I may so speak, amid the recesses and under cover of the general

chaotic mass, there harbored no inconsiderable amount of superstition, there rested over it the clouds of a dreary scepticism. I have sometimes, in looking back on the doubts and questionings of this period, thought, and perhaps even spoken, of myself as an infidel. But an infidel I assuredly was not: my belief was at least as real as my incredulity, and had, I am inclined to think, a much deeper seat in my mind. But wavering between the two extremes, —now a believer, and anon a sceptic,—the belief usually exhibiting itself as a strongly-based instinct,—the scepticism as the result of some intellectual process,—I lived on for years in a sort of uneasy see-saw condition, without any middle between the two extremes, on which I could at once reason and believe.

That middle ground I now succeeded in finding. It is at once delicate and dangerous to speak of one's own spiritual condition, or of the emotional sentiments on which one's conclusions regarding it are often so doubtfully founded. Egotism in the religious form is perhaps more tolerated than in any other; but it is not on that account less perilous to the egotist himself. There need be, however, less delicacy in speaking of one's beliefs than of one's feelings; and I trust I need not hesitate to say, that I was led to see at this time, through the instrumentality of my friend, that my theologic system had previously wanted a central object, to which the heart, as certainly as the intellect, could attach itself; and that the true centre of an efficient *Christianity* is, as the name ought of itself to indicate, "the Word made flesh." Around this central sun of the Christian system,—appreciated, however, not as a *doctrine* which is a mere abstraction, but as a Divine Person,—so truly man, that the affections of the human heart can lay hold upon Him, and so truly God, that the mind, through faith, can at all times and in all places be brought into direct contact with Him,—all that is truly religious takes its place in a subsidiary and subordinate relation. I say subsidiary and subordinate. The Divine Man is the great attractive centre,—the sole gravitating point of a system which owes to

Him all its coherency, and which would be but a chaos were He away. It seems to be the existence of the human nature in this central and paramount object that imparts to Christianity, in its subjective character, its peculiar power of influencing and controlling the human mind. There may be men who, through a peculiar idiosyncrasy of constitution, are capable of loving, after a sort, a mere abstract God, unseen and inconceivable; though, as shown by the air of sickly sentimentality borne by almost all that has been said and written on the subject, the feeling, in its true form, must be a very rare and exceptional one. In all my experience of men, I never knew a genuine instance of it. The love of an abstract God seems to be as little natural to the ordinary human constitution as the love of an abstract sun or planet. And so it will be found, that in all the religions that have taken strong hold of the mind of man, the element of a vigorous humanity has mingled, in the character of its gods, with the theistic element."

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"In the false or corrupted religions, the two indispensable elements of Divinity and Humanity appear as if blended together by a mere mechanical process; and it is their natural tendency to separate, through a sort of subsidence on the part of the human element from the theistic one, as if from some lack of the necessary affinities. In Christianity, on the other hand, when existing in its integrity as the religion of the New Testament, the union of the two elements is complete: it partakes of the nature, not of a mechanical, but of a chemical mixture; and its great central doctrine,—the true Humanity and true Divinity of the Adorable Saviour,—is a truth equally receivable by at once the humblest and the loftiest intellects. Poor dying children possessed of but a few simple ideas, and men of the most robust intellects, such as the Chalmerses, Fosters, and Halls of the Christian Church, find themselves equally able to rest their salvation on the *man* "Christ, who is over all, God blessed forever." Of this fundamental truth of the two natures, that condensed enunciation of the gospel

which forms the watchword of our faith, "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved," is a direct and palpable embodiment; and Christianity is but a mere name without it."

In the close of his volume we have a delightful bird's-eye view of Chalmers. While yet in the bank at Cromarty, Chalmers visited the place, and the modest accountant was nearly taken off his seat by hearing the great preacher rehearse an incident from one of the accountant's own fugitive publications, and which his "*deep mouth*" clothed with a tenfold interest and eloquence. He adds:

"I had been introduced to the Doctor in Edinburgh a few weeks before; but on this occasion I saw rather more of him. He examined with curious interest my collection of geological specimens, which already contained not a few valuable fossils that could be seen nowhere else; and I had the pleasure of spending the greater part of a day in visiting in his company, by boat, some of the more striking scenes of the Cromarty Sutors. I had long looked up to Chalmers as, on the whole, the man of largest mind which the Church of Scotland had ever produced; not more intense or practical than Knox, but broader of faculty; nor yet fitted by nature or accomplishment to make himself a more enduring name in literature than Robertson, but greatly nobler in sentiment, and of a larger grasp of general intellect. With any of our other Scottish ministers it might be invidious to compare him; seeing that some of the ablest of them are, like Henderson, little more than mere historic portraits drawn by their contemporaries, but whose true intellectual measure cannot, from the lack of the necessary materials on which to form a judgment, be now taken anew; and that many of the others employed fine faculties in work, literary and ministerial, which, though important in its consequences, was scarce less ephemeral in its character than even the labors of the newspaper editor. The mind of Chalmers was emphatically a many-sided one. Few men ever came into friendly contact with him, who did not find in it, if they had really any-

thing good in them, moral or intellectual, a side that suited themselves ; and I had been long struck by that union which his intellect exhibited of a comprehensive philosophy with a true poetic faculty, very exquisite in quality, though dissociated from what Wordsworth terms the "accomplishment of verse." I had not a little pleasure in contemplating him on this occasion as the *poet* Chalmers. The day was calm and clear ; but there was a considerable swell rolling in from the German Ocean, on which our little vessel rose and fell, and which sent the surf high against the rocks. The sunshine played amid the broken crags atop, and amid the foliage of an overhanging wood ; or caught, half-way down, some projecting tuft of ivy ; but the faces of the steeper precipices were brown in the shade ; and where the waves roared in deep caves beneath, all was dark and chill. There were several members of the party who attempted engaging the Doctor in conversation ; but he was in no conversational mood. It would seem as if the words addressed to his ear failed at first to catch his attention, and that, with a painful courtesy, he had to gather up their meaning from the remaining echoes, and to reply to them doubtfully and monosyllabically, at the least expense of mind. His face wore, meanwhile, an air of dreamy enjoyment. He was busy, evidently, among the crags and bosky hollows, and would have enjoyed himself more had he been alone. In the middle of one noble precipice, that reared its tall pine-crested brow more than a hundred yards overhead, there was a bush-covered shelf of considerable size, but wholly inaccessible ; for the rock dropped sheer into it from above, and then sank perpendicularly from its outer edge to the beach below ; and the insulated shelf, in its green unapproachable solitude, had evidently caught his eye. *It was the scene*, I said,—taking the direction of his eye as the antecedent for the *it*,—it was the scene, says tradition, of a sad tragedy during the times of the persecution of Charles. A renegade chaplain, rather weak than wicked, threw himself, in a state of wild despair, over the precipice above ; and his body, intercepted in its fall by that

shelf, lay buried among the bushes for years after, until it had bleached into a dry and whitened skeleton. Even as late as the last age, the shelf continued to retain the name of the "Chaplain's Lair." I found that my communication, chiming in with his train of cogitation at the time, caught both his ear and mind; and his reply, though brief, was expressive of the gratification which its snatch of incident had conveyed. As our skiff sped on a few oar-lengths more, we disturbed a flock of sea-gulls, that had been sporting in the sunshine over a shoal of sillocks; and a few of them winged their way to a jutting crag that rose immediately beside the shelf. I saw Chalmers' eye gleam as it followed them. "Would you not like, Sir," he said, addressing himself to my minister, who sat beside him,— "Would you not like to be a sea-gull? I think I would. Sea-gulls are free of the three elements,—earth, air, and water. These birds were sailing but half a minute since without boat, at once angling and dining, and now they are already rustivating in the Chaplain's Lair. I think I could enjoy being a sea-gull." I saw the Doctor once afterwards in a similar mood. When on a visit to him in Burntisland, in the following year, I marked, on approaching the shore by boat, a solitary figure stationed on the sward-crested trap-rock which juts into the sea immediately below the town; and after the time spent in landing and walking round to the spot, there was the solitary figure still, standing motionless as when first seen. It was Chalmers,—the same expression of dreamy enjoyment impressed on his features as I had witnessed in the little skiff, and with his eyes turned on the sea and the opposite land. It was a lovely morning. A faint breeze had just begun to wrinkle in detached belts and patches the mirror-like blackness of the previous calm, in which the broad Frith had lain sleeping since day-break; and the sunlight danced on the new-raised wavelets; while a thin long wreath of blue mist, which seemed coiling its tail like a snake round the distant Inchkeith, was slowly raising the folds of its dragon-like neck and head from off the Scottish capital, dim in

the distance, and unveiling fortalice, and tower, and spire, and the noble curtain of blue hills behind. And there was Chalmers, evidently enjoying the exquisiteness of the scene, as only by the true poet scenery can be enjoyed. Those striking metaphors which so abound in his writings, and which so often, without apparent effort, lay the material world before the reader, show how thoroughly he must have drunk in the beauties of nature; the images retained in his mind became, like words to the ordinary man, the signs by which he thought, and, as such, formed an important element in the power of his thinking. I have seen his *Astronomical Discourses* disparagingly dealt with by a slim and meagre critic, as if they had been but the chapters of a mere treatise on astronomy,—a thing which, of course, any ordinary man could write,—mayhap even the critic himself. The *Astronomical Discourses*, on the other hand, no one could have written save Chalmers. Nominally a series of sermons, they in reality represent, and in the present century form perhaps the only worthy representatives of, that school of philosophic poetry to which, in ancient literature, the work of Lucretius belonged, and of which, in the literature of our own country, the “Seasons” of Thomson, and Akenside’s “Pleasures of the Imagination,” furnish adequate examples. He would, I suspect, be no discriminating critic who would deal with the “Seasons” as if they formed merely the journal of a naturalist, or by the poem of Akenside as if it were simply a metaphysical treatise.”

When this article was commenced it was expected that the last work upon which Hugh Miller was engaged and which he had just completed before his death,—the “*Testimony of the Rocks*”—would have issued from the press in this country before the article must necessarily be closed; and in that case we expected to detail more minutely the results of his scientific labors, and especially to define his position upon the theological bearings of Geology, to which we deemed this last work indispensable, it being understood that it is particularly devoted to the consideration

of these tendencies of the science. This work, however, has not appeared at the present writing. Hence we have avoided anything more than mere references to his scientific labors, and have not placed any of his geological works at the head of this paper, hoping to resume the consideration of these at a future time. Here we have merely attempted an outline sketch of Hugh Miller as an original and remarkable *man*,—an object which, be he poet, painter, preacher, geologist, plowman, king, or what not, is always worthy of thoughtful study.

J. C.

Chambersburg, Pa.

ART. VII.—THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE AT BERLIN.

It is generally known that the King of Prussia has extended a special invitation to the British branch of the Evangelical Alliance, first by letter, and then through one of his chaplains, the Rev. Dr. Krummacher, who visited Scotland for the purpose in the summer of 1856, to hold their next general meeting at Berlin. We have now just been informed by the Secretary of the Committee of Arrangements in that city, and have been requested to make known in America, that the next meeting of the Alliance, the first ever held on German soil, will commence on the 10th of September of the current year and be continued for six successive days, and that all the friends of the unity and general interests of Evangelical Protestantism are heartily invited to attend.

The programme, as far as it has been settled, is this: On the evening preceding the first session, a prayer meeting

will be held in the German, French, and English languages.

The opening sermon will be preached by the Rev. Dr. F. W. Krummacker, the well known author of *Elijah the Tishbite* and other popular works.

The first three days will be devoted to the exchange of greetings and the discussion of the following appropriate and interesting topics :

1. Unity and difference among the children of God. Introduced by Dr. Liebner, President of the Superior Consistory and Court preacher at Dresden, and the Rev. Mr. Wünsche, Moravian minister at Berlin.

2. The causes and remedies of the comparative want of spiritual life in the congregations. Speakers: Dr. Hundeshagen of Heidelberg, and Professor Krafft of Bonn.

3. The general priesthood of believers. Speakers: Dr. Nitzsch of Berlin, Dr. Mallet of Bremen, and Rev. Mr. König of Mayence.

4. The duty of evangelical Christians in view of the aggressive operations of modern Romanism. Speakers: Dr. Schenkel of Heidelberg, and Prof. Heppe of Marburg.

The fourth day is to be occupied by reading and discussing reports on the state and wants of the missionary work among Heathens and Jews in all parts of the world.

The two remaining days are reserved for reports of eye witnesses selected by the Central Committee, on the religious and ecclesiastical condition of the various countries of Christendom, especially of Germany, France, Holland, England and America.

The meeting will close with the celebration of the holy communion by all the members and friends of the Alliance in the different languages there represented. Dr. Gobat, the present incumbent of the Anglo-Prussian missionary bishopric of Jerusalem, (a Swiss by birth) has already consented to administer on the occasion, if circumstances will at all permit him to leave the Holy Land at the time. During the meeting the principal pulpits of Berlin will be occupied by distinguished foreign speakers of different languages.

This extract of the programme, as well as many other indications, justify the expectation that the approaching meeting of the Evangelical Alliance of Berlin will be the most important and interesting which has been held since its organization in 1845. It is to be hoped, that American Christianity may be well represented on this free general conference of Evangelical Protestantism and make a salutary impression upon the land of the Reformation.

March 11, 1857.

P. S.

VIII.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

GERMAN THEOLOGY AND LITERATURE.

GERMANY: its Universities, Theology, and Religion. With Sketches of Neander, Tholuck, Olshausen, Hengstenberg, Twisten, Nitzsch, Müller, Ullmann, Rothe, Dorner, Lange, Ebrard, Hundeshagen, Wichern, and other distinguished German Divines of the Age. By Philip Schaff, D. D. Philadelphia. Lindsay & Blakiston. 1857. pp. 418. \$1.25.

A few months ago there appeared in the "New York Observer" a series of articles on German Theology, almost exclusively derived from a thoroughly rationalistic work of Schwarz, formerly of Halle, now of Gotha, where the anonymous writer held up to the horror of orthodox readers such men as Baur, Strauss, and Feuerbach, as the genuine representatives of German Theology. This is, to say the least, fully as unjust as if some American would exhibit Channing, Parker, and Emerson, as the true types of American Theology and Christianity, or our election riots and the late Kansas troubles as the only legitimate fruits of American republicanism.

But the fact, that such a paper as the one mentioned, finds it necessary to devote several columns to Teutonic criticism and metaphysics, shows that the subject can be no longer ignored with the silence of ignorance or contempt. Whatever be the errors and defects of the literature, and especially the theology of modern Germany, it is impossible to deny that in its original form, as well as in multiplying translations, imitations, and

more independent works, it has become an irresistible power both for good and evil in Great Britain and the United States. You can hardly take up a single number of any of our leading literary Reviews without being brought into friendly or hostile contact with German works, German learning, and German ideas. It is by no means the Churches of German descent only, who are influenced from that direction, and that more now than ever before; but the leading Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, and even Baptist, and Methodist divines feel an equal, if not a greater, interest in the theological and religious movements of the land of the Reformation.

The reason of this must be found partly in the profound learning, the laborious research, the critical penetration, and the vigorous thought of the modern evangelical theology of that country; but especially also in the fact that, as to its main current, it is truly catholic in spirit and tendency, and not sectional and denominational in any bigotted sense of the term. It is not subservient to the interests of a particular party or sect, but honestly and vigorously labors to promote the knowledge of truth for truth's sake, and the general interests of Christ's kingdom. Its mission is to Protestantism at large, and hence it will affect more or less the theological thinking and writing of other Protestant Churches, until it shall be superseded by a new epoch in the onward march of the sacred science. America will no doubt produce, in due time, a classical theology of its own, as well as Holland and England did in the seventeenth, Germany in the nineteenth centuries; and from the extensive preparations now going on among various denominations, we may infer almost with certainty, that this theology will not be a continuation simply of the theology of England and Scotland, but the result of the combined action and reaction of the Anglo-Saxon and German mind as applied to the peculiar wants and condition of American Christianity and society.

With all this, we are far from denying, on the contrary we strongly assert, that Germany might learn fully as much from the practical Christianity of Great Britain and the United States, as these may be benefitted by a judicious and discriminating use of German learning and speculation. We say by a judicious and discriminating use. For we would fully subscribe to what the late Archdeacon Hare wrote in the Preface to his *Mission of the Comforter*: "That there is an enormous mass of evil, of shallow presumption, of ostentatious folly, of wild extravagance, in the German theology of the last half century, I have no disposition to deny." "Nevertheless," he continues, "they who know what has really been done in Germany since the publication of Kant's great work, must also know that in Germany the mighty intellectual war of Christendom has been

waged, and is now going on. If the host of evil has become subtler and more audacious, the army of the faith has also become much stronger; and able champions of the truth are continually raised up, who defend the truth, not by shutting their eyes to its difficulties, and hooting at its adversaries, but by calmly refuting those adversaries, and solving the difficulties, with the help of weapons derived from a higher philology and philosophy."

The growing interest which is felt in the literary institutions, the intellectual life, and especially the more recent theological and religious movements of the land of the Reformation, seems to call for a work which should place them in their proper light against both ignorant and malevolent censure, and indiscriminate praise; trace their origin, history, connections and bearings; and thus serve as a faithful and reliable guide to the American student through the luxuriant forest and intricate labyrinth of Teutonic systems and speculations.

This is the principal object of the book which will appear under the title given above, before this notice will reach the reader. It is the only one of the kind which has as yet been presented to the English and American public. For Kahn's *History of German Protestantism*, recently translated for Clark's Foreign Library, has a different object in view, and is constructed on an altogether different plan.

Whether the author of this book has done justice to his subject and met the wants of those American students who feel a more than superficial interest in it, he must leave to the public to decide. Nor would this Review be the proper organ for the discussion of the merits or demerits of a production from the pen of one of its editors. We, therefore, simply add the remark, that the book is dedicated to the "Alumni of Franklin and Marshall College, and the Theological Seminary at Mercersburg, in remembrance of twelve years of pleasant and agreeable intercourse during the most interesting period in the history of their Literary and Theological Alma Mater."

P. S.

OLSHAUSEN'S COMMENTARY.

Biblical Commentary on the New Testament by Dr. HERMANN OLSHAUSEN. Translated from the German for Clark's Foreign and Theological Library. First American edition, revised after the fourth German edition, by A. C. Kendrick, D. D. Vol. I. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co., 115 Nassau St. 1856. Vol. II. 1857.

The late Dr. Hermann Olshausen stands, together with Tholuck, Lücke, and Hengstenberg, in the very first rank among the modern reformers of exegetical theology. His Commentary on the New Testament, though interrupted by his premature death, is destined to exert, for many ages to come, a si

lent, but deep and salutary influence far beyond the limits of the German tongue. Like Neander's Church History, it has already become, we may say, a standard work in English literature, and enjoys perhaps a wider circulation in Great Britain and the United States, than in the land of its birth. The Edinburgh translation which forms a part of Clark's Foreign Theological Library, met with such general and steadily-growing favor, that an American house (Sheldon, Blakeman & Co., New York,) ventured upon a new issue under the editorial care of Dr. A. C. Kendrick, Professor of Greek in the Baptist University of Rochester. Dr. Kendrick revised the translation, embodied Ebrard's improvements from the last original edition, with occasional notes of his own where he thought it necessary to dissent from the author, enriched the first volume by adding Olshausen's valuable tract on the Genuineness of the Writings of the New Testament (translated by D. Fosdick) as an appropriate introduction to the Commentary, and intends to translate also the concluding volumes of Ebrard and Wiesinger. The first two volumes which have thus far appeared, were received with high commendation by our most respectable theological organs, and we hope that both the editor and publishers may be amply encouraged to carry the arduous undertaking to successful completion.

If I am asked by American students, what German Commentary I would recommend them most, I generally point to Olshausen, unless they should specify their wishes as to the peculiar kind of exegesis, and the books of the Bible. For while they may find more brevity and condensation in DeWette's and Meyer's Exegetical Handbooks, a fuller and more satisfactory philological and historical apparatus in Tholuck on the Sermon on the Mount, Lücke on John, Bleek on the Hebrews, Harless on the Ephesians, Stier on the Discourses of Jesus, and many other works; yet take all in all, Olshausen will best answer the wants of the general Biblical student and serve the purposes both of edification and instruction. He is unsurpassed in the rich, mellow, spiritual tone of comment, and although he is sometimes a little fanciful in tracing symbols and analogies, his very mysticism will do good, and introduce a new element into our theology which is too much under the control of logic and the cold understanding.

The peculiar merit and charm of Olshausen's work consists in what we may call organic reproduction of the ideas of the sacred writers, and in the explanation of Scripture by Scripture, viewed as a dynamic unity, or as one vitally organized structure where the various parts perform their appropriate functions and mutually sustain, interpenetrate and illustrate each other. He regarded it, as he says in the Preface, as his chief object to bring out the inward unity of the whole New Testa-

ment and of the Scriptures generally, and to introduce the reader to the unity and spirit of the sacred books. In this he has been eminently successful, more so than any modern Commentators, German or English. He has an intuitive power of seizing, as if by a sacred sympathy with the mind of the inspired writer, the true vein of his thought. His work is pervaded by a devout spirit and warm glow of a profoundly pious heart. He introduces the reader into the sanctuary of revelation, and makes him exclaim, Here is holy ground, here is the very gate of heaven.

P. S.

A PRESBYTERIAN LITURGY.

A BOOK OF PUBLIC PRAYER, compiled from the authorized Formularies of Worship of the Presbyterian Church, as prepared by the Reformers Calvin, Knox, Bucer, and others. With supplementary Forms. New York: Published by Charles Scribner, 377 and 379 Broadway. 1857. pp. 360.

Every student of Church History knows that the Christian Church from time immemorial approved and made use of forms of prayer, the principal of which was given by Christ himself; that all the Protestant Churches of the Reformation prepared liturgies for public worship, most of which are in use to this day on the Continent of Europe, and in the Anglican communion; that the *exclusive* system of extemporaneous prayer in the house of God was not heard of till the latter part of the seventeenth century, and that it is to this day confined to a comparatively small portion of Christendom, in Great Britain and the United States. And yet in spite of these facts many a Puritan and Presbyterian clergyman of this country abhors the very idea of a form of prayer as contrary to the nature of devotion and the spirit of the Gospel, and as necessarily tending to dead formalism, without reflecting that this extreme individualism implies a serious censure of all the Reformers and of the classical age of the Protestant Churches. More recently, however, a change has taken place in the minds at least of some prominent divines of various Calvinistic denominations. We cannot speak as yet of a liturgical *movement* in the Congregational or Presbyterian bodies. But we have reason to believe that there is a considerable and growing number of their ministers and laymen, who would greatly prefer at least the optional or occasional use of a good liturgy to the present exclusive system of free prayer which resolves itself, after all, at last, into an endless variety of individual liturgies, and is fully as liable to abuse as the opposite extreme. But where shall we find a collection of forms of prayer which would be likely to satisfy Presbyterian and Puritan congregations?

The above work, from the author of "Eutaxia, or the Presbyterian Liturgies" (1855), a son of the Rev. Dr. Baird, and

minister of the Old School Presbyterian Church, is intended to meet this want, where it may exist. It is gotten up by Mr. Scribner in superior style and most excellent taste. The forms of public devotion here offered are selected mostly from approved liturgies of the Reformed Churches in the sixteenth century, prepared by Martin Bucer, John Calvin, and John Knox. The author entertains no idea of seeking "for this or any other Form of Worship an adoption by ecclesiastical courts, that would impose it upon the Churches for compulsory observance." He bespeaks for them simply a "free consultation and voluntary use." We sincerely wish that they may fully subserve this purpose, and assist at the same time, in forming a liturgical taste which will go far beyond what is here offered and desired.

For, with all proper regard for these Calvinistic prayers, we must think that their tone and style is upon the whole too didactic to answer the proper idea of a liturgy, and this may be one of the reasons why they have been changed so often, or gone out of use altogether, while the "Common Prayer Book" of the Anglican Communion has maintained itself to this day and exerts its happy influence wherever the English language is spoken. The object of prayer is not to expound doctrine and to oppose error, but to pour out the desires and the gratitude of our hearts in the language of devotion, such as we find in the Psalms of David and in the liturgies of the primitive Church.

Secondly, a simply optional or discretionary liturgy will never answer the true idea of public worship. A liturgy, like the catechism, the constitution, and the hymn book, should have the sanction of ecclesiastical authority, and be the law of the Church which adopts it, so long as it is found to answer its purpose. It is in this way only that that order, dignity and unity of worship can be maintained and promoted, which is one of the chief objects in the adoption and use of a good liturgy. We do not advocate by any means the *exclusive* use of stated forms of prayer, as the high Church Episcopalians. On the contrary, we would leave ample room and liberty, not only in the private, but also in the public devotions, for the exercise of the gift of extemporaneous prayer under the fresh influences of the Holy Spirit and the inspiration of the occasion. It is perfectly practicable to unite both the objective, stationary, and the subjective, free element in every full and regular service. Why should not, for instance, the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed, the Te Deum, the Gloria in excelsis, or other sublime forms which are truly catholic in their origin and character and which convey the piety of ages, be heard every Sunday morning, in connection with a free prayer conceived in similar spirit and with special reference to the subject of the sermon.

Thirdly, every sound Liturgy must be based upon the recog-

nition of the Christian year in its essential features, and provide prayers for the leading festivals, such as Christmas, Easter and Pentecost, which commemorate annually the great deeds of God for the salvation of man. In this respect the author of the book before us seems to be altogether Puritanic in the modern sense, and falls far behind his authorities, even Knox and Calvin, not to speak of his favorite, Bucer. He never even mentions the Church year, while all Reformed Liturgies of the sixteenth century contain services for the celebration of the birth, the passion, the resurrection of the Saviour, and the outpouring of the Holy Ghost. This is the more surprising as Mr. Baird gives, at the end of the volume, all the Collects of the Episcopal Liturgy, which every body knows are mostly translated from the old Latin Collects and intended for the successive Sundays of the ecclesiastical year. Out of this connection, and separated from the corresponding Scripture lessons, they have no meaning whatever, unless we choose to call a heap of stones a building, or a mass of flesh without bones, a human body.

We might object to many other features in this volume, as the false use of the sectional and denominational term *Presbyterian*, and on the title page and in the introduction, instead of the far more appropriate, original and general appellation "Reformed;" also the heretical note to the Apostles' Creed, on page 41, which resolves Christ's descent into Hades into a mere tautological "continued in the state of the dead," in direct violation of the scriptural and historical meaning of the article.

But we would rather speak kindly of the pious and amiable author and recommend his book to the favorable notice of all those readers who feel an interest in the all important subject of public worship. It is not such a liturgy yet, by any means, as the wants of the Reformed Church seem to demand, but it is one of the helps, which are necessary to prepare the way for it, and which, in the mean time, may answer all the special objects which the author had principally in view, according to the Preface.

P. S.

THE MEMORIAL PAPERS.

MEMORIAL PAPERS. The Memorial: with circular and questions of the Episcopal Commission; report of the commission; contributions of the commissioners; and communications from Episcopal and non-Episcopal divines. With an Introduction by Rt. Rev. ALONZO POTTER, D. D., one of the Commission. Philadelphia. Butler & Co. 1857. pp. 444.

While some Presbyterian, Congregational and other non-Episcopal ministers are becoming liturgical in their tastes and tendencies, a considerable number of Episcopalians meet them half way, by an attempt to graft upon their liturgical system the

advantages of free prayer and discretionary services. The object of the Memorialists was not to give up the fixed order and worship which is the characteristic and time-honored feature of the Episcopal communion, but simply so to relax its exclusive rigor, as to allow a sufficient amount of freedom to the clergy to adapt the Church of their choice, hitherto confined to a particular class of society, to the local wants and to the great mass of a people which, like ours, is made up of all nations and tongues, and which will never bend to any system of stiff and pedantic exclusiveness. When we asked an Episcopal clergyman, after the adjournment of the last Triennial Convention, at Philadelphia, what had become of the Memorial question, he replied: "It just ended where it ought to end, in a fudge." But we are happy to find that it has been able to produce a book like the present, which is considerably more than a fudge. The Memorialists have started the most important, and eminently practical questions which ever agitated the Episcopal Church of this country, or which can claim her present attention. They have made a charitable approach to other Protestant denominations, and petitioned their bishops to appoint a standing commission on Church unity, which was granted. We cannot believe that such a movement, proceeding from some of the most able and devoted ministers of the Episcopal Church and honestly undertaken for the purpose of promoting her best interests, should be in vain, although it may not, for some time to come, lead to any tangible results. The Memorial Papers contain also communications of Presbyterian, Congregationalist, Baptist, German Reformed, and Methodist divines, who were requested to express their views on the Memorial question. We read the report of the Episcopal Commission, the contributions of Drs. Potter, Burgess, Bowman, Mühlenberg, etc., with considerable interest. Altogether we think that the Memorial Papers contain quite an important and honorable chapter of the inner history of American Episcopacy, and will command the respectful attention of other Christian denominations.

P. S.

LEE ON INSPIRATION.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE, its nature and proof. Eight Discourses, preached before the University of Dublin. By William Lee, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1857. pp. 478.

"The Word became flesh." This is true not only of the personal, but also of the written Word of God. The Bible is a strictly divine, and yet a strictly human book from beginning to end. The eternal truth of God which can never pass away, has assumed here the form and nature of human thought and

speech. As in the doctrine of Christ's person there are two extreme heresies, Gnosticism, which denies the humanity, and Ebionism, which denies the divinity of the Saviour; so there are two corresponding errors in the doctrine of the Scriptures, the hyperorthodox or magic theory, which resolves the inspiration into a miraculous dictation of the Holy Ghost, and reduces the sacred writers to blind and passive instruments, and the rationalistic error, which sees in the Bible only its human form, without perceiving the glory of the only begotten of the Father which shines through the veil of the flesh full of grace and truth. The true theory then, should avoid equally these two extremes, and endeavor to do full justice to the real divinity and the real humanity of the Bible, and thus to reconcile the plain results of science and criticism with the faith of the Church in all ages.

This seems to be the object of Mr. Lee's work, as far as we have been able to examine it. The author is a learned and pious Episcopalian, and may be classed with the same school of which Professor Trench and the late Archdeacon Hare are the most distinguished representatives. We do not like his mode of treatment in Lectures or Sermons, to which extensive notes and a large Appendix are added. It is liable to the same objections, although in a far less degree, as the method pursued by Hare in his "Mission of the Comforter." But as to the contents, the book before us is unquestionably a very elaborate and scholarly performance and abounds in patristic and modern German learning. In the preface he expresses his greatest obligations to Olshausen, Hävernicks, Sack, Beck, Rudelbach, and other German divines, who have treated the same subject either expressly, or incidentally. Of English works he notices especially Coleridge's "Confessions of an Enquiring Spirit," and Morell's "Philosophy of Religion," but seriously objects to both, and labors "to reconcile the unquestionable stamp of humanity impressed upon every page of the Bible with that undoubted belief in its perfection and infallibility, which is the Christian's most precious inheritance." The book is worthy of an extended review. We may, perhaps, return to the subject in a future number of this periodical.

P. S.